The Christian Invention of Judaism:
The Theodosian Empire and the Rabbinic Refusal of Religion

It seems highly significant that there is no word in premodern Jewish parlance that means “Judaism.” When the term Ioudaismos appears in non-Christian Jewish writing—to my knowledge only in II Maccabees—it doesn’t mean Judaism, the religion, but the entire complex of loyalties and practices that mark off the people of Israel. After that, it is used as the name of the Jewish religion only by writers who do not identify themselves with and by that name, until well into the nineteenth century. It might seem, then, that Judaism has not, until some time in modernity, existed at all, that whatever moderns might be tempted to abstract out, to disembodied from the culture of Jews and call their religion, was not ascribed particular status by Jews until very recently.

Until our present moment, it could be argued, Judaism both is and is not a “religion.” On the one hand, for many purposes it—like Hinduism—operates as a religion within multireligious societies. Jews claim for their religion a semantic, cultural status parallel to that of Christianity in the West. They study Judaism in programs of religious studies, claim religious freedom, have sections on Judaism at the American Academy of Religion—even one on comparative Judaism and Hinduism—and in general function as members of a “faith”—or system of ultimate meaning, or whatever—among other faiths. On the other hand, there are many ways that Jews continue to be uncomfortable and express their discomfort with this very definition. For both Zionists and many non-Zionist Jews (including me), versions of description or practice with respect to Judaism that treat it as a faith that can be separated from ethnicity, nationality, language, and shared history have felt false. Precisely that very position of Judaism at the American Academy of Religion has been experienced by us, sometimes, as in itself a form of ambivalently capitulating behavior (which is not, I hasten to add, altogether unpleasurable). Something about the difference between Judaism and Christianity is captured pre-
cisely by insisting on the ways that Judaism is not a religion. This ambivalence has deep historical roots.

My argument is that the cause of this ambivalence has to be disclosed diachronically; that, at the first stage of its existence, at the time of the initial formulation of rabbinic Judaism, the Rabbis, at least, did seriously attempt to construct Judaism (the term, however, is an anachronism) as an orthodoxy, and thus as a “religion,” the product of a disembedding of certain realms of practice, speech and other, from others and identifying them as of particular importance. If you do not believe such and such, practice so and so, you are not a Jew, imply the texts of the period. At a later stage, however, according to my hypothesis, at the stage of the “definitive” formulation of rabbinic Judaism in the Babylonian Talmud, the Rabbis rejected this option, proposing instead the distinct ecclesiological principle: “An Israelite, even if he [sic] sins, remains an Israelite [one remains a part of a Jewish or Israelite people whether or not one adheres to the Torah, subscribes to its major precepts, or affiliates with the community].” Whatever its original meaning, this sentence was understood throughout classical rabbinic Judaism as indicating that one cannot cease to be a Jew even via apostasy. The historical layering of these two ideologies and even self-definitions by the Rabbis themselves of what it is that constitutes an Israel and an Israelite provide for the creative ambivalence in the status of Judaism today. Christianity, it would seem, or rather, the Church, needed “Judaism” to be a religious “Other,” and maintained and reified this term as the name of a religion.

At the end of the fourth century and in the first quarter of the fifth century, we can find several texts attesting how Christianity’s new notion of self-definition via “religious” alliance was gradually replacing self-definition via kinship and land. These texts, belonging to very different genres, indeed to entirely different spheres of discourse—heresiology, historiography, and law—can nevertheless be read as symptoms of an epistemic shift of great importance. As Andrew Jacobs describes the discourse of the late fourth and early fifth centuries, “Certainly this universe of discourses engendered different means of establishing normativity: the disciplinary practices of Roman law, for instance, operated in a manner quite distinct from the intellectual inculcation of historiography or the ritualized enactment of orthodoxy. Nevertheless, the common goal of this discursive universe was the reorganization of significant aspects of life under a single, totalized, imperial Christian rubric.”

This construction of “Christianness” primarily involved the invention of Christianity as a religion, disembedded, in Seth Schwartz’s words, from other cultural practices and identifying markers. Susanna Elm shows that late-fourth-century Christians were already committed to the idea of religions and even understood quite well the difference between religious definition and other modes of identity formation. She finds evidence for this claim as early as Julian, “the Apostate,” who formed his religion, Hellenism, in the 360s on the model of Christianity. But as we shall see, there is evidence that goes back at least as far as Eusebius in the first half of...
the century. He insists that only one who believes in “Hellenism” can understand it and teach it and uses this point as justification for his denial of the right to teach philosophy to Christian teachers. Vasiliki Limberis emphasizes how, for all Julian’s hatred of Christianity, his religiosity was deeply structured by the model of Christianity: “Christians had never been barred from letters. Not only was this an effective political tool to stymie Christians, it had the remarkable effect of inventing a new religion and religious identity for people in the Roman empire.” I would slightly modify Limberis’s formulation by noting that Julian did not so much invent a new religion as participate in the invention of a new notion of religion as a category and as a regime of power/knowledge. She further writes: “In particular, Julian echoes Christianity’s modus operandi by turning pagan practices into a formal institution that one must join.” The great fourth-century Cappadocian theologian Gregory Nazianzen retorted to Julian:

But I am obliged to speak again about the word . . . Hellenism: to what does the word apply, what does one mean by it? . . . Do you want to pretend that Hellenism means a religion, or, and the evidence seems to point that way, does it mean a people, and the language invented by this nation. . . . If Hellenism is a religion, show us from which place and what priests it has received its rules. . . . Because the fact that the same people use the Greek language who also profess Greek religion does not mean that the words belong therefore to the religion, and that we therefore are naturally excluded from using them. This is not a logical conclusion, and does not agree with your own logicians. Simply because two realities encounter each other does not mean that they are confluent, i.e. identical.

Gregory clearly has some sort of definition of the object “religion” in mind here, distinct from and in binary semiotic opposition to ethnos, contra the commonplace that such definitions are an early modern product.

Gregory knew precisely “what kinds of affirmation, of meaning, must be identified with practice in order for it to qualify as religion”: it must have received its rules from some place (some book? Gregory surely doesn’t mean geographical locations, for then he would be playing into Julian’s hands) and some priests. While Gregory’s definition of religion, is, of course, quite different from the Enlightenment one (a difference oddly homologous to the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism), he nevertheless clearly has a notion of religion as an idea that can be abstracted from any particular manifestation of it. For Gregory, different peoples have different religions (some right and some wrong), and some folks have none.

Whichever way the “evidence pointed” for Gregory Nazianzen, it is clear, as Elm demonstrates, that for Julian “Hellenism” was indeed a religion, and on Gregory’s terms. Gregory affords a definition of religion as clear as that of later comparatists (although quite different from them). A religion is something that has priests, rites, rules, and sacrifices. It is absolutely clear, moreover, from Gregory’s discourse that, for this Christian, “the emergence of religion as a discrete category of human experience—religion’s disembedding,” in Schwartz’s terms—has taken place fully and finally, since he explicitly separates religion from ethnicity/language. As
Schwartz explicitly writes, “religion” is not a dependent variable of *ethnos*; indeed, almost the opposite is the case. A corollary of this is that language itself has shifted its function as an identity marker. As Claudine Dauphin has argued, by the fifth century linguistic identity was tied to religious affiliation and identity and not to geographic or genealogical identification.

Gregory, in the course of arguing that Hellenism is not a religion, at the same time exposes the conditions that would enable some entity other than Christianity to lay claim to that name. Before Julian, other fourth-century Christian writers had no problem naming “Hellenism” a religion, thus, I expect providing Julian with the very model that he was later to turn against the Christians. Eusebius of Caesarea, the first church historian and an important theologian in his own right, could note, “I have already said before in the *Preparation* how Christianity is something that is neither Hellenism nor Judaism[,] but which has its own particular characteristic piety [o Χριστιανισμός οὐτε Ἐλληνισμός τις ἐστιν οὐτε Ἰουδαισμός, οίκεῖον δὲ τίνα φέρον χαρακτήρα θεοσεβείας],” the implication being that both Hellenism and Judaism have their own characteristic forms of piety (wrong-headed ones, to be sure). He also writes:

This compels us to conceive some other ideal of religion, by which they [the ancient Patriarchs] must have guided their lives. Would not this be exactly that third form of religion midway between Judaism and Hellenism, which I have already deduced as the most ancient and venerable of all religions, and which has been preached of late to all nations through our Saviour. . . . The convert from Hellenism to Christianity does not land in Judaism, nor does one who rejects the Jewish worship become ipso facto a Greek.

Here we find in Eusebius a clear articulation of Judaism, Hellenism, and Christianity as “religions.” There is something called “religion,” which takes different “forms.” This represents a significant conceptual shift from the earlier uses of the term *religion* in ancient sources, in which a *religio* is an appropriate single act of worship, not a conceptual or even practical system separate from culture and politics, and in which there is not, therefore, something called “religion” at all, no substance that we can discover and look at in its different forms.

The fullest expression of this conceptual shift appears in the heresiology of Epiphanius (floruit early fifth century), although his terminology is not entirely clear. For him, not only “Hellenism” and “Judaism” but also “Scythianism” and even “Barbarianism” are no longer the names of ethnic entities but of “heresies,” that is, religions other than orthodox Christianity. Although Epiphanius’s use of the term is confusing and perhaps confused, apparently what he means by “heresies” is often what other writers of his time call “religions”: “<Hellenism originated with Egyptians, Babylonians and Phrygians>, and it now confused <men’s> ways.” It is important to see that Epiphanius’s comment is a transformation of a verse from the Pauline literature, as he himself informs us. In Colossians 3:11
we find, “Here there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, but Christ is all, and in all.” This is a lovely index of the semantic shift. For pseudo-Paul, these designations are obviously not the names of religious formations but of various ethnic and cultural groupings, whereas for Epiphanius they are the names of “heresies,” by which he means groups divided and constituted by religious differences fully disembedded from ethnicities: How, otherwise, could the religion called “Hellenism” have originated with the Egyptians? Astonishingly, Epiphanius’s “Hellenism” seems to have nothing to do with the Greeks; it is Epiphanius’s name for what other writers would call “paganism.” Epiphanius, not surprisingly, defines “the topic of the Jews’ religion” as “the subject of their beliefs.” For Epiphanius, as for Gregory, a major category (if not the only one) for dividing human beings into groups is “the subject of their beliefs,” hence the power/knowledge regime of “religion.” The system of identities had been completely transformed during the period extending from the first to the fifth centuries. The systemic change resulting in religious difference as a modality of identity that began, I would suggest, with the heresiological work of Christians such as Justin Martyr works itself out through the fourth century and is closely intertwined with the triumph of orthodoxy. Orthodoxy is thus not only a discourse for the production of difference within, but functions as a category to make and mark the border between Christianity and its proximate other religions, particularly a Judaism that it is, in part, inventing.

There is a new moment in fifth-century Christian heresiological discourse. Where in previous times the general move was to call Christian heretics “Jews” (a motif that continues alongside the “new” one), only at this time (notably in Epiphanius and Jerome) is distinguishing Judaizing heretics from orthodox Jews central to the Christian discursive project. As one piece of evidence for this claim, I would adduce an explosion of heresiological interest in the “Jewish-Christian heresies” of the Nazarenes and the Ebionites at this time. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, J. K. L. Gieseler had already recognized that “the brightest moment in the history of these two groups doubtless falls about the year 400 A.D., at which time we have the best accounts concerning them.” Given that it seems unlikely that these sects actually flourished at this time, we need to discover other ways of understanding this striking literary flowering. The Ebionites and Nazarenes, in my reading, function much as the mythical “trickster” figures of many religions, in that precisely by transgressing borders that the culture establishes, they reify those boundaries. The discourse of the “Judaizing heretics” thus performs this very function of reinforcing the binaries.

The purpose of Epiphanius’s discourse on the Ebionites and Nazarenes is to participate in the imperial project of control of (in this case) Palestine by “identifying and reifying the . . . religions.” Epiphanius explicitly indicates that this is his purpose by writing of Ebion, the heresiarch-founder of the sect: “But since he is
practically midway between all the sects, he is nothing. The words of scripture, ‘I
was almost in all evil, in the midst of the church and synagogue’ [Proverbs 5:14],
are fulfilled in him. For he is Samaritan, but rejects the name with disgust. And
while professing to be a Jew, he is the opposite of Jews—though he does agree with
them in part.’36 In a rare moment of midrashic wit (one hesitates to attribute it to
Epiphanius himself), the verse of Proverbs is read to mean that I was in all evil,
because I was in the midst [between] the church and the synagogue. Epiphanius's
declaration that the Ebionites “are nothing,” especially when put next to Jerome’s
famous declaration that the Nazarenes think that they are Christians and Jews, but
in reality are neither, strongly recalls for me the insistence in the modern period
that the people of southern Africa have no religion, not because they are not Chris-
tians, but because they are not pagans.37 Suddenly it seems important to these two
writers to assert a difference between Judaizing heretics and Jews. The ascription
of existence to the “hybrids” assumes (and thus assures) the existence of nonhybrid,
“pure” religions. Heresiology is not only, as it is usually figured, the insistence on
some right doctrine but on a discourse of the pure as opposed to the hybrid, a disc-
ourse that then requires the hybrid as its opposite term. The discourse of race
as analyzed by Homi Bhabha proves helpful here: “The exertions of the ‘official
knowledges’ of colonialism—pseudo-scientific, typological, legal-administrative,
eugenistic—are imbricated at the point of their production of meaning and power
with the fantasy that dramatizes the impossible desire for a pure, undifferentiated
origin.”38 We need only substitute “heresiological” for “eugenistic” to arrive at a
major thesis of this article. Thus if on one level, orthodox Judaism is produced as the
abject of Christian heresiology, and orthodox Christianity as the abject of Jewish
heresiology, on yet another level the “heretics” and the minim are the same people,
perhaps literally so, but certainly discursively so: they constitute the impossible de-
sire of which Bhabha speaks.

Jerome, Epiphanius’s younger contemporary, is the other most prolific writer
about “Jewish-Christians” in antiquity.39 Andrew Jacobs reads Jerome’s Hebrew
knowledge as an important part of the “colonialist” project of the Theodosian
age.40 I want to focus here on only one aspect of Jerome’s discourse about Jews,
his discussions of the “Jewish-Christians.” Hillel Newman has recently argued that
Jerome’s discourse about the Judaizers and Nazarenes is more or less constructed
out of whole cloth.41 It thus sharply raises the question of motivation, for, as histo-
rian Marc Bloch notes, “To establish the fact of forgery is not enough. It is further
necessary to discover its motivations. . . . Above all, a fraud is, in its way, a piece of
evidence.”42 I would suggest that Jerome, in general a much clearer thinker than
Epiphanius, moves in the same direction but with greater lucidity. For him, it is
absolutely unambiguous that rabbinic Judaism is not a Christian heresy but a sepa-
rate religion. The Mischlinge thus explicitly mark out the space of illegitimacy, of
no religion:
Hegemonic Christian discourse also produced Judaism (and paganism, for example, that of Julian) as other religions precisely in order to cordon off Christianity, in a purification and crystallization of its essence as a bounded entity. Julian cleverly
reverses this procedure and turns it against Christianity. In at least one reading of Julian’s “Against the Galileans,” the point of that work is to reinstate a binary opposition between Greek and Jew, Hellenism and Judaism, by inscribing Christianity as a hybrid. Eusebius’s claim that one who leaves Hellenism does not land in Judaism and the reverse now constitutes an argument that Christianity itself is a monstrous hybrid, a mooncalf: “For if any man should wish to examine into the truth concerning you, he will find that your impiety is compounded of the rashness of the Jews and the indifference and vulgarity of the Gentiles. For from both sides you have drawn what is by no means their best but their inferior teaching, and so have made for yourselves a border of wickedness.” Julian further writes: “It is worth while... to compare what is said about the divine among the Hellenes and Hebrews; and finally to enquire of those who are neither Hellenes nor Jews, but belong to the sect of the Galileans.” Julian, as dedicated as any Christian orthodox writer to policing borderlines, bitterly reproaches the “Galileans” for contending that they are Israelites and argues that they are no such thing, neither Jews nor Greeks but impure hybrids. Here Julian sounds very much like Jerome when the latter declares that those who think they are both Jews and Christians are neither, or Epiphanius when he refers to the Ebionites as “nothing.” This would make Julian’s project structurally identical to the projects of the Christian heresiologists who, at about the same time, were rendering Christianity and Judaism in their “orthodox” forms the pure terms of a binary opposition, with the “Judaizing” Christians as hybrids who must be excluded from the semiotic system. I suggest, then, a deeper explanation for Julian’s insistence that you cannot mix Hellenism with Christianity. It is not only that Hellenism and Christianity are separate religions that, by definition, cannot be mixed with each other, but even more that Christianity is always already (if you will) an admixture, a syncretism. Julian wants to reinstate the binary of Jew and Greek. He provides, therefore, another instance of the discursive form that I am arguing for in the Christian texts of his time, a horror of supposed hybrids. To recapitulate, in Julian’s very formation of Hellenism (or should I say Hellenicity?), as a religious difference, he mirrors the efforts of the orthodox churchmen. This is another instantiation of the point made by Limberis. While he was protecting the borders between Hellenism and Judaism by excluding Christianity as a hybrid, Julian was in effect smuggling some Christian ideas in his attempt to outlaw Christianity.

This interpretation adds something to that of Jacobs, who writes that “among the deviant figures of Christian discourse we often find the Jew, the ‘proximate other’ used to produce the hierarchical space between the Christian and the non-Christian.” I am suggesting that the heretic can also be read as a proximate other, producing a hierarchical space between the Christian and the Jew. This point is at least partially anticipated by Jacobs himself when he writes that “Jews exist as the paradigmatic ‘to-be-known’ in the overwhelming project of conceptualizing the ‘all in all’ of orthodoxy. This comes out most clearly in the [Epiphanian] accounts of
‘Jewish-Christian’ heresies.”53 One way of spinning this would be to see heresiology as central to the production of Judaism as the “pure other” of Christian orthodoxy, while the other way of interpreting it would be to see Judaism as essential to the production of orthodoxy over and against heresy. My point is that both of these moments in an oscillating analysis are equally important and valid. Seen in this light, orthodoxy itself, orthodoxy as an idea, as a regime (as opposed to any particular orthodox position) is crucial in the formation of Christianity as the universal and imperial religion of the late Roman Empire and, later on, of European Christendom as well.

In a not inconsiderable sense, Epiphanius’s *Panarion* (Medicine Chest),54 a classification of all the many varieties of heresy, can be seen as performing a function for the disciplining of religion that Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s similar work on the perversions played in the disciplining of sexuality at the end of the nineteenth century.55

The Conversion of Count Joseph

A puzzling moment in Epiphanius’s text, the narrative of the conversion of Count Joseph of Tiberias, supports the suggestion that the exporting of hybridity from within to without in the form of heresiology is complicit in the production of Christianity and Judaism as separate, unequal orthodoxies.56 Count Joseph was a Jew and a high official in the court of the Patriarch—and thus certifiably orthodox—who, Epiphanius reports, converted to orthodox Christianity.

After citing the heretical Christological doctrines of the Ebionites and related “heresies,” Epiphanius remarks that they use only the Gospel of Matthew, called “According to the Hebrews.”57 There follows a strange remark that some will object that the Jews secretly hold in their “treasuries” copies of the Gospel of John and the Acts of the Apostles translated into Hebrew, “So the Jews who have been converted to Christ by reading it have told me.” The text already inscribes, therefore, two differing spaces, a “heretical” one in which the Gospel according to the Hebrews is the Gospel and an “orthodox” Jewish space in which other texts are kept, enabling (inadvertently?) Jews to convert to orthodox Christianity. The relevant opposition being inscribed is thus that between orthodoxy and heresy, not between Judaism and Christianity. Orthodox Judaism and orthodox Christianity, as in Jerome’s letter, are lined up on one side of a semantic opposition, with the heretics, who do not respect the difference between being Jew or being Christian and attempt to combine them, positioned on the other side. The Joseph story follows immediately upon these declarations, and, in my reading, is powerfully contextualized by them. From the beginning to the end of the narrative, Epiphanius emphasizes over and over the “orthodoxy” of Joseph’s Christianity. He has as a houseguest Bishop Eusebius of Vercelli, “since Constantius had banished him for his orthodox
faith,” and, at the very beginning and as a sort of headline to the conversion narrative itself, “Josephus was not only privileged to become a faithful Christian, but a despiser of Arians as well. In that city, Scythopolis, he was the only orthodox Christian—they were all Arian. . . . But there was another, younger man in town too, an orthodox believer of Jewish parentage.”

The intimate connection between Jewishness and orthodoxy within the Epiphanian discourse is thus doubled in this conversion narrative.

The first step toward Joseph’s conversion is his observation (through a keyhole) of the deathbed baptism of no lesser a person than the Patriarch, “Ellel.” Thus at the very heart and head of the orthodox Jewish power structure they understand that salvation is only through conversion to Christianity. Joseph is understandably “troubled over the subject of baptism.” Upon the death of this Ellel, Joseph and another one of the Patriarch’s “apostles” are made regents for his minor son, the Infante Patriarch, one “Judas” by name. This is indeed a name common in the patriarchal family, but Epiphanius twice marks that he does not know that that is his name—“I suppose that he was called that,” suggesting to this reader, at any rate, that the name is being marked as emblematic. This young man is a libertine. While Joseph watches, a beautiful young Christian woman is saved from his magical charms by the cross that she carries, once more raising thoughts in Joseph’s mind, “but at this point he was by no means convinced that he should become a Christian.” During this time Joseph reads the Gospels, an Ebionite Matthew (originally in Hebrew), canonical John (translated into Hebrew), and canonical Acts (also translated), which are kept in the secret treasury of the Patriarchs. Upon becoming deathly ill, Joseph is informed by the Elders, who whisper in his ear, that he will be healed if he believes in the Christian creed; Epiphanius has, moreover, heard such a story from another Jew as well. Joseph’s heart remains hard, but after the young Patriarch Judas grows up, he makes our Joseph tax gatherer for the province of Cilicia, where Joseph lodges next to the church, befriends the bishop, borrows the Gospels, and reads them again. When the Jews, full of resentment because of Joseph’s campaign against their corruption, discover that he is reading the Gospels, they fall upon him, take him to the synagogue, “and whip . . . him as the Law prescribes.” At this point, Joseph accepts baptism, goes to Constantine’s court, and is offered high rank in the imperial government by the “good emperor—a true servant of Christ, and after David, Hezekiah and Josiah, the king with the most godly zeal.” After being permitted to build churches in the Jewish towns of the Galilee, Joseph sets up furnaces to burn the lime for them. The “natural-born Jews” perform sorcery to make these fires deviate from their own nature and be ineffective. When Joseph hears of this, he cries out in the name of Jesus and sprinkles water on the furnaces. The spell is thereby broken, the fire blazes up, “and the crowds of [all Jewish] spectators cried, ‘there is (only) one God, the help of the Christians.’” All of the formerly orthodox Jews have now become orthodox Christians, a conversion portrayed as without remainder. The Ebionites, with their heret-
ical Gospel “According to the Hebrews,” are safely marked as the true locus of hybridity. The discursive entities, orthodox Judaism and orthodox Christianity, work very similarly to the discourse of race as Young describes it: “The idea of racial purity [orthodoxy] here shows itself to be profoundly dialectical: it only works when defined against potential intermixture, which also threatens to undo its calculations altogether.”

After relating this tale, Epiphanius returns to his main point. He argues, “So much for my account and description of these events, which I recalled here because of the translation of the books, the rendering from Greek to Hebrew of the Gospel of John and the Acts of the Apostles. But I resume—because of the Gospel according to Matthew the progress of the discussion obliged me to give the sequel of the knowledge which had come my way. Now in what they call a Gospel according to Matthew, though it is not entirely complete, but is corrupt and mutilated—and they call this thing ‘Hebrew’!—the following passage occurs.” I would argue that this true Gospel and Acts, found in the hands of the true Jews, are being dramatized in opposition to that fake Gospel, neither Christian nor Jewish: “And they [the Ebionites] call this thing Hebrew!”

Most scholars believe that this story has been interpolated into the middle of Epiphanius’s account of the Ebionites because of the metonymical link between the books that Joseph found and the Ebionite “Jewish Christians.” I think, however, that it plays a more central role in Epiphanius’s text. Stephen Goranson sends us in the right direction: “The story of Joseph of Tiberias is of a conversion from one orthodoxy to another, skipping over middle groups, more numerous at the time in Galilee.” I submit that the story of Joseph further underlines Epiphanius’s distinction between those who are “something”—Jews or Christians or pagans—and those who are nothing, the Mischlinge. The function of the story is hardly to use the somethingness of the “religions” in order to establish the “nothingness” of the Ebionites and their associates, but can more plausibly read in the opposite manner, namely using their nothingness to establish the somethingness of the absolutely distinguished “real” religions.

Thus a narrative that inscribes the binary opposition between a “pure,” orthodox Judaism and a “pure,” orthodox Christianity, as well as the ambiguous tricksters, the Jewish/Christian hybrids, can be seen as participating in the same process of the production of absolute boundaries, of “individual and communal stability.” I thus read a narrative interposed by Epiphanius, seemingly almost by accident, as a hermeneutic key for understanding at least one of the crucial motives of his text. It is not just, as Goranson puts it, “that the church has in the interim, from the first to the fourth centuries, decided that Ebionites and Nazarenes are heretical,” but rather that the discursive project of imperial Christian self-definition requires an absolute separation from Judaism. In order to help produce that, Epiphanius (the Church) needs to make space for an orthodox Judaism that is completely Other to Christianity. Now we can see the fifth-century explicit notices of curses of
“Nazarenes” in synagogues as participating in the same project. The Jews who curse the middle groups are discursively necessary for the orthodox project, performing the same function as orthodox Jews like Count Joseph who absolutely convert to orthodox Christianity, thus guaranteeing the latter’s legitimacy. Joseph was the only “orthodox Christian” in all of Scythopolis. It was his complete separation from Christianity as an “orthodox” Jew that enabled his transformation into a purely orthodox Christian. In other words, a Jewish orthodoxy is produced by the Christian legend in order to help guarantee a Christian orthodoxy, over and against hybrids. The hybrids, however, also produce the no-man’s land, the mestizo territory, that guarantees the purity of the orthodox formations.

Orthodox Judaism as State-Sanctioned (But False) Religion in the Theodosian Code

In support of this interpretation of Epiphanius and Jerome, I adduce a further bit of contemporaneous evidence of a very different sort, the Code of Theodosius of 438.

To more fully appreciate the import of that code, we must focus on the semantic shift in the terms religio and superstitio. In Latin, superstitio in its earliest appearances was not in binary opposition to religio. Indeed, too much religio could be superstitio. It was not the index of worship of the right gods, but of the right or wrong worship of the gods. Maurice Sachot concurs that, in the Latin of the early empire, superstitio was itself not so much the opposite of religio as a type of religio, simply a dangerous and illegitimate excess of religio itself. As Peter Brown puts it, “Outside Epicurean circles, superstition was not treated as a cognitive aberration—an ‘irrational’ belief in nonexistent or misperceived beings. Superstition was a social gaffe committed in the presence of the gods. It betrayed a lack of the ease and candour that were supposed to characterise a free man’s relations with any persons, human or divine. Excessive observance was strictly analogous to flattery and ostentation; and magic was a form of graft and manipulation.”

In later Christian Latin, religio is not defined as the practices that are useful and appropriate for maintaining Roman solidarity and social order, but as the belief in that which is true, that is, as sanctioned by an authoritatively and ultimately legally produced ecumenical orthodoxy. Beard, North, and Price support this point:

“Religio is worship of the true god, superstitio of a false,” as the Christian Lactantius remarked in the early fourth century A.D.—so asserting that alien practices and gods were not merely inferior to his own, but actually bogus. The traditional Roman distinction seems to have made no such assumption about truth and falsehood: when Romans in the early
empire debated the nature of religio and superstitio they were discussing instead different forms of human relations with the gods. This is captured in Seneca’s formulation that “religio honours the gods, superstitio wrongs them.”

A somewhat different way of naming this shift is to point out that, in the earlier usage, religiones and superstitiones are the names of acts—including speech acts—and the results of such acts. If Judaism (sometimes) and Christianity (always) are referred to as superstitiones in non-Christian literature, that is a judgment on all of the acts that members of those communities perform, but not a name for the community itself. After the shift, religio and superstitio are the names of institutions and communities. Before, one performs a religio or a superstitio; now one belongs to one.

This helps explain why the Epiphanian narrative of conversion is so crucial in establishing the new sense of religio, for the possibility of conversion itself converts Christianity into an institution, rather than merely a set of practices, an institution that we might name “the Church.” Now it becomes possible for Christianity to be a true religio, whereas Judaism and paganism are false religiones, another name for which is superstitiones in its new sense. After the invention of sexuality in the nineteenth century, everyone has a sexuality; similarly, after the invention of religion in the fourth century, everyone has a religion. Greek, we might say, also rises to the occasion of this semantic and social shift, with the once very rare word ὡφροσκεία stepping into the new semantic slot now occupied by the Latin religio in its post-Christian sense. This semantic development is paralleled in Hebrew מ, which in biblical and early rabbinic usage means something like religio in the old Latin sense and comes to mean “religion” only in the Middle Ages.

A paradox in the representation of Judaism within the Theodosian Code illustrates these points. Throughout the code, Judaism is sometimes nominated religio and sometimes superstition, but, as legal historian Amnon Linder observes, after 416 only superstition is used. In older Roman usage this shift to exclusive designation as superstition ought to mark an absolute delegitimation of Judaism, entirely unlike its prior status as religio licita, in Tertullian’s famous—if pleonastic—phrase. However, Linder also describes a complex and increasing legislative legitimation of Judaism through the fourth and fifth centuries. Both Günter Stemberger and Lee Levine have pointed to the paradox engendered by the fact that the Palestinian patriarchate achieved its heyday in the fourth and early fifth centuries, that is, precisely as the Jewish position was otherwise deteriorating drastically.

Moreover, as Seth Schwartz has recently put it, “The legislation incorporated in the Theodosian Code book 16 titles 8 and 9 (and scattered through other books of the Code) constitutes the first more or less systematic exposition in a Roman imperial context of the view that local Jewish communities are fully licit and partly autonomous, and that their leaders are to enjoy the privileges of clergy and the right to rule their constituents in partial accordance with Jewish law.” Here, then, is the paradox. How can it be that Judaism definitively became a superstition precisely
when "the Christian Empire—to a far greater extent than the pagan Empire—accepted Judaism as a religion rather than as a nation or a people?" The answer is that superstitio itself has shifted in meaning; indeed, the whole semantic field has shifted. First, however, let me sharpen the apparent paradox. The legitimation of Judaism went so far as to comprehend recognition of the Jewish Sabbath and festivals, including Purim [CTh XVI 8.18] (provided the Jews didn’t mock the crucifixion on that occasion) the Jewish priesthood, and the synagogue. The following has a particularly “modern” ring: “[Buildings] which are known to be used by Jews for their meetings, and which are described as synagogues, let no-one dare to desecrate or occupy; for all shall keep their own with rights undisturbed, without attacks on religion or worship” (CTh XVI.8.20) of 26 July 412 (Honorius). Particularly dramatic is the continued, even enhanced, right of the primates of the Jews (including probably Rabbis) to excommunicate [CTh XVI 8.8]. This power continued well after 416, and during that time Jewish religious autonomy was enhanced by other laws as well. Indeed, “in a law of Justinian from 553 (No. 66), the lawful observance of the Jewish religion and its cult was taken for granted.” Furthermore, through the fourth century the Jewish religion received greater and greater legitimacy in the recognition of the Jewish Patriarch as the virtual Metropolitan of the Jews. As Schwartz writes: “In the late fourth century the patriarchs reached the peak of their power. The Palestinian church father Epiphanius and the Codex Theodosianus both indicate that the apostole, or aurum coronarium [the Jewish head tax, exacted by the Patriarchs from the Diaspora], was now collected as if it were a conventional tax.” In 397 Arcadius and Honorius affirm that “we shall imitate the ancients by whose sanctions it was determined that those privileges which are conferred upon the first clerics of the venerable Christian religion shall continue, by the consent of Our Imperial Divinity, for those persons who are subject to the power of the Illustrious Patriarchs, for the rulers of the synagogues, the patriarchs, and the priests, and for all the rest who are occupied in the ceremonial of that religion” (CTh XVI.8.13). This law was reaffirmed in 404. Despite the explicit rhetoric of the law of 397, Schwartz makes the important point that “the laws about the Jews in the Theodosian Code are not at all conservative. By their very existence they constitute a significant innovation, because they imply that by the late fourth century the Roman state consistently regarded the Jews as a discrete category of humanity. I would suggest that the state had not done so, at least not consistently, between the first and the fourth centuries.” In my reading of the archives, more even than providing evidence of the growing importance of the Patriarch (which I am not, to be sure, denying), these materials suggest the importance of the representation, perhaps a sort of colonial trompe-l’oeil, in Bhabha’s terms, of a powerful and prestigious Jewish Patriarch in the discourse of the orthodox Christian Empire.

With the shift in designation Linder dates to 416, Judaism, paradoxically, in effect became a superstitio licita (an oxymoron, of course), a genuine, though wrong
religion from which conversion was possible, leaving a remainder that guaranteed the existence of the Christian herself. In a law variously dated to 412, 418, and 420, we read, “Let no one, as long as he is innocent, be disparaged and subject to attacks because he is a Jew, by whatever religion [CTh XVI.8.21, my emphasis].” “By whatever religion” must comprehend more than just Christianity, or this sentence would make no sense whatsoever. The licit status of the superstition, Judaism, as opposed to “heresy”—and consequently the crucial conversion of Judaism from heresy to superstition, or alternative but wrong religion—is beautifully indicated in the following edict of Honorius and Theodosius:

We punish with proscription of their goods and exile, Manichaeans and those persons who are called Pepyzites [=Montanists]. Likewise those persons who are worse than all other heretics in this one belief, namely, that they disagree with all others as to the venerable day of Easter, shall be punished with the same penalty if they persist in the aforesaid madness. But we especially command those persons who are truly Christians . . . that they shall not abuse the authority of religion and dare to lay violent hands on Jews and pagans who are living quietly and attempting nothing disorderly or contrary to law (CTh XVI. 10.24).

If they do so, continues the edict, “they shall also be compelled to restore triple or quadruple that amount which they robbed.” As Caroline Humfress remarks on this law of 423, “This vision of peaceful, law-abiding, fifth-century ‘pagans’ and Jews legally pursuing hard-line Christians through the courts of the Roman empire, for the four-fold restitution of their robbed property, is diametrically opposed to the more usual fifth century rhetoric of Christian triumphalism. And it provides stimulus and justification for an account of the evolution of late paganism as an alternative to a repetition of the traditional historiographical story of its demise.” Hal Drake has commented on explicit fourth-century discourse that indicates the co-existence of Christians and “pagans,” with “heretics” marked off as the genuine enemy. If that is so for “late paganism,” then it is even more so for “early Judaism.” Judaism was evolving within the context of the world that Christianity, Christendom, and the Christian Empire had made for it. As Jacob Neusner has perspicaciously noted, the success of rabbinic Judaism itself, its final triumph as Judaism tout court, was, at least in large part, a product of its effectiveness in providing an answer to Christian challenges, challenges to the relevance of Jewish peoplehood, genealogy, and the physical practice of the Torah. As Neusner writes, “in context Christianity (and later on, Islam) made rabbinic Judaism permanently relevant to the situation in which Jews found themselves.” Although I would dissent in some measure from the specific time frame of this argument, its major notional base appeals to me. Rabbinic Judaism was successful as Judaism for two reasons: (1) Christianity “needed” a Jewish orthodoxy with which to think itself, and (2) rabbinic Judaism provided a winning set of responses to the Christian questions:

The rabbinic Sages produced responses to the Christian challenge in their enduring doctrines of the meaning of history, of the conditions in which the Messiah will come to Israel,
and of the definition of Israel. Rabbinic Judaism’s symbolic system, with its stress on Torah, the eschatological teleology of that system, with stress on the messiah-sage coming to obedient Israel, the insistence on the equivalence of Israel and Rome, Jacob and Esau, with Esau penultimate and Israel at the end of time, these constituted in Israel powerful responses to the Christian question.101

Christianity needed a Jewish orthodoxy. Everything about title 8 of Book XVI suggests that Judaism is to be legitimated, while vigorously protecting Christians and Christianity from any temptations to cross the border. The indictment of the Quartodecimans as worse than Manichaeans in the passage just read makes this point eloquently.102 The trenchant condemnation of the “Caelicolists,” by all signs a combination of Christianity and Judaism, in this title (8.19) immediately preceding a law (8.20) enjoining the absolute protection of synagogue and Sabbath for Jews also argues for this interpretation.103 It is hybridity that is at once the threat and the guarantor of the “purity” of Christianity and Judaism, the whole system necessary for the discursive production of an orthodoxy that was “one of the primary discursive formations around which ancient Christian strategies of self-definition coalesced.”104

Converting Judaism: The Letter of Severus of Minorca

These texts and the ways that they suggest an epistemic shift taking place early in the fifth century may provide background for a historicist reading of yet another narrative treated much in recent scholarship, the story of the conversion of the Jews of Minorca at that time, the Epistula Severi.105 Epiphanius’s story of Count Joseph suggests to us that we can find the traces of this regime of Christian imperial power and knowledge about Jews, not only in the texts of heresiologists, but also in other narratives about the conversion of the Jews. I wish to suggest a reading in which the Epistula Severi is not primarily about an instance of the forced conversion of Jews or in support of forced conversions but an aspect of the invention of “the conversion of the Jew” through which the “Christian only exists,” that is, part of a process of the making of a new status for Judaism, one that takes account of the “remainder,” the necessity that the Jew paradoxically remain in order for the Christian to find both himself and an Other.

A text from the margins of the Christian discourse of empire will help to articulate this important point. In February of the year 418, according to the encyclical letter of Bishop Severus of Minorca, there took place “on that lowly thing of the world” events that the author of the epistle thought so significant that he addressed his epistle “to the most Holy and Blessed Lord Bishops, Presbyters, Deacons and to the Universal Brotherhood of the whole world.”106 I will begin with a summary of the plot.
Soon after Severus assumed the episcopate, “a certain holy priest,” who as it turns out from other sources was none other than Orosius, the historian and disciple of Augustine, arrived on Minorca carrying with him the relics of St. Stephen, the protomartyr, “which recently had come to light.” He placed these relics in the church of Magona, one of the two cities on the island, “doubtless at the inspiration of the martyr himself.” The frenzy that the martyr kindled continued to work, for the bishop and his congregation became filled with holy zeal, evidently leading the congregation of Christians to break off relations with the Jews immediately. Oddly, Severus describes these relations as both an “obligation” and as a “sinful phenomenon” within the same sentence. Indeed, upon the “translation” of St. Stephen’s relics to the Christian congregations of Minorca, “even the obligation of greeting one another was suddenly broken off, and not only was our old habit of easy acquaintance disrupted, but the sinful phenomenon of our longstanding affection was translated into temporary hatred.” Upon the return of Theodorus, the leader of the Jews and patronus of the island, from business on Majorca, the Christians of the entire island declared “war” [bellum] on the Jews, preparing dialectical “weapons” that in the end they would not be obliged to use, while the Jews, in turn, prepared themselves for both dialectic and martyrdom, weapons that in the end they would not be privileged to use.

After dreams and miracles, cowardice and bravery, flight and misprision, the burning of the synagogue and spoliation of its silver fittings and Torah scrolls, and the forced rebuilding by the Jews of their former synagogue into a church, miraculously all 540 Jews of the island are converted to Christianity in eight short days. At the same time, social relations are restored to their previous state. Everyone greets each other again. The former Jew Theodorus is reinstated to his position as patronus of Minorca, but obviously now he and all of his former flock are under the still greater patronage of St. Stephen, not only protomartyr but also protoconvert, as well as “first to wage the Lord’s wars [dominica bella] against the Jews.” In the words of Peter Brown: “Within a few weeks, Theodorus and his relatives and congregants had made their peace with the bishop. Through becoming Christians, they maintained their full social status within their own community, though now subject to the higher patroncinium of St. Stephen, and seated beside the Christian bishop as Christian patroni.” It is interesting here to compare Epiphanius’s emphasis on the fact that Joseph had held the highest rank among the Jews and now held high rank in the Christian Empire.

Within the dossier in which the Epistula circulated are other documents that are almost certainly of fifth-century provenance as well. One of them is an account of the miraculous unearthing of the relics of St. Stephen after a dream of the monk Lucianus in Jerusalem in 415 in which their whereabouts were revealed to him by a converted Rabban Gamaliel the Great of the first century. The other is a Passio of St. Stephen, “discovered” just before the aforesaid disinterment, predicting this very apparition. This documentary context will prove fruitful in reading the epistle.
While the *Epistula* may seem to provide evidence of a developing practice of forced conversion at that time, there are other manners of reading and establishing a context for it than attending to its manifest content—interpretations, moreover, that are rendered stronger if the text is a fraud (as it seems to be, although they are possible even if it isn’t). Rather than reading the text in the context of events of forced conversion for which it is, in fact, the only evidence, I would read it not so much (or not only) as referring to the conversion of Jews of Minorca, but rather as itself a sherd in an early-fifth-century assemblage of relics that point to a conversion of Judaism itself in the discourse of the hegemonic Christians in the first quarter of the fifth century. That is, whatever the truth value of the report of the events themselves, its writing and dissemination, together with its associated relics and other hagiographical narratives, suggest to me a moment of epistemic shift, the invention of a new form of “truth,” “religion,” here manifested by the production of a certain narrative about conversion from Judaism to Christianity.

In *The Cult of the Saints*, Peter Brown has provided a reading of the *Epistula Severi* that turns our attention away from forced conversions and focuses it on a well-attested contemporary discourse, the developing cult of the saints. Not disagreeing with Brown, so much as adding to his words, I would suggest that the letter is an integral part as well in a developing discourse of Judaism and Christianity as separate, if not quite equal, religions. As Brown has shown, this cult had much to do with locations in space, “translations—the movement of relics to people” that “hold the center of the stage in late-antique piety” as practices for the invention of communities. In his study of the cult of the saints, Brown has illuminated how the festivals that attended the anniversaries of the appearance of relics in particular shrines functioned socially: “The festival of the saint was conceived of as a moment of ideal consensus on a deeper level. It made plain God’s acceptance of the community as a whole: his mercy embraced all its disparate members, and could reintegrate all who had stood outside in the previous year,” that is, monks, Frankish counts, and even “striking blonde princesses” from Gaul. As Brown suggests, the “translation” of relics, their resettlement from place to place, permanently transformed the “spiritual landscape of the Christian Mediterranean” by diasporizing (my term) the sacred, converting a system of local saints’ shrines into a “dependence of communities scattered all over Italy, Gaul, Spain, and Africa” and even “far beyond the ancient frontiers of the Roman world.” One function of a text like the letter of Severus is to accompany the message implied by the translation of the relics with another message meant to spread its influence, and, like the body of St. Stephen itself in Augustine’s account, “bring light to all lands.” The argument that the point of the letter is a “world-wide” communique and of its participation in an empire-wide epistemic shift is supported by the address of the epistle “to the Universal Brotherhood of the whole world”: Christianity becoming Christendom, that imagined community the citizens of which are “naturally” Christians.

Seen in this way, the cult of the saints was an instance of empire-wide commu-
communication of a new discursive regime, which Brown’s reading explains in part. I would suggest, however, in addition to this general interpretation, a specific one focusing on the particular rhetorical or historical contexts of Severus’s letter. Scott Bradbury has helped us to establish this context by locating the Epistula Severi at “the confluence of two broad currents in the religious life of late antiquity: the rise of the cult of saints and the increasing intolerance of Catholic Christians against the unorthodox: pagans, heretics, and Jews,” especially as attested, in his view, in the Theodosian Code promulgated within a decade of Severus’s letter. It is no accident, then, that at that confluence the body of St. Stephen reveals itself miraculously “in waking visions to a certain Lucian, priest of the church on an estate called Kefar Gamala in 415 north of Jerusalem,” no accident that it was 415 (or thereabouts) when this revelation took place, and no accident that his relics were connected with conversions. Something impelled St. Stephen’s corpse to rise from the ground at just that time, something having to do with Jews, Palestine, and transitions in the self-fashioning of Christianity.

Throughout the third and fourth centuries and into the fifth we are witness to efforts on the part of various Christian writers to make any ambiguities of Jewish-Christian identity impossible. Only the most famous of these are Chrysostom’s sermons against the Jews, which have been decisively interpreted as triggered by Christian attraction to Jewish rites and sites. Another example is Cyril of Jerusalem’s mid-century sermons for catechumens. A fully separate category for Jews, the religion of “Judaism,” was necessary in order to produce the full identity of the Church. The only subject who can be converted to Christianity with that necessary “remainder” of “Otherness” is not the ambiguously differentiated Judaeo-Christian of earlier centuries, but someone who to begin with has such a fully separate identity (someone like Count Joseph or the Jews of Minorca). In the Epistula, with its ostensibly totalizing account of the conversion of all of the Jews of Minorca, I find the reproduction of a discourse of conversion itself, and therefore of convertibility—of the convertible subject, the Jew. A scholar working in a different tradition (in both senses) has articulated the point somewhat analogously and also usefully for this inquiry: “The remarkable persistence of ethnic groups is not maintained by permanent exclusion nor by preventing boundary crossing. One might even suggest that it is in the act of crossing boundaries that such demarcations are reaffirmed.”

Closer reading of certain passages in the Epistula will expose the ambivalence about Judaism that is encoded and enacted in the text. The first is the moment of common hymn singing, taken by Brown as an illustration of the concord that allegedly obtained between Jews and Christians on the island before the arrival of St. Stephen’s relics there. As described by Brown, “Theodore and his relatives stood at the head of a community where Jews and Christians had learned to coexist, sharing, for instance, in the same haunting beauty of their chanted psalms.” Bradbury, like Brown, interprets this haunting beauty as if it related the halcyon situation of the Jews and Christians on the island before the distressing new events.
sage, however, lends itself to a reading considerably more sinister than Brown’s paraphrase implies. At the time of the haunting hymnody, according to the account, Severus is already attempting the forced conversion of the Jews by coercing them to go to the synagogue in order to reveal that the weapons that they have gathered there were intended for offensive violence against the Christians and the government: “Then we [Severus and virtually the whole population of the island] set out for the synagogue, and along the way we began to sing a hymn to Christ in our abundance of joy. Moreover, the psalm was ‘Their memory has perished with a crash and the Lord endures forever’ [Psalms 9:7–8], and the throng of Jews also began to sing it with a wondrous sweetness.”

Given that the particular verse that is being sung is effectively a prophecy of the doom of the Jews, a fact marked by Severus’s own “moreover,” an ironically bitter reading of this “wondrous sweetness” emerges. Not, in fact, participating in a concord of common worship, the Jews in a moment of dramatic irony are unwittingly prophesying the disaster that is about to befall them—that is, in the Christian discourse. As Chava Boyarin has remarked to me, if these events took place in actuality and there were real Jews (under a tree outside Delhi, as it were), they might well have had a very different intent, prophesying or praying for the downfall of their Christian oppressors through the recitation of these words, in Bhabha’s terms an exemplary moment of colonial mimicry. As ever (or from Justin Martyr on, at any rate), the Jewish text is made to portray the downfall of the Jews and the end of their memory—in both senses. It is in the very next sentence, not surprisingly, that the violence begins. The ambivalence of this moment, with its representation of harmony but implication of coercion, exemplifies the ambivalence that has produced much, if not all, Christian violence against Jews, with Christians using the very texts of the Jews to predict precisely the discordant crashing of Jewish memory.

Thus, rather than reading this as a moment of concord and harmony, I would propose to read it as a singular moment of violence in the text. The shared hymn singing, on this reading, is symptomatic of the pervasive ambivalence that drives the narrative. It is the fact that Jews and Christians share the same scripture and, in part, the same liturgy that produces the anxiety about borders that our text is so avid to dispel by reinforcing those very borders. Indeed, the irony that Bradbury refers to of the Easter octave during which the Jews were converted as being itself “from Jewish precedents” is another symptom of the type of religion trouble that mobilizes such textual productions.

The Epistula Severi manifests this ambivalence at its very heart. Even as it narrates the conversion of the Jews of the island without remainder, as it were, I would suggest at the same time it palpably participates in the creation of a new status for Judaism, no longer categorized as a heresy of Christianity, as it was in much of Christian writing of the third and fourth centuries, but as a separate (if wrong) religion. Thus it is the continued existence of “Judaism” and its redefinition as an object on the same semiotic level as Christianity, not the extinction of Judaism, that
guarantees Christian orthodox existence. We can observe this shift from heresy to religion taking place within the narrative of the text. At the very beginning of the narrative, after reporting miraculous events that prevent Jews from living in the village of Jamona, the author goes on:

What is even more marvellous is that vipers and scorpions are indeed very plentiful, but have lost all ability to do violent harm. Although none of the Jews, who are rightly compared with wolves and foxes for fierceness and villainy, dares to approach Jamona, not even for the right of hospitality, Magona seethed with so great a multitude of Jews, as if with vipers and scorpions, that Christ’s church was being wounded by them daily. But that ancient, earthly favour was recently renewed for us in a spiritual sense, so that, as it is written, that generation of vipers [Luke 3:7], which used to attack with venomous stings, suddenly under the compulsion of divine power has cast aside the lethal poison of unbelief.132

These “venomous stings” are plausibly read as a reference to the attraction that the synagogue had for the Christians of Minorca, whether actually to abandon the Church, or, more likely, to participate in the preaching and rituals of the Jews and their holidays much like Chrysostom’s Antiochene congregation.

Since the language of “vipers and scorpions” with which the text initially describes the Jews is a topos in contemporaneous depictions of heresy,133 “Judaism” is at this moment in the beginning of the text being read as a Christian heresy and, therefore, as supremely dangerous for Christians. The original “generation of vipers,” were, after all, “children of Abraham” who came to be baptized (but not converted), thus also blurring the boundaries between the old and the new. “Severus” has informed us that on Minorca snakes and scorpions have no venom. Likewise, now, on the spiritual level, a similar miracle has happened, that is, the Jews have lost their power to harm. The implication, however, is that Jews they remain—at least for the purposes of discourse—hence, once more that ambivalent slippage, on which Christian identity is built, the remains of the Jew.

Through the narrative, however and thus, in part, via the agency of the text, Judaism itself will be converted from a heresy, a disease of Christianity, into both a superstitio and religio, which are, for the discourse of this time, two sides of the same coin, no longer understood as inappropriate and appropriate worship of the gods, respectively, but as false and true modes of belief. It is this conversion—and the shift in semantic fields that lies behind it, a shift brought about in part by the discourse of Christian orthodoxy—that enables the text to represent the Jews of Minorca as having converted. Heretics do not convert to orthodoxy, they repent, while converts move between religions, abandoning the false one for the true. It is, therefore, the representation of the conversion of the Jews of Minorca in the text that interpellates Judaism as a religion, signaling the more radical conversion of Judaism. Christianity herein produces both Judaism and itself as equivalent but opposite entities, each as a separate religion. It is thus that the Minorcan Jews can be seen as converting to Christianity “with a remainder,” the remainder that is the Jewish religion. It is precisely this narrative of a conversion from Judaism to Christianity that produces
Judaism as a semiotic object in the same paradigm as Christianity, making it finally impossible to be both, since one is exactly the negation of the other.

The first of the Jews (appropriately named, as the text doesn’t hesitate to point out, “Reuben”) who decides to convert, “delighted the hearts of all with a most holy cry, begging that he be released from the chains of the Jewish superstitio [absolvi se a vinculis Iudaicae superstitionis deprecabatur].”134 When Jews who have not (yet) resolved to convert speak, however, they refer to the act of Theodorus, the converted leader of their congregation, as “apostasizing,” and to their own Judaism as “our religio.”135 Again, when two “fathers of the Jews” do resolve out of fear to convert, they say, “But even if His great power does not draw you to Christ, my brother, Florianus and I, while we cannot use force against you in your rejection of such great salvation, none the less we, with our entire households, will abandon the mockery of this religio, which we lack the strength to defend [nostra religionis huius, quam astruere non valemus, ludibria deserentes], and we will join in alliance with the faithful ranks of the Christians.”136 This passage is richly ambiguous, as our two Jewish fathers and brothers seem to be converting out of conviction, but then reveal that it is only because they lack the “strength to defend” their religio that they do so, a religio, however, that they are impelled by the narrator to designate as a “mockery.” But a mockery of a religion, that is, an object of the class religion that nevertheless is “not white, not quite,” in Bhabha’s catchphrase. The ambivalence of this sentence is then the ambivalence of mimicry/mockery itself in the discourse of imperial domination.137 The “colonial” authority desires the Jewish religion to be not quite a religion, a mimicry of religion, analogous—but not identical—to the British, who set up mock parliaments in their colonies but were surprised when the colonials “misunderstood” and thought that they had indeed been authorized to govern, or, alternatively turned those mimic parliaments into a form of mockery of colonial pretension: “It is out of season to question at this time of day, the original policy of conferring on every colony of the British Empire a mimic representation of the British Constitution. But if the creature so endowed has sometimes forgotten its real significance and under the fancied importance of speakers and maces, and all the paraphernalia and ceremonies of the imperial legislature, has dared to defy the mother country . . . To give to a colony the forms of independence is a mockery; she would not be a colony for a single hour if she could maintain an independent station.”138 Somewhere in this territory, if not precisely defined by it, lies the status of Judaism, that “mockery of a religion,” within that earlier Christian Empire of the fifth century. This phrase is rendered more salient and more poignant in the context of the legal authorization (in the Theodosian Code) of the Jewish “mimic church.”

One of the Christian leaders, addressing the unconverted Jews, also refers to Judaism as a religio: “The Christian throng bore witness and I heard it with my own ears, that your brother, Theodorus, who is greater than you in learning, honour
and years, converted to faith in Christ,” and then, “Isn’t it likely that you too, con-
strained by the example of your own blood brother, will desert the Jewish reli-
gion?” Conversion, then, is the deserting of a religio. It makes sense then that at
the very moment that Jews begin converting to Christianity in the narrative, Juda-
ism, even of the unconverted, is no longer represented as a heresy but as a superstitio
from the point of view of Christians, that is a false religion, but as a religio from the
point of view of unconverted Jews, that is, a true religion. A false religion is that
from which one can convert. The discourse of “conversion” is what brings into be-
ing, in a sense, the episteme of “religions.” The text thus dramatizes the social situa-
tion of the episteme of “conversion” that it is itself engaged in producing, one in
which superstitio is merely the dark Doppelgänger of religio and in which it is the very
nomination of Judaism as superstitio (as opposed to heresy) that empowers (uncon-
verted) Jews to see it as a religio.

Whether or not this text contains some “kernel of truth” about the events it
narrates, its dissemination with the relics and the miracle tales as a highly stylized,
fictionalized hagiographical document for the “universal brotherhood of the whole
world” was, I reckon, part of a well-attested promulgation of a new status for the
Jews of Christendom at the beginning of the fifth century, a status as a legitimate
but despised “wrong” religion and not a Christian heresy. True history or no, the
text is part of the production of a new form of “truth.” In other words, the rhetoric
here of “forced conversion” is about the making of the medieval discourse of conver-
sion itself, and therefore, of religion. At the same time, then, that the Epistula is, at
least symbolically, depriving that small island’s Jews of any place in the world at
all, it can, on one reading, be perceived as opening up a space for “Judaism” in the
larger world to which it was addressed.

The text, I would thus argue, doesn’t only “remainder” the Jew, but actually
opens up a space for a new Jewish subjectivity, a space for the Jews to have and
claim a religio of their own, paralleling in the story’s terms of the individual subject
and her speech the explicit “permission” afforded by the legal discourse discussed
earlier, for, as Seth Schwartz has written, “The law codes demonstrate that the
Christian state had an interest, which the pagan Roman state had lacked, in regard-
ning the Jews as constituting a separate and discrete religious community. This is
one reason, though not the only one, for the revival of Judaism in late antiquity to
which archaeology and an explosion of literary production testify.”

The Kingdom Turns to Minut:
The Rabbis Reject Religion

There is a small but suggestive body of evidence that during this period
Christianity takes on a different role in the self-understanding of rabbinic Judaism
as well. As I have noted elsewhere in later Palestinian texts—the midrashim—we frequently find the expression “Nations of the World” as a reference to Christianity. In a precise mirror of the contemporary Christian move in which ethnic difference is made religious, for the latter-day Rabbis religious difference has been ethnicized; Christians are no longer seen as a threatening Other within but as an entity fully Other; as separate as the Gentiles had been for the Jews of Temple times. It is not that the referent of the term minut has shifted from “Jewish Christianity” to Gentile Christianity, but that with the historical developments of the centuries, its significance has changed. Since Christianity itself is no longer a threatening blurring within but a clearly defined without, minut comes now simply to mean the religious practices of the Gentiles, the Christian Romans. For the Jews of the fourth century, the Gentiles are now the Christians. Whatever the Mishna [Sotah 9:15] meant in predicting that when the Messiah comes, “The Kingdom will turn to minut,” for the Talmuds [TP Sotah 23b, TB Sotah 49b], I would warrant that: “The Kingdom has turned to minut” refers to the Christianization of the empire, but it also means, of course, that minut has turned (in)to the empire. The Christians are now the Gentiles.

In the Talmud, minut clearly no longer means what it had meant in the Mishna and the Tosefta. As Richard Kalmin observes: “The notion of the powerful attraction that minut (‘heresy’) and Christianity exerted on rabbis and their families is found almost exclusively in tannaitic collections such as the Tosefta, but also in tannaitic sources in the Babylonian Talmud that have toseftan parallels. Statements attributed to later Palestinian and Babylonian amoraim in both Talmuds, in contrast, reveal no hint of this notion.” This argument can be further substantiated by observing that the Babylonian Talmud almost systematically “forgets” the meaning of the term min. Indeed, according to that Talmud, minut becomes simply a name for the “other” religion, Christianity to the Jews, Judaism to the Christians. As I have said, it is no longer the name for a Jewish heresy but simply refers to false religious practices, functionally equivalent to idolatry in biblical usage and consequently of no particular attraction to Jews, any more than idolatry had been in Second Temple times. And they imagine that this is the term under which they might, in turn, be persecuted by the Christian Empire. We see, therefore, a real asymmetry; whereas Christian discourse in this time develops a three-term paradigm—Christians, Jews, and heretics—rabbinic discourse imagines only two terms: us and the Gentiles. Religious difference has been, it seems, fully re-ethnicized.

Two moments in the Babylonian Talmud support this proposition. The first comes from the continuation of the Talmud’s version of the narrative about the arrest of Rabbi Eleazar that I have discussed at length in previous work. In one early (mid-third-century) Palestinian story, Rabbi Eleazar is arrested by the Romans on suspicion of being a Christian, referred to as minut in the story. This is the excerpt:
It happened to Rabbi Eli’ezer that he was arrested for sectarianism (*minut* = Christianity), and they took him up to the platform to be judged.

The ruler said to him: “A sage such as you having truck with these matters!?”

He said to him: “I have trust in the judge.”

The ruler thought that he was speaking of him, but he meant his Father in Heaven. He said to him: “Since you trust me, I also have said: Is it possible that these gray hairs would err in such matters? *Dimus [=Dimissus]*! Behold, you are dismissed.” (Tosefta Ḥullin, 2:24)

Having tricked the Roman, he then confesses to his fellows that he has, indeed, had improper friendly religious conversation with a disciple of Jesus. Indeed, on my reading, that he had been “arrested by minut,” that is, found heresy arresting, and not only arrested for minut—the Hebrew phrase allows for both meanings. The fact that this alleged James, the disciple of Jesus, cites midrashic interpretations of his Master makes even more palpable both the Jewishness of minut and, as well, that the issue in this story is the attraction of the Christian minut for even the most prominent of Rabbis. So far, in this text, which has its origins in Palestine, minut means what we would expect it to mean, a Jewish heresy, which we might call Christianity.

In the earlier Tosefta and the Palestinian midrash, this text appears without a sequel, but in the Babylonian Talmud we find the following continuation:

Our Rabbis have taught: When Rabbi El’azar the son of Perata and Rabbi Ḥanina the son of Teradyon were arrested for sectarianism [*minut*], Rabbi El’azar the son of Perata said to Rabbi Ḥanina the son of Teradyon: “Happy art thou, who have been arrested for only one thing. Woe unto me, who have been arrested for five things.” Rabbi Ḥanina the son of Teradyon said to him: “Happy art thou, who have been arrested for five things and will be rescued. Woe unto me, who have been arrested for one thing and will not be saved, for you busied yourself with Torah and with good deeds, while I only busied myself with Torah.”—This is in accord with the view of Rav Huna, who said that anyone who busies himself with Torah alone is as if he had no God. (TB Avoda Zara 17b)

In contrast to Rabbi Eli’ezer, where the “*minut*” involved is explicitly Christianity, these two Rabbis clearly are under no suspicion whatever of Christianity. Their fictive arrest clearly happens during the Hadrianic persecutions of the early second century (not earlier under Trajan) and has to do with the public teaching of Torah, forbidden by Hadrian for political reasons. In other words, they are arrested for practicing Judaism, not for being Christians. And yet the Talmud refers to it as an arrest for *minut*. The term *minut* has clearly shifted meaning for the Babylonian Talmud. It no longer refers to Jewish heresy, but to the binary opposition between Jewish and Gentile religion. Judaism is *minut* for the Romans; Roman religion and Christianity are *minut* for Jews. This semantic shift changes the interpretation of Rabbi Eli’ezer’s arrest in the Talmudic context via what is in effect a misreading. It is unthinkable to this Talmud that Rabbi Eli’ezer had been under suspicion—much less somewhat justifiable suspicion—for association with *minim*, and therefore the text has to make it a code name for arrest for being Jewish, for teaching Torah—that is, *minut*, heresy, as seen from the viewpoint of the Roman order, not from the

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viewpoint of Judaism. In my view, we have evidence, then, that by the time of the editing of the Babylonian Talmud, and perhaps at that geographical distance from Palestine, the center of contact, Jewish Christianity (not in its heresiological sense but in the sense of the Christianity of Jews who remained Jews) had receded into the distance for rabbinic Judaism; Christianity was sufficiently definable as a separate "religion" that it no longer posed a threat to the borders of the Jewish community.

We now have an explanation for the well-known fact that in the Babylonian Talmud, the term min no longer refers to a difference within Judaism, an excluded heretical other, but has come to mean Gentiles and especially Gentile Christians. Once more, as in the period of the Second Temple (up until 70 A.C.) and before, the excluded Other of Judaism is the Gentile and not the heretic within.

The second piece of evidence comes from another story, which historians have hitherto read quite differently:

Rabbi Abbahu used to praise Rav Safra [a Babylonian immigrant to Caesarea Maritima] to the minim that he was a great man [that is, a great scholar]. They released him from excise taxes for thirteen years. One day they met him. They said to him: "It is written: Only you have I known from all of the families of the earth; therefore I will tax you with all of your sins" [Amos 3:2]. One who is enraged,\textsuperscript{49} does he punish his lover?

He was silent, and didn't say anything to them. They threw a scarf on him and were mocking him.

Rabbi Abbahu came and found them.

He said to them: "Why are you mocking him?"

They said to him: "Didn't you say that he is a great man, and he could not even tell us the interpretation of this verse?"

He said to them: "That which I said to you has to do with Mishna, but with respect to the Scripture, I didn't say anything."

They said to him: "What is it different with respect to you that you know [Scripture also]?"

He said to them: "We who are located in your midst, take it upon ourselves and we study; but they do not study." (TB Avoda Zara 4a)

Following the principle set out by Saul Lieberman—that talmudic legend may be read as useful information for the history of the time and place of its production and not the time and place of which it speaks—there is no way that this story, attested only in the Babylonian Talmud, should be taken to represent Palestinian reality.\textsuperscript{150} Its mere existence only there demonstrates that it does not, because the genre of encounters between Rabbis and minim is very rare in Palestinian sources, but very common in Babylonian texts, as Kalmin has recently shown.\textsuperscript{151} Almost always these Babylonian narratives relate the confrontation between a Palestinian sage and a min, of whatever variety. A story such as this may tell us something, therefore, about Babylonian reality in the fourth and fifth centuries.\textsuperscript{152} In that time and space, this text explicitly testifies, Christians were no longer an internal threat to the integrity of the religious life-world of the Rabbis: "They [the Babylonians] do not study Bible, because you [the minim] are not found in their midst." Although
this text is frequently read as indicating that there weren’t Christians or Christianity in the Sassanian environs of the Babylonian Rabbis, this is not, I think, the only—or even the right—way to read it. Christianity may not have been the state religion, but it was certainly present, active, and in open dispute with the Jews there. I would suggest, rather, seeing here an indication of separation of the two “religions.” This is not to be taken as a sign that Christianity did not have powerful effects on the historical development of Judaism in Babylonia (and the reverse), but only that, with the borders clearly established, Christianity was no longer considered a subversive danger for believing Jews. It is thus perhaps not surprising that it is in the Babylonian Talmud that early Palestinian Judaism comes to be re-presented as “a society based on the doctrine that conflicting disputants may each be advancing the words of the living God.” With the borders of unanimity secured, there are no more internal others (at least in theory).

In the imagination of the Rabbis, Judaism has been reconfigured as a grand coalition of differing theological and even halakhic views within the clear and now uncontested borders of rabbinic Judaism. It is this reconfigured imaginaire of a Jewish polity with no heresies and no heresiologies that Gerald Bruns has described: “From a transcendental standpoint, this [rabbinic] theory of authority is paradoxical because it is seen to hang on the heteroglossia of dialogue, on speaking with many voices, rather than on the logical principle of univocity, or speaking with one mind. Instead, the idea of speaking with one mind . . . is explicitly rejected; single-mindedness produces factionalism.” The Rabbis, in the end, reject and refuse the Christian definition of a religion, understood as a system of beliefs and practices to which one adheres voluntarily and defalcation from which results in one’s becoming a heretic. At this moment, then, we first find the principle that has been ever since the touchstone of Jewish ecclesiology: “an Israelite, even though he sin, remains an Israelite,” which we find only once in all of classical rabbinic literature, in the Babylonian Talmud and then in the name of a late amora (Sanhedrin 44a). This same watchword becomes nearly ubiquitous and foundational for later forms of rabbinic Judaism. There is now virtually no way that a Jew can stop being a Jew, since the very notion of heresy was finally rejected and Judaism (even the word is anachronistic) refused to be, in the end, a religion. For the Church, Judaism is a religion, but for the Jews, only occasionally, ambivalently, and strategically it is so. To add one more piquant bit to the material already adduced earlier, let me just mention that, when Jews teach Judaism in a department of religious studies, they are as likely to be teaching Yiddish literature or the history of the Nazi genocide as anything that might be said (in Christian terms) to be part of a Jewish religion!

Jonathan Boyarin writes, “The question of the imbalance between a totalizing categorical usage of the term ‘diaspora’ and the discourses within various diasporic formations that may not recognize that category leads us to the necessary recognition that whatever the criterion for judging our own discourse may be, it cannot rest on a simplistic notion of pluralist (different but in the same ways) tolerance.”
Analogously empowered by the Christian interpellation of Judaism as a religion, the Jews, nevertheless, significantly resisted the (ambiguous) tolerance enacted by the Theodosian Empire’s emplacement of “a frontier all the more mysterious . . . because it is abstract, legal, ideal.” Refusing to be different in quite the same ways, not a religion, not quite, Judaism (including the bizarrely named Jewish orthodoxy of modernity) remained something else, neither quite here nor quite there. Among the various emblems of this different difference remains the fact that there are Christians who are Jews, or perhaps better put, Jews who are Christians, even up to this very day.

Notes

This paper is an expanded and modified version of the last chapter of Daniel Boyarin, *Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity* (Philadelphia, 2004). It is dedicated to a good friend first met in the pages of *Representations*, Carlin A. Barton.


2. For this, if for no other reason, referring to the history of modern Hinduism as its “Semitization” is both inaccurate and disturbing; Daniel Boyarin, “Jewish Cricket,” *PMLA* 113, no. 1 (January 1998): 40–45.

3. Defending the defensibility of this proposition will be the work of chapters 2 and 3 of Daniel Boyarin, *Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity* (Philadelphia, 2004).

4. For instance, a Jew who “converts” to another religion does not have to convert back but only repent his/her sins in order to be accepted in the community again.

5. Hal A. Drake, “Lambs into Lions: Explaining Early Christian Intolerance,” *Past and Present* 153 (1996): 25. Drake’s theory is germane to the hypothesis of this article; Limberis argues that for second-generation Christians this process was reversed → Vasiliki Limberis, “‘Religion’ as the Cipher for Identity: The Cases of Emperor Julian, Libanius, and Gregory Nazianzus,” *Harvard Theological Review* 93, no. 4 (2000): 377. I am not entirely persuaded by her argument on this point but do not wish to entirely disallow it, either. One way of thinking about it would be to see who is left out of “us.” In both the earlier rabbinic and orthodox Christian formations, exemplified by Nazianzen below, there are those tied to us by tradition, kinship, and land who are, nevertheless, not us; they are heretics. See also Rosemary Radford Ruether, “Judaism and Christianity: Two Fourth-Century Religions,” *Sciences Religieuses/Studies in Religion* 2 (1972): 1–10, and Jacob Neusner, *Judaism and Christianity in the Age of Constantine: History, Messiah, Israel, and the Initial Confrontation* (Chicago, 1987), who take related positions.


8. Susanna Elm, “Orthodoxy and the True Philosophical Life: Julian and Gregory of
Nazianzus,” unpublished manuscript (Berkeley, 2000). I am grateful to Professor Elm for sharing her work with me prior to publication. See also Limberis, “Cipher,” 383.

9. Although Gideon Foerster and Yoram Tsafrir, “Nysa-Scythopolis—A New Inscription and the Titles of the City on Its Coins,” Israel Numismatic Journal 9 (1986): 53–58, has been cited as relevant in this context, it seems to me not so. Even accepting the interpretation of the publishers of this inscription that the unique designation of Scythopolis as “one of Coele Syria’s Greek cities” was to insist on the “Hellenic-Pagan” character of the city owing to a threat posed by its mixed population of Jews and Samaritans, we still need not conclude that “Hellenic” here means the religion.


11. Ibid., 386.

12. Ibid., 399. I accept Limberis’s assent to Asad’s critique of Geertz, but nevertheless see much more continuity and a shift toward something that could be called “religion” in the modern sense taking place precisely in these fourth-century echoes of Christianity.


15. Ibid., 45.


17. This point is not contradicted in any way by Denise Kimber Buell, “Race and Universalism in Early Christianity,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 10, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 429–68. Buell’s compelling analysis of second- and third-century texts indicates early Christianity’s struggle to find a mode of identity, with notions of Christianess as a new ethnos/genos being very prevalent indeed. However, Buell herself marks a shift that takes place in the fourth century: “Beginning in the fourth century, ethnic reasoning serves to naturalize the equation of Christianess with gentileness, or Romaness, in part through the oppositional construction of non-Jewish non-Christians as ‘pagans’”; “Race,” 465. I would argue, however, that such a classification marks the undoing of an “ethno/racial” definition of Christianess, insofar as in general throughout the fourth century “pagans” were understood to be just as Roman as Christians. “Pagan” surely did not constitute an ethnic or racial designation but a religious one. Even in the earlier writings considered by Buell, where Christianity is defined as an ethnos or a genos, these terms are the dependent variable of “faith.” This is decidedly not the case for Jews much before the Christian era nor for Judaism since the early Middle Ages. Buell argues elegantly that Christian universalism should not be seen in opposition to or against the background of a putative Jewish particularism: “Seeing that early Christians defined themselves in and through race requires us to dismantle an oppositional definition of Christianess and Jewishness on the basis of race or ethnicity. Doing so may also contribute to resisting periodizations that mark an early and decisive split between Christianities and Judaisms. Not only do many early Christians define themselves as a people, even competing for the same name—Israel—but early Christians adapt and appropriate existing forms of Jewish universalism in formulating their own universalizing strategies in the Roman period. . . . Since ethnic reasoning also resonates with non-Jewish cultural practices of self-definition, it offers an analytic point of entry that treats both Jewish and non-Jewish frames of reference as integrally part of Christian self-definition, not as its ‘background.’”; “Race,” 467. At the same time, notwithstanding Buell’s reference to Isaiah as “emphasizing attachment to Yahweh as defining membership in Israel,” I would suggest that
the notion of “orthodoxy” as defining membership in the Christian community and
the feints in that direction in rabbinc literature that define orthodoxy as the criterion
for membership in Israel represent a “new thing.” That new thing would ultimately
be called “religion.”
55. See also the discussion in Jacobs, “Construction,” 75–100.
19. J. Rebecca Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in Origen, Eusebius,
“Construction,” 33.
23. Which is not, of course, to claim that the notion of ethnic identity is a stable and fixed
(Leiden, 1987), 16–50. Cf., however, Eusebius’s *Demonstratio evangelica* 1.2.1, in Euse-
25. Frances Young, “Did Epiphanius Know What He Meant by ‘Heresy’?” *Studia Patristica*
26. *Panarion*, 17–18. In another part of the Christian world, Frankfurter points out, for
the fifth-century Coptic abbot Shenoute “Hellène did not carry the sense of ethnically
‘Greek’ and therefore different from ‘Egyptian,’ but simply ‘pagan’—‘not Christian’”;
David Frankfurter, *Religion in Roman Egypt: Assimilation and Resistance* (Princeton, NJ.,
1998), 79.
29. For a highly salient and crystal clear delineation of the terms *ethnic* and *cultural*, see
30. As has been noted by previous scholars, for Epiphanius “heresy” is a much more capa-
cious category than for most writers; Aline Pourkier, *L’hérésiologie chez Epiphane de Sala-
mine* (Paris, 1992), 85–87; Young, “Epiphanius”. See the discussion in Jacobs, “Con-
struction,” 56.
32. Justin’s discussion of Jewish heresies is a different move from this, as analyzes ← Daniel
Boyarin, “Justin Martyr Invents Judaism,” *Church History* 70, no. 3 (September 2001):
427–61.
neue Kirchengeschichte* 4, no. 2 (1819): 279, as cited in Glenn Alan Koch, “A Critical
Investigation of Epiphanius’ Knowledge of the Ebionites: A Translation and Critical
(Edinburgh, 1999), 80, writes: “It seems that there were no significant Jewish-
Christian communities left in Palestine itself, and the primary problem for the wider
church was the attraction of Judaism for the members of Gentile Christianity.”
35. Nathaniel Deutsch, *Guardians of the Gate: Angelic Vice Regency in Late Antiquity* (Leiden,
1999), 19.
36. *Panarion*, 120.
44. See the discussion in Jacobs, “Construction,” 114.
46. Boyarin, “Justin Invents Judaism.”
48. Ibid., 319–21.
49. Ibid., 393–95. Fascinatingly, this perspective gives us another way of understanding Julian’s intention to allow the Temple in Jerusalem to be rebuilt. A large part of his polemic consists, as we have seen, of charges that Christians are nothing, since they have abandoned Hellenism but not become Jews, given that they do not follow the Torah. He imagines a Christian answering him that the Jews, too, do not sacrifice as they are enjoined (405–7). What better way to refute this Christian counterclaim and demonstrate that the only reason that Jews do not sacrifice is that they have no Temple—than to help them rebuild their Temple and reinstitute the sacrifices?
50. Hall, *Hellenicity*, xix. Hall’s book was published too late for its results to be incorporated into the discussion here.
51. Wright points out that Julian has Christ-like figures in his own theology; Julian and Wright, “Against the Galileans,” 315.
53. Ibid., 57.
54. *Panarion*, treated by Jacobs, “Construction,” 54–64. My treatment is somewhat different in emphasis from that of Jacobs but, once again, not antithetical.
58. *Panarion*, 123 both quotes.
60. Ibid., 127. 61. Ibid., 126. 62. Ibid., 128.
63. Ibid.
65. *Panarion*, 129 both cites.
66. For the previous scholarship of this sort, see (citing it to oppose it), Goranson, “Revised,” 337.
67. Ibid., 338. I am not entirely sure on what basis Goranson can make the positivist claim in the final clause, but I assume he has good basis for it. In any case, my argument does not depend on such propositions about the actual situation. See the discussion immediately following of Jerome’s notices of “Jewish Christians.” Note, in any case, that in Goranson’s reading, as accepted and extended here, Frédéric Manns is wrong; “Joseph de Tibériade, un judéo-chré tien du quatrième siècle,” in *Christian Archaeology in the Holy Land, New Discoveries: Essays in Honour of Virgilio C. Corbo, OFM*, ed. Giovanni Claudio Bottini (Jerusalem, 1990), 553–60. The whole point of the story is that Joseph does not become a “Jewish-Christian” but a Christian who is not Jewish. See, making a similar point with respect to another scholar’s work, Goranson, “Episode,” 8.
68. Thus one scholar has recently argued that the only function of this story in Epiphanius’s text is to provide some entertaining relief for the reader; T. C. G. Thornton, “The Stories of Joseph of Tiberias,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 44 (1990): 54–63. My interpretation is both similar to and subtly different from that of Jacobs, “Construction,” 62–63, to which it should be compared. The two readings are probably compatible. I somewhat disagree, however, with Jacobs’s last point: “The entire fabric of Joseph’s story in the *Panarion* prepares us to understand how the imperial Christian is to overcome the onslaught of the unorthodox ‘other’: Jews then, Arians now, a bewildering multitude of gnostics, Jewish-Christians, encratites, Origenists, or any other theological deviant who might cross the Christian’s future path. If they can be as thoroughly comprehended as the Jew, their threat will be as easily squashed as an annoying insect”; Jacobs, “Construction,” 63–64. My way of phrasing this point would be that Epiphanius produced the orthodox Jew as the absolute Other of the Christian in order to draw the lines clearly and thus have a space for the absolute delegitimation of other Christians, especially the “Arians,” who are shown to have no religion at all by this move (a motive that appears over and over within the narrative).
71. For an analogous and similarly ramified shift in the meanings of terms within an imperial situation, see Young, *Desire*, 50, on the vicissitudes of “civilization” and “culture.”
75. *Religio ver dei cultus est, superstitio falsi*, 4.28.11.

77. And see the quotation from Seth Schwartz in the next paragraph.


83. Stemberger, Jews and Christians, 29.

84. See the discussion in ibid., 155.

85. Pharr, Theodosian Code, 468. “It does remain likely that there were rabbis among the primates mentioned in the law codes”; Schwartz, Jewish Society, 118. See also J. H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, Antioch: City and Imperial Administration in the Later Roman Empire (Oxford, 1972), 12, 16; Limberis, “Cipher,” 382.

86. Stemberger, Jews and Christians, 308.


88. Schwartz, Jewish Society, 116. For the Patriarch as a perceived threat to Christianity, see Wilhelm Karl Reischl and Joseph Rupp, Cyrilli Hierosolymarum Archiepiscopi Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed. Wilhelm Karl Reischl (Hildesheim, 1967), 2:24, and discussion by Jacobs, “Construction,” 51. Compare the roughly analogous insistence in the code that the high priest of Egypt must not be a Christian (CTh XII. 1.112), and see the discussion in Frankfurter, Religion, 24. According to Stemberger, even this, however, is an understatement with respect to the Patriarch. He shows that in the fourth century the Patriarch was higher in authority than the governor; Stemberger, Jews and Christians, 242–43. Levine writes that in the fourth century the Patriarch was more powerful than the Herodian kings; Levine, “Patriarch,” 651.

89. Pharr, Theodosian Code, 468. See also Schwartz, Jewish Society, 103–4, although “the patriarch, or nasi, by the middle of the fourth [century] had become a very estimable figure indeed, the rabbis did not have any officially recognized legal authority until the end of the fourth century and even then it was severely restricted and in any case not limited to rabbis.” Moreover, and importantly, “As for the patriarchs, they acquired much of their influence precisely by relaxing their ties to the rabbis and allying themselves instead with Palestinian city councillors, wealthy diaspora Jews, and prominent gentiles.” See also Stemberger, Jews and Christians, 34.

90. Pharr, Theodosian Code, 469.
93. This would suggest a possible qualification to claims such as those made by Shaye Cohen, “Pagan and Christian Evidence on the Ancient Synagogue,” in *The Synagogue in Late Antiquity*, ed. Lee I. Levine (Philadelphia, 1987), 170–75.
94. Although this term does not, to the best of my knowledge, exist, Beard, North, and Price, *Religions of Rome*, 237, strongly imply that its virtual synonym, *religio illicita*, does, but only in Christian texts, a fact that would strengthen my case if it could be verified.
95. Stemberger, *Jews and Christians*, 35, even seems to suggest that, when the Theodosian Code (CTh XII.1.158) writes “irrespective of what religion (*superstitio*) they profess,” this might even include Christianity as one of the religions.
97. “*Idem aa. philippo praefecto praetorio per illyricum. nullus tamquam iudaeus, cum sit innocens, obteratur nec expositum eum ad contumeliam religio qualiscumque perficiat.*”
102. Note that since belief is the crucial modus for determining Christian legitimacy, the Quartodeciman heresy is described as a belief and not a practice. Orthodox Judaism would tend to do the opposite, describing wrong beliefs as bad practice.
106. Severus of Minorca, *Letter*, 83. The reference is to 1 Cor. 1:28.
107. Ibid., 83.
108. “*Denique statim intercisa sunt etiam salutationis officia, et non solum familiaritatis consuetudo divulsa est, sed etiam noxia inverterat species caritatis ad odium temporale pro aeternae salutis amore, transleta est*”; ibid., 84–85.
113. Bradbury concludes, “The *Epistula* is thus a central document in the history of religious coercion in late antiquity”; introduction to Severus of Minorca, *Letter*, 2. It is also virtually the only such document for this period, for, as pointed out by Bernhard Blumenkranz and more recently by Günther Stemberger, there is no other evidence


116. Ibid., 88. 117. Ibid., 99–100. 118. Ibid., 105.

119. Exemplary instances of these would be those of Islam or North African and Hassidic Judaism, which have only local relevance. It is fascinating that Moroccan Jewish saints have revealed in dreams to Israeli immigrants that their bodies have been miraculously translated entire to some Israeli site or other. This exemplifies a strategy of “translation” that is almost directly opposite to that of the Western Christian cult of the saints. See also Patricia Cox Miller, “1997 NAPS Presidential Address: ‘Differential Networks’: Relics and Other Fragments in Late Antiquity,” *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 6, no. 1 (1998): 113–38.


121. Ibid., 91, alluding to Augustine.


123. As Bradbury notes, M. van Esbroeck, “Jean II de Jérusalem et les cultes de S. Étienne, de la Sainte-Sion et de la Croix,” *Analecta Bollandiana* 102 (1984): 99–134, suggested that John of Jerusalem’s political initiatives were behind the composition of the various documents attesting to the revelation of these relics and the Passion of St. Stephen at this time. I shall be suggesting a broader political context for them.


130. For this “political” use of psalmody, see Richard Paul Vaggione, *Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution* (Oxford, 2000), 154: “The result, however, was not the ethereal sound of an English cathedral choir singing Evensong [‘haunting beauty’], but the loud cries of a group of religious activists shouting slogans—for this ‘psalmody’ was
as much at home on the streets as in a liturgical ceremony.” Although Vaggione is, of course, speaking of events elsewhere in the Christian world, I am very tempted to tie these two instances together. A perhaps even sharper pendant is the following: “A similar procession during the reign of Julian accompanied the body of St. Babylas. The emperor had ordered it removed from the temple precincts at Daphne; thousands of men, women, and children followed the remains of the martyr into the city shouting again and again: ‘Confounded be all they that worship carved images and put their trust in idols!’ (Ps. 96 [97]:7). Julian was not amused”; Vaggione, Eunomius, 154–55. Neither, I warrant, were the Jews of Minorca.


131. Severus of Minorca, Letter, 83.
132. Pourkier, Épiphane, 78–79 and passim.
133. Severus of Minorca, Letter, 94–95.
134. Ibid., 107.
135. Ibid., 111.
137. Bhabha, Location, 85–92.
138. Sir William Cust, writing in 1839, quoted in Bhabha, Location, 85.
140. And it is, several times in this text, a female Jewish speaker claiming the name of Jewish religio.

141. Schwartz, Jewish Society, 16. My treatment of the code’s materials should be compared with Schwartz, Jewish Society, 192–95.
145. For a much longer and more detailed discussion, see Daniel Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism (Stanford, Calif. 1999), chap. 1.
146. This identification is explicit in the continuation (not cited here), in which Rabbi El’ezer refers to his intercourse with a certain James, the disciple of Jesus. Jerome knows that the term min, “sectarian” is a name for Jewish Christians, as we see from his famous letter to Augustine; Jerome, Correspondence, 55: 381–82. This letter was written about 404; Fritz, Nazarene Jewish Christianity, 53.
148. In the early Palestinian version of the narrative, there is not a hint of the term minut with respect to the arrest and martyrdom of these Rabbis; Louis Finkelstein, ed., Sifre on Deuteronomy (1939; reprint, New York, 1969), 346. For a discussion, see Daniel Boyarin, “A Contribution to the History of Martyrdom in Israel,” in Festschrift for Prof. H. Z., Dimitrovsky, ed. Menahem Hirschman et al. (Jerusalem, 1999), in Hebrew.
149. Translation following Rashi ad loc.
151. Kalmin, “Christians and Heretics.”