FREUD’S BABY, FLIESS’S MAYBE
HOMOPHOBIA, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND THE INVENTION OF OEDIPUS

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“I recover this drama not to unseat Freud, but to reupholster him for the purposes of gay criticism.”

Wayne Koestenbaum

Something happened around 1890, something that John C. Fout has called “a new, historically specific stage in the history of sexuality” (389). It is quite clear that our reading of what exactly happened around 1890 will be contingent in large measure on our assessment of Freud’s “discovery” of the Oedipus complex and thus of psychoanalysis, just at this time. How to interpret this foundational event, however, is less clear. According to the “official” accounts endorsed by the psychoanalytic establishment, what happened was simply that Freud’s attainment of psychological maturity—marked not least by the “overcoming” of homoerotic desire—led to an advance in the theory of sexuality that made possible a great scientific discovery (Kris). According to critiques of Freud that currently enjoy hegemony, on the other hand, the story is one of betrayal and abuse (Masson). According to this revisionist version, Freud originally asserted that abuse of girls by adult male relatives (usually fathers) is the cause of later hysteria in women, but he abandoned this correct understanding in favor of a theory of infantile sexual desire and fantasy because the “true” account was threatening to patriarchal privilege. Neither of these extremes will do, neither Saint Sigmund nor Freud the fraud. There is something that hagiographers and demonologists of Freud alike have left out of accounts of this stage in the history of sexuality, the ways in which the foundations of psychoanalysis and the Oedipus complex are specifically embroiled in the homophobic–anti-Semitic movement of the fin de siècle.
THE COMPLEXITIES OF OEDIPUS

The simple positive Oedipus complex simplifies the child's multifarious attachments to this one heterosexual drama in an attempt to explain how the so-called bisexual male child, filled with contradictory ideas about the salient differences between his parents, uncertain of his own or other's gender, and pace Freud, rife with passive and active sexual aims toward both parents, reemerges on the other side of latency and adolescence merely a more or less neurotic heterosexual.

John Brenkman, *Straight Male Modern*

I must begin by delineating as precisely as possible what exactly is the move in Freud's thinking that I am setting out to explain. As is quite well known by now, there are two Freudian theories of the psyche, an earlier one, of which the dominating trope is hysteria, and a later one, in which hysteria was largely set aside in favor of the diagnosis and investigation of the neuroses. Moreover, the fundamental account of psychic development also shifted epochally, from traumas of infantile sexual abuse causing later disturbances leading to hysteria in certain people to unresolved fantasies of sexual desire for parents that produce neurotic symptoms in almost everybody: the Oedipus complex, with its attendant the castration complex. These two aspects of the reversal are also well known, although the first is frequently ignored in favor of the more sensational second one. This latter is, moreover, read simply as a misogynist refusal on Freud's part to take seriously accounts by female patients of being raped as children (Masson). However, there is an even greater shift that seems hardly to get noticed at all. The first model is gendered as paradigmatically feminine, while the second one is gendered as normatively and exclusively masculine.

In a recent essay, Martha Noel Evans has paid explicit attention to the incongruity of this shift in the apparent object of the scientific theory: "What is strange in Freud's shift from the seduction theory to the theoretical assertion of sexual drives in young children is the uncanny substitution that takes place: at the center of the seduction theory is a young girl seduced by the father; at the center of the Oedipus complex, there is a young boy constructing erotic fantasies about his mother" (80). Evans notes as well how odd it is that Freud in *The Studies* has virtually nothing to say about male hysteria, since nothing in his theory precludes it and previously he had published several papers on male hysterics. On the other hand, I find her explanation less compelling. It depends on the stereotype of "the fantasy of a feminine patient and a masculine authority figure" (75); in other words, on another version of the familiar story of "the misogyny of male physicians and the persecution of female deviants in witch-hunts" (Showalter, "Hysteria" 287).
The presupposition of the currently canonical account is that “Freud succumbed to the popular, medical and legal prejudices of his time: respectable men wouldn’t commit such acts; hysterical women are liars” (Brenkman 96). Against this account we must place two historical considerations: 1) There were men—Freud’s brother and Freud himself—among the victims, and 2) there were women among the abusers. It follows that the interpretation that Freud was just defending the privilege of men against the imprecations of women does not hold water.

Moreover, in the current version of events, it seems obvious that the new model should also have explained the etiology of neurosis in women, or at least dealt with the sexuality and sexual development of women. Another way of saying this is that we can’t both “accuse” Freud of dealing only with women in the first theory because of the age-old androcentric theme of male scientist and female patient and, at the same time, account for his dealing only with men in the second as a product of simple androcentrism in which men are the only object of interest. Such theories end up explaining everything and consequently explain nothing. If indeed, on Evans’ account, “Freud’s new theory can be seen as a symptom at once symbolically reenacting and concealing the abuse of young women” (76), why does it have so little to do with young women? Evans has seen the problem and has given what I take to be a correct answer as far as it goes:

What was denied along with the stories of childhood sexual abuse and then returns symptomatically in the second theory is the (for Freud) devastating knowledge that a boy—perhaps himself—might experience sexual seduction in the passive mode of a female; that, to state it more radically, a boy might be treated like a girl. The theory of childhood sexual fantasies which supplants the seduction theory very precisely protects against this indeterminacy of the sexes by positing a law of heterosexuality. (80–81)

Hysteria, in short, while gendered as paradigmatically feminine, is not exclusively about women, but involves both women and “feminized” men. Evans, however, situates this insight in a timeless narrative of male self-protection against loss of male privilege and power: “Denied in this instance is first, fear of being feminized by seduction, and second, fear of losing control of knowledge, with concomitant fear of the sexual autonomy and power of women” (82). Sprengnether also clearly “gets” the fact that Freud avoids putting himself into a “feminized” position, but like Evans does not locate this within a specific historical cultural-political scenario. She writes: “Feminine identification for Freud seems to threaten loss of power for the male and a corresponding gain (through refusal) for the female” (53), thus locating Freud’s resistance to identification with female positions in an
apparently ageless “War of the Sexes” rather than in the struggles of a disempowered political, social, and cultural male subject.4

Elaine Showalter, on the other hand, proposes the notion of hysteria as a “disease of the powerless and silenced” as an alternative to the conclusion that hysteria is about “Women’s questions.” In a recent paper she has written, “Although male hysteria has been documented since the seventeenth century, feminist critics have ignored its clinical manifestations, writing as though ‘hysterical questions’ about sexual identity are only women’s questions” (“Hysteria” 288). Hysteria is indeed about femaleness but not, therefore, exclusively about “women.” The feminist critics that I have been citing have captured a highly compelling insight. In order both to maintain the perceptions of the “feminist critics” (I hardly think that Showalter is taking herself out of this category, nor am I) and to take more seriously the connections of hysteria to the oppression of male subjects, we will have to reconceive the category of gender itself in directions that the most sophisticated current feminist theory is already taking us.

The opposition itself between hysteria as “women’s questions” and hysteria as the “disease of the powerless and silenced” is an artifact of the false binary between race and gender. Insofar as gender is a set of cultural expectations and performances, usually but not determinately mapped onto the “anatomical differences between the sexes,” it becomes impossible to assume constant genderings in cross-cultural comparison. If being gendered “male” in our culture is having power and speech—phallus and logos—the silenced and powerless subject is female, whatever her anatomical construction.5 “Hysteria” itself—a female malady, as feminist historians have properly registered—provides an elegant demonstration of this thesis, precisely because hysteria was not exclusive to anatomical women but to women and certain racially marked men. This recognition, indebted to Hortense Spillers’ claim that “there is no such thing as a black woman,” will give us a clue to a fresh reading of the great shift in Freud’s thinking.

The key to understanding the development of Freud’s oedipal model is, indeed, that his hysteria theory is also about such men, as well as about women. Freud said as much openly (Showalter, “Hysteria” 315). It is well known that what most aroused the ire of the Viennese medical audience that heard Freud’s first lecture upon returning from Charcot was the fact that it was about male hysteria. In his first model Freud reconstructed (or invented) memories of child abuse not only for female patients but for boys as well—including his brother—as a means of accounting for his own male hysteria. Six out of the eighteen cases mentioned in the paper on which the seduction theory is based, “The Aetiology of Hysteria” (1896), are cases of boys, not of girls (Robinson 160).6 In one of the most famous of Freud’s letters to Fliess, he writes, “Unfortunately my own father was one of these
perverts and is responsible for the hysteria of my brother (all of whose symptoms are identification) and those of several younger sisters" (Complete Letters 230–31; see also 264).

This theory implicated Freud himself quite directly, a point that enables me to propose an explanation for otherwise quite startling developments. Freud adapted the language of Oedipus as a self-diagnosed hysteric, a representation that further configured him as female and thus, according to the "inversion" model then current, as queer. This transpires clearly in his letter to Fliess of October 3, 1897, where he refers to "resolving my own hysteria" (Complete Letters 269). Interestingly enough, this diagnosis was current in the psychoanalytic establishment itself, albeit discreetly so. In 1951 Strachey wrote to Ernest Jones, "I was very much interested by your account of the suppressed passages in the Fliess letters. It is really a complete instance of folie à deux, with Freud in the unexpected role of hysterical partner to a paranoiac" (qtd. in Masson 216). This is easily decoded as "with Freud in the unexpected role of female partner to a male," hysteria naming the characteristically female neurosis, while paranoia represents the characteristic male (homosexual) neurosis. This diagnosis in the Briefwechsel was, moreover, explicitly associated both by Strachey and by Jones with Freud's "bisexuality," by which they, writing in the 1950s, meant not the theory of androgyny but precisely what we mean by this word, sexual desire for both male and female objects.

Very soon after the letter in which he identifies his father as a "pervert," simply and only on the basis of the symptomatology of his siblings, he writes, "The point that escaped me in the solution of hysteria lies in a different source, from which a new element of the product on the unconscious arises. What I have in mind are hysterical fantasies which regularly, as I see it, go back to things that children overhear at an early age" (Complete Letters 234, and see 239). In short, Freud was already beginning to abandon (or better complicate) the "seduction" theory in early April 1897, only two months after indicting his father as a child abuser in February of that year. The explanation that Freud abandoned the (absurdly named) seduction theory because he became convinced that it is impossible to assume such an incredibly enormous number of paternal child abusers accounts for the abandonment of the theory of sexual abuse at the origin of every hysteria, but does not explain the oedipal theory that "replaced" it. Freud could, after all, simply have substituted childhood fantasies and desires of seduction for the actual events and otherwise maintained the structure of his "neurotica."

Only a month later we find him writing, "It is to be supposed that the element essentially responsible for repression is always what is feminine. . . . What men essentially repress is the pederastic element" (Complete Letters 246). In spite of the odd use of "pederastic" here, or perhaps because of it, it
seems that Freud means that men always repress their desire to be penetrated. Else, how could he call it “the feminine”? And indeed, Freud’s oedipal theory reenacts the repression of the pederastic element of which he himself speaks. Because it has not been actually replaced with an alternative, the seduction theory remains like a repressed memory in Freud’s thought as a sort of phantom, a revenant, reappearing only considerably later (especially in the Wolf Man text: Davis 65–71) as the so-called negative Oedipus, the desire on the part of the son to be penetrated by the father. More than the possibility of seduction (that is, child-rape), which Freud never, in fact, denied, it is the fantasy and desire of the boy child for the father that is repressed in the oedipal theory.11

Two questions concerning the invention of the oedipal theory occur as a result of recognizing that Freud’s hysteria theory was also about men. Why was the role of desire for the father so threatening to Freud? Equally shocking desires are given their due by Freud, but the role of the “negative Oedipus” remains a black sheep of the family, never quite acknowledged although not, to be sure, entirely rejected as well. Second, why did hysteria practically disappear from the scene of Freud’s writing at this time, and especially, whatever happened to the male hysteric?12 If we forget that he existed, this is surely because Freud wanted us to. What, in short, was at stake?

**FREUD’S HYSTERIA AND THE “SEDUCTION THEORY”**

The first step toward answering these questions is easily taken. It is striking to me how many scholars and interpreters of Freud have been recently talking about the powerful homoerotic content in some of Freud’s early writings, notably in his letters to his friend Wilhelm Fliess and in the text produced at about the same time, The Interpretation of Dreams. The association of homoerotic desire with the “feminized” men included in the category of hysterics was a commonplace of fin-de-siècle culture. That the “seduction” theory disclosed Freud’s own homoerotic inclinations becomes clear if we look more deeply into his understanding of the hysteria that the Oedipus model effaces and represses—the hysteria that Freud had diagnosed in himself.

To begin with, it is increasingly being recognized that the parental seductions Freud reports in his early case histories of hysterics were indeed very likely fantasies—not, however, fantasies of the patients but of Freud himself (Robinson 165). In Freud’s own description (before “abandoning” the theory), “The fact is that these patients never repeat these stories spontaneously, nor do they ever in the course of treatment suddenly present the
physician with the complete recollections of a scene of this kind. One only succeeds in awakening the psychical trace of a precocious sexual event under the most energetic pressure of the analytic procedure and against enormous resistance. Moreover, the memory must be extracted piece by piece” (3: 153, emphasis added). The Fliess correspondence provides an excellent example of how Freud led some of his patients to “remember” parental abuse:

**Habemus papam!**

When I thrust the explanation at her, she was at first won over; then she committed the folly of questioning the old man himself, who at the very first intimation exclaimed indignantly, “Are you implying that I was the one?” and swore a holy oath to his innocence.

She is now in the throes of the most vehement resistance, claims to believe him, but attests to her identification with him by having become dishonest and swearing false oaths. I have threatened to send her away and in the process convinced myself that she has already gained a good deal of certainty which she is reluctant to acknowledge.

She has never felt as well as on the day when I made the disclosure to her. In order to facilitate the work, I am hoping she will feel miserable again.

The pain in her leg appears to have come from her mother. (Freud, *Complete Letters* 220–21, emphases added)

The patients reported symptoms; it was Freud who translated the symptoms into narratives of child abuse. Here is Freud describing his method: “Having diagnosed a case of neurasthenic neurosis with certainty and having classified its symptoms correctly, we are in a position to translate the symptomatology into aetiology” (3: 269).

In contrast to other writers who have pointed these texts out, I see here, however, no defect in either Freud’s procedure not in his honesty. What, after all, is the procedure of any diagnosis but reasoning from symptomatology to aetiology? This recognition does, however, force us to reevaluate both the standard interpretation of the discovery of psychoanalysis in the “recognition that the seduction stories told by the patients were fantasies,” as well as the indictment that Freud chose to disbelieve true stories of child abuse. Both are equally dependent on the assumption that the patients actually produced such accounts, but as he himself wrote, even after revealing the secret to the patients, “they have no feeling of remembering the scenes” (3: 204). Freud later revised these forced, in every sense of the word, interpretations of his—not the memories of his patients—into narrative of childhood desires and fantasies of seduction by the parent. Let me make myself absolutely clear; the issue here is not belief or disbelief of patients but rather the (almost violent) imposition (“thrust”) through threats of a theory on the
patients against their “most vehement resistance.” In contrast, in December 1897, months after the letter in which he “abandoned my neurotica,” Freud writes of “the intrinsic authenticity of infantile trauma” and of a father who “belongs to the category of men who stab women, for whom bloody injuries are an erotic need. When she was two years old, he brutally deflowered her” (Complete Letters 288; emphasis in original). The end of this same letter reads: “A new motto: ‘What has been done to you, you poor child?’”

Freud never chose systematically to disbelieve women; he abandoned a theory whereby all hysteria was to be explained by child abuse, whether remembered or not. The question is not, then, why did Freud revise this theory, but why was it necessary in the first place for him to assume childhood sexual abuse as the universal etiology of hysteria? Why, in short, did Freud force these narratives on (at least some of) his patients, male and female? If we assume as a hermeneutical principle that Freud thought what he thought and wrote what he wrote in good faith, then there was some reason within him—psychological or sociocultural—that led him to read those symptoms as narratives of seduction by the father. Here as well the most plausible interpretation is that these were projections of Freud’s own fantasies and desires (or memories of childhood seduction) into his patients’. This need not be read as unconscious projection, but could simply have been the product of a strong heuristic principle that Freud employed even much later to generalize from his own experience and assume its universality (cp. Mahony). Such seduction, moreover, on Freud’s own theories, as we shall see forthwith, would have led as well to homosexuality.

It should not be understood that the hysterogenic sexual event was necessarily homosexual. Indeed, as it is eminently clear in the cases of male hysteria, including Freud’s own, there was often a female sexual abuser (Freud, Complete Letters 268; see Sprengnether 36–37). Sprengnether focuses on this aspect of the issue and arrives at the interesting hypothesis that Freud was primarily motivated by a need to erase the desiring mother from his theory: “Because of its strategic function in this regard, Freud’s focus on Oedipal masculinity effectively obscures his vision of the preodipal mother” (38; 50). Sprengnether writes of Freud’s interpretation of an incident in which the Wolf Man’s sister had played with his penis: “Freud’s comment on this episode reveals the extent to which he associates it with the kind of sexual humiliation he had experienced at the hands of his own nanny. He characterized the Wolf Man’s memory of this event as ‘offensive to the patient’s self-esteem,’ and one that elicits a counterfantasy in which he takes the aggressive role” (72). It is the sexual passivity of the male that feminizes (and paradoxically homosexualizes), not the gender of the active subject. This transfer takes place within Freud’s reading of the Wolf Man. The reality (or fantasy) of female sexual aggression directed at the boy is trans-
lated into a “feminine” desire directed at his father. Freud writers, “The boy had travelled, without considering the difference of sex, from his Nanya to his father” (17: 46), the same journey that Freud took in his own psyche, from the nanny to the father, thus representing for us via the Wolf Man his own feminized and thus homosexual desire.

Let us follow the sequence of thoughts that are produced in Freud’s crucial letters of late September–early October 1897. In the first he claims to abandon the theory of hysteria that he has been so laboriously developing because it would imply that an incredible number of fathers (including his own) would have had to be sexual abusers to produce the numbers of hysterics that there were, and he cannot believe that. A few days later, however, he still seems to believe the “seduction” theory and, in the case of his brothers and sisters, that his father is responsible, because he writes, “I can only indicate that in my case the ‘prime originator’ was an ugly, elderly, but clever woman” (*Complete Letters* 268). Moreover, in the very next sentence Freud is already referring to an entirely hypothetical outburst of desire directed toward his mother after seeing her nude on a train trip at the age of two to two-and-a-half years. Finally, less than two weeks later, Freud for the very first time refers to Oedipus and to “everyone in the audience” having been “a budding Oedipus in fantasy” (272). Following the reasoning that Freud produced in the Wolf Man, the logical conclusion would be that the sexual stimulation provided by the nurse, which puts the boy in the passive (feminized) position, would have been translated into passive desires directed at Freud’s father. The immediate shift to the (again I emphasize quite “fictional”) account of having seen his mother naked and the accompanying “awakening of libido toward matrem,” as well as the rapid discovery of Oedipus, suggests strongly that something indeed is being repressed here: passive desire for the father. Because of its strategic function in this regard, Freud’s focus on oedipal masculinity effectively obscures his experience as the passively desiring male.

This interpretation receives strong support from a very famous passage of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, in which Freud repeats a story that his father had told him of having had his hat knocked off his head by a gentile who demanded that he get off the sidewalk. The boy Freud asked the father what he had done and received the reply that he had gone into the gutter and picked up the hat. The man Freud, reporting this incident, writes of his disappointment with this “unheroic conduct on the part of the big, strong man” (4: 197). In a brilliant interpretation, William J. McGrath argues that the hat in the story would have been understood by Freud as a symbol for the phallus, so “the knocking off of his father’s hat could have directly symbolized to him the emasculation of Jakob Freud” (64). Psychoanalytic historian Samuel Slipp has remarked that “Freud’s early oedipal experience
with a dominant mother and a passive father probably led him to the conclusion that male homosexuality was due to lack of resolution of Oedipus complex and failure to identify with the father” (6). What seems to be missing from his account is the obvious logical conclusion to which it inexorably leads, namely that Freud himself identified as “a homosexual.” That is the only way that Freud’s experience could have “led him” to such a “conclusion.”

FREUD AND FLEISS AS LOVERS: OR, FREUD WAS ONE QUEER JEW

I am looking forward to our congress as to the slaking of hunger and thirst. I bring nothing but two open ears and one temporal lobe lubricated for reception.

—The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904.

The various interpreters of Freud who have been at the same time focusing on the homoerotic content of Freud’s early writings complement each other and together yield the possibility of a powerful hypothesis with regard to the question of the origins of the Oedipus complex. Freud was engaged in what can only be described as a highly erotic relationship with his friend. They exchanged the most intimate of letters and had “congresses.” The next sentence of the letter quoted above includes a reference to “male and female menstruation in the same individual,” that is, to the bisexuality theory. The association seems hardly coincidental.

This element was first paid attention to by Peter Heller (95), even though he was limited to the “censored” version of the Freud-Fliess correspondence published by Kris. A recent writer on this topic has remarked that when she first read the full edition of the letters, “What was most apparent—and surprising—to me about them was that they are love letters. Careful rereadings have not changed my mind” (Garner 86; see also Koestenbaum 19). One example will do beautifully to illustrate her point: “If there now are two people, one of whom can say what life is, and the other can say (almost) what the mind is—and furthermore the two are very fond of each other—it is only right that they should see and talk to each other more frequently” (Freud, Complete Letters 287). Didier Anzieu makes the even more startlingly pungent observation that Freud’s love letters to his fiancée Martha were “a kind of dress rehearsal for his later correspondence with Fliess” (22), and indeed the tone of these two bodies of correspondence is remarkably alike. Freud had written to Martha, “The sweet girl . . . came towards me [and] strengthened the faith in my own value and gave me new hope and energy to work when I needed it most” (qtd. in Anzieu 22). Later he was to write to
Fliess, “When I think of the many weeks when I felt uncertain about my life, my need to be with you increases greatly” (Complete Letters 89).

In addition to the elements of homoeroticism in the letters of Freud to Fliess, or rather intimately bound up with them, it has also been strongly theorized that Freud’s relationship with Fliess was marked by manifold symptoms of fantasies of pregnancy by him. Erik Erikson had already cited evidence for Freud’s self-feminization in the relationship in a justly famous paper of 1954 on the dream of Irma’s injection (33). During the course of the liaison Freud repeatedly figures his own creativity as the product of this congress; he fantasizes (consciously?) that he is bearing Fliess’s child. “In his 12 June 1895 letter to Fliess, Freud states that ‘Reporting on [the psychological construction of defense] now would be like sending a six-month fetus of a girl to a ball’” (Geller, “(G)nos(e)ology” 260). In 1897 Freud writes, “after the frightful labor pains of the last few weeks, I gave birth to a new piece of knowledge” (Complete Letters 278). Were it not for all of the other evidence, one might be inclined to take these as “mere (and conventional) metaphors.” The other evidence, however, suggests much more—and indeed is suggestive as to the ultimate origin of these conventional modes of expression themselves.

Thus Geller interprets Freud’s and Fliess’s theoretical speculations on the connections between noses and genitals, and especially between nosebleeds and menstruation: “The reference to the Nasenmuscheln also evokes another intrinsically ‘feminine’ body process: birthing. Again, according to Fliess, these ‘genital spots’ were intimately related to the birthing process.” Geller further notes that “the process of conception is alluded to at both the beginning and end of the dream. When the dream opens, Freud and his wife are receiving guests. The German term for ‘receive,’ ‘empfangen,’ is rife with associations to conception; for example, the ‘unbefleckte Empfängnis’ is the Immaculate Conception.” Geller also observes that “Freud would later write to Fliess that birthing—or miscarrying—is dirty, diarrhetic: ‘everything related to birth, miscarriage, period goes back to the toilet via the word Abort [toilet] Abortus [abortion].’ . . . And the cause of the conception, the unclean syringe, is a dirty squirter or penis [Spritze nicht rein]. These images of befouled or failed birth conflict with Freud’s desire to create. His works are his creations, his children with Fliess” (“(G)nos(e)ology” 265–66).

In an unpublished paper, Gerard F. Beritela has augmented Geller’s reading of this letter, noting that Freud refers to “making” and “making more” and boasts to make more shit as the “new Midas.” This shit is clearly connected with birth in Freud’s own explicit and conscious expression “via the word Abort.” “Freud is thus bragging about his own anal fertility, as if trying to entice Fliess into ‘making more’ with him.” From here Freud segues into a description of anal rape, and then, “The last paragraph of the letter
speaks of censorship and repression as if to signal that what has gone before is indeed the remnant of a highly censored communication. Read this way, the letter begins with Freud’s desire to be passive in the upcoming congress with Fliess. It continues with a description of Freud’s anal fertility and a crypto-pornographic description of anal rape.” 22 Freud’s own comments in the letter just before this about “keeping one’s own mouth shut about the most intimate things” certainly buttresses this reading.

For Freud’s own associations between shit and creation the letter of February 23, 1893 is very significant (Complete Letters 300); Freud refers in his letter to “depositing his novelties” in his DR (Dreckologisch Report). Masson translates this as “collection of filth” (Freud, Complete Letters 293), interpreting Dreck in its German sense, while to me it is clear that Freud is using the term in the Yiddish sense of shit. Freud thus deposits his novellae in the place for shit; the novelties are shit. And on 5 March Freud writes, “The DR have been interrupted, since I no longer write them for you” (301)!

Under the influence of the primal scene he came to the conclusion that his mother had been made ill by what his father had done to her; and his dread of having blood in his stool, of being as ill as his mother, was his repudiation of being identified with her in this sexual scene. . . . But the dread was also a proof that in his later elaboration of the primal scene he had put himself in his mother’s place and envied her this relation with his father. The organ by which his identification with women, his passive homosexual attitude to men, was able to express itself was the anal zone. (17: 78)

In another passage of the same text, Freud writes, as explicitly as possible, that “the stool was the child,” and then continues,

The necessary condition of his re-birth was that he should have an enema administered to him by a man. . . . This can only have meant that he had identified himself with his mother, that the man was acting as his father, and that the enema was repeating the act of copulation, as the fruit of which the excrement-baby . . . would be born. The phantasy of re-birth was therefore bound up closely with the necessary condition of sexual satisfaction from a man. So that the translation now runs to this effect: only on condition that he took the woman’s place and substituted himself for his mother, and thus let himself be sexually satisfied by his father and bore him a child—only on that condition would his illness leave him. (17: 100).

We are entitled to interpret excrement in Freud’s writing as having to do with birth, then, not because this association is a universal of the psyche, but
on the evidence of Freud’s own texts. The association between the anus, anal penetration, shit, and birth-giving seems to be well established on the overt intertextual level within which Freud worked and can thus be legitimately read in his own letters as well. Freud here provides the key for reading his fantasies of being pregnant with Fliess’s child when he implicates “excrement babies” with “the necessary condition of sexual satisfaction from a man.”

When all of these data and interpretations are put together, a reading emerges: what is at stake in the suppression of the male hysterical and the desire for the father in the shift to the oedipal theory is the suppression of Freud’s own homoeroticism. Freud was motivated in his relationships with men, and especially with Fliess, by acknowledged homoerotic desires, associated as they were at the time with both fantasies of “inversion” and of all-male procreation. To what extent these desires found physical satisfaction, I think we will never know (Heller 95), although it seems rather improbable. The Oedipus complex is an inexorably heterosexual, even heterosexist concept. It was gradually unfolding itself and its full heteronormative purport, moreover, approximately at the same time as the rift with Fliess was opening and then widening, finally resulting in what Freud later refers to as an overcoming of Fliess as well as an overcoming of “a bit of unruly homosexual investment” (Freud and Ferenczi 221). As Davis has acutely noted, “Those who think that Freud’s understanding of the nature, importance, and prevalence of the Oedipus complex was complete following his self-analysis and his subsequent publication in 1900 of The Interpretation of Dreams may be surprised to learn that Freud’s first published use of the term did not occur until 1910 in a paper called ‘A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men’” (54). 1910 is a crucial year—as crucial as 1897. In 1910, as we shall see, Freud was claiming (in letters to Ferenczi) that he had been recently “occupied with overcoming Fliess” (Freud and Ferenczi 221), that is, with repressing his own homoerotic desire. And in 1910 he was writing the Schreber text. An adequate explanation of these developments will, therefore, necessitate an understanding of how they are imbricated in each other. Moreover, since I am not psychoanalyzing Freud but historicizing him, the explanation will have to go beyond the biographical details of Freud’s life and intellectual development.

Freud was apparently aware of the homoerotic dimensions of his attachment to Fliess from the beginning, as Garner effectively argues (95–96). He almost explicitly associated his relationship with Fliess as one in which he adopted a passive, i.e. “feminine,” role in the indirect communication to Fliess in Interpretation of Dreams, chapter 6, where he writes: “A little girl asked me the way to a particular street, and I was obliged to confess that I did not know; and I remarked to my friend: ‘It is to be hoped that when she grows up that little girl will show more discrimination in her choice of the
people she gets to direct her.’” Anzieu notes “Freud’s female/passive identification (he is the little girl who chooses the wrong person to direct her) vis-à-vis the male/active Fliess,” and concludes that “Freud’s interest, now enthusiastic, now hesitant, in the notion of bisexuality is directly connected with a ‘transference effect’ of a homosexual nature. Freud still had a long way to go before he was able to realize the latent submission and homosexuality that bound him to Fliess. It was only after Freud had shaken off that bond that psychoanalysis became an independent science” (259).

According to Anzieu’s reading, then, the invention of psychoanalysis was intimately connected with Freud’s repudiation of his “homosexuality.” Anzieu—like Schur and McGrath—understands this event, however, as a freeing of Freud from Fliess’s pernicious influence so that he would be free to develop his own theories. I question the inexorability of this explanation. Once it is questioned, other possibilities arise almost of themselves. Listen to Freud explaining his breakup with Breuer to Fliess: “If Breuer’s masculine inclination were not so odd, so faint-hearted, so contradictory, as is everything emotional in him, he would be a beautiful example of the kinds of achievement to which the androphile current in men can be sublimated” (Complete Letters 447). What Freud is saying here, astonishingly, is that if Breuer had been more open and direct about his homoerotic desire, he would have been a worthier friend for Freud to hang on to. Can there be much doubt that a message is being sent to Fliess as well, just as he is acknowledging the unbridgeable rift between them (August 7, 1901)? Freud never quite got over his love for Fliess, even according to Jones. Why did Freud feel comfortable with (sublimated) homoeroticism early in the 1890s but later feel that he had to “overcome” it, “overcome” Fliess, and produce a theory in which repudiation of passivity—of femininity—is projected as the “bedrock” of the psyche?

The “official” view of the link between Freud’s break with Fliess and his discovery of Oedipus is summed up by Schur: “He recognized that his patients’ fantasies rather than early seductions were the most frequent etiological factor of their hysteria; he uncovered the ubiquitous role of infantile sexuality and especially the oedipal conflict in normal and abnormal development. He now knew that he had solved one of the great riddles of nature. With this conviction he also achieved an inner independence. Simultaneously the critical part of him reasserted itself in relation to Fliess” (Freud 139).

I am turning this picture upside down. Freud indeed abandoned the seduction theory/trauma theory of hysteria (the fantasy of his own “seduction”) at the same time he was beginning to separate from Fliess. In the letter that first announces Oedipus there is already strong—if indirect and ironic—indication of the scepticism about Fliess’s theories that would eventually be one of the major causes of their break (Complete Letters 273). Schur (Freud
and McGrath (234) both date the beginnings of the “collision course” in the fall of 1897. The final breakup was, of course, not until 1900. But during all this period, when Freud struggled with his growing ambivalence about Fliess and Fliess’s theories and about his own theories of seduction and the oedipal complex, what was constantly at stake was the tension between a theory of sexuality that would heterosexualize him via the repression of homoeroticism and a theory of sexuality that implicated him homoerotically and that was mapped over a heartfelt homoerotic relationship.

In short, not only was the new theory of psychoanalysis essentially an act of repression/overcoming, but the Oedipus model itself ought to be interpreted as a repression of homoerotic desire. The fundamental ideas of human sexual development in Freud are a sort of screen or supervalent thought for a deeper but very threatening psychic constituent that Freud had found in his own hysteria but that then panicked him: the desire for “femaleness,” for passivity, to be the object of another man’s desire, even to bear the child of another man. The analysand that Freud came to disbelieve was thus himself.

**MALE HYSTERICS AND THE RACE OF MENSTRUATING MEN**

The real question underlying the invention of the heteronormativizing Oedipus model is: What was the source of this panic? The answer that I suggest is that it was occasioned by a nexus of historical forces that included the pathologizing of the “homosexual,” an appellation that had only recently become available, and the racialization of the Jews (Sedgwick). Freud panicked at the discursive configuration imposed on him by three deeply intertwined cultural events: the racialization/gendering of anti-Semitism, the fin-de-siècle production of sexualities, including the “homosexual,” and the sharp increase in contemporary Christian homophobic discourse (the “Christian Values” movement) (Fout; Davidson; Cohen). These discourses produced a perfect and synergistic match between homophobia and anti-Semitism. By identifying himself as hysterical and as Fliess’s *eromenos*, Freud had been putting himself in the very categories that the anti-Semitic discourse of the nineteenth century would put him in: feminized, pathic, queer—Jewish.

Stewart suggested in 1976 that among the factors that led Freud to abandon Charcot’s heredity theory were its connotations of racism, which meant at that time anti-Semitism (221). It is important to emphasize that this factor need not be read reductively to the effect that Freud abandoned and created theories in order to protect himself against racism and that the theories, themselves, have therefore no value. I could as easily interpret this to
mean that because of his sensitivity as a victim of the racist implications of
the theory, he was led to think further and deeper and more critically about
the problem itself. With reference to a case in which a man who was sexually
abused by another man as a child then abused his sister, and both became
hysterical, Freud writes, “You may gather from this how a neurosis escalates
to a psychosis in the next generation—which is called degeneracy—simply
because someone of more tender age is drawn in. Here, by the way, is the
heredity of this case” (Complete Letters 222). That the word “degeneracy” is
used ironically by Freud—as is “heredity”—provides evidence for this inter-
pretation. And in the same ironic tone Freud writes in his Studies: “We
should do well to distinguish between the concepts of ‘disposition’ and
‘degeneration’ as applied to people; otherwise we shall find ourselves forced
to admit that humanity owes a large proportion of its great achievements to
the efforts of ‘degenerates,’” that is, Jews and homosexuals (Breuer and
Freud 104). It was at precisely the same point he stopped writing about male
hysteric.

In the second half of the 1890s, Freud realized (consciously or not) the
deeply problematic implications of his position. Charcot had, of course,
referred to the special propensity of Polish Jews to hysteria (Mosse 142;
Goldstein 536 and especially 540–41). An American Jewish doctor of the time
wrote, “The Jewish population of [Warsaw] alone is almost exclusively the
inexhaustible source for the supply of specimens of hysterical humanity, partic-
ularly the hysteria in the male, for all the clinics of Europe” (Fishberg, qtd. in
Gilman, “Image” 405). Gilman shows that his view, which resulted from a mis-
quotation, became the standard view in German psychiatric circles. By focus-
ing on hysteria, especially in light of his own self-diagnosed hysteria, Freud was
fashioning a self-representation that collaborated with one of the most tena-
cious of anti-Semitic topoi—that Jews are a third sex: men who menstruate.

The topos of Jewish men as a sort of women is a venerable one going back
at least to the thirteenth century in Europe, where it was ubiquitously main-
tained that Jewish men menstruate (Biller 192–93, 196). As the fourteenth-
century Italian astrologer Cecci d’Ascoli writes, “After the death of Christ
all Jewish men, like women, suffer menstruation” (Biller 199). As Biller has
shown, melancholia and sexual excess were already given in the thirteenth
century as two of the major factors that produced Jewish male menstrua-
tion. The explanation of this myth is to be found in the consistent represen-
tation of male Jews as female in European culture, largely because of their
circumcision, which was interpreted as feminizing (Geller, “Paleontological
View”). In Viennese slang of Freud’s time, the clitoris was called “the Jew”
and female masturbation was “playing with the Jew” (Gilman, Freud 38–39).
If Jewish men are a kind of women, or even women simpliciter, then it is
hardly surprising that they menstruate; moreover, if a primary cause of the
theory of their femaleness is their circumcised penises, an operation that causes genital bleeding and within which the bleeding is in fact a primary motif, then the base for myths of Jewish male menstruation seems clear. Such representations of male Jews as females were internalized by Jews as well, including Spinoza, who in a fascinating passage writes: “The mark of circumcision is also, I think, of great importance in this connection; so much so that in my view it alone will preserve the Jewish people for all time; indeed, did not the principles of their religion make them effeminate [effeminat] I should be convinced that some day when the opportunity arises . . . they will establish their state once more, and that God will choose them afresh” (Geller, “Paleontological View” 59, citing Spinoza 63; see also Boyarin and Boyarin).

This ambivalent gendering was the reason that male Jews were particularly prone to hysteria in the medical imaginary of the nineteenth century: they were gendered as Victorian women. According to Thomas Sydenham, a mid-nineteenth-century English medical writer, the prime candidates for (male) hysteria were “such male subjects as lead a sedentary or studious life, and grow pale over their books and papers” (qtd. in Veith 141). These men were enacting a male equivalent of the “female” pursuits of embroidery, tatting, and such; in short—although Sydenham may not have realized it—almost a perfect portrait of the ideal Jewish male of Eastern Europe, the pale, sedentary, studious Yeshiva Bokhur, whose wife (and he did always end up with one) was ideally robust, energetic, and economically active.30 If, as Freud writes, after discovering the heteronormativizing power of Oedipus, the etiology of homosexuality is “masculine women, women with energetic traits of character, who were able to push the father out of his proper place” (11: 99), that is, it seems exactly the sort of mother Freud had, as well as a father who had indeed been pushed out of his “proper place.” More to the point, Galician Jewish culture in general had such mothers and fathers.31

The representation of the ideal male Jew as female thus was not only an external one, one that originated in the fantasies of anti-Semites, but also an internal one that represented a genuine Jewish cultural difference. It is, moreover, while not troubled, also not negative in its traditional cultural manifestations. In fact, this sense of self-feminization was one of the traditional ways in which male Jews defined themselves over and against the gentile world. Within traditional rabbinic Jewish culture, the feminization of the male, in part symbolized (or effected?) through truncation of the penis, was experienced as a positive phenomenon, as a positive sense of self-identification and differentiation from the Romans (and their descendants). In fact, as Martin Bergmann has noted, the “feminine” response of Freud’s father in the famous hat incident was not “unheroic” but antiheroic: “A Jew was expected to be able to control his anger, not to be provoked; his feelings
of inner dignity were sustained by a belief in his own spiritual superiority which a ruffian and a ‘Goy’ can in no way touch” (12). Not so, however, for the “emancipated” Jew of Vienna, the Jew living a life “in between,” to adopt Leo Spitzer (the younger)’s evocative terminology. For the emancipated Jew this representation would have been transvalued into something negative and shameful, especially as two discourses were intensifying at the fin de siècle, the discourses of misogyny and homophobia (Cohen; Senelick). These two movements are, moreover, profoundly related at this time owing to the associations of homosexuality with passivity, i.e. with femaleness, and hatred of such femaleness was raised to a fever pitch that it seems not to have known before at just this time (Dijkstra; Showalter, Sexual Anarchy). Misogyny thus returns, however in a much more complex guise, as a motive force in Freud’s ideation.

The shift in Freud’s thinking records the subjectivity of a person living and experiencing the invention of heterosexuality in his lifetime. “Heterosexuality,” as famously defined by David Halperin, is the strange idea that a “normal” man will never feel desire for sex with a man. Two particular events of that period may very well have been instrumental in focusing his attention on the threat that his own theories bore him, one the Oscar Wilde trials in 1895 and the other the discourse of and around Otto Weininger, with his claim of an essentially female Jewishness. In 1902 and 1906 there were sensational “homosexual” scandals in Germany as well (Mosse 88; 105). Traditional Jewish male passivity—associated with queerness—would have become very problematic in such an environment.

Gilman connects Fliess’s fantastic theories of male periodicity associated with bleeding from the nose with anti-Semitic fantasies of male menstruation and argues that by generalizing these as theories of maleness, Fliess was attempting to deflect the marginalizing effect of such representations of Jewish men. Freud’s apparent assent to such ideas, at least at first, indicates his similar concern about the situation for the Jewish male physician. It seems to me at least as plausible to assume that Freud’s persistent expressed fantasies of his own menstruation (Complete Letters 256; 270) are rather a reflection than a deflection of his feminization. Such an interpretation would be more consistent with Freud’s apparently quite self-conscious production of homoerotic fantasy about Fliess, his open references to “a special—let us say feminine—side” of his personality (Complete Letters 412), which certainly means the presence of “passive” homoerotic sexual aims for Freud (Davis 52, citing 9: 250), as well as his persistent use of birthing imagery for the relationship. It also gives us a powerful explanation for his fainting—a performance of femaleness in his culture—when Emma Eckstein haemorrhages from the nose. Madame Eckstein, ç’est moi. As Sprengnether has written, “The dramatic scene attended by Freud in which Eckstein
nearly bled to death elicited in him a mirror response—‘I felt sick.’ The real terror of this moment may consist not only in the castration fantasy hovering on the edges of Freud’s description but also in the collapse of sexual difference which it implies. To be like Eckstein, a victim of Fliess’s bungled operation, is not only analogous to being a victim of sexual violation; it is also to be woman” (31). And, I am adding, bleeding from the nose was particularly redolent for Freud with images of Jewish male menstruation. Freud reports easily, almost with pride, Eckstein’s taunt: “So this is the strong sex!” (Complete Letters 117).

In other words, I am suggesting that for Freud at least, the early acceptance of these seemingly bizarre representations and notions was a signifier of his initial self-construction as homoerotic, as feminized. But as Jewish difference became configurable not only as feminine but also as queer, and as queer solidified into an identity toward the end of the century, Freud would have been even more at pains to deny and repress anything that would seem to cast him as queerJew.

Gilman has provided a vitally important piece of information by observing how thoroughly Jewishness was constructed as queer in fin-de-siècle Mitteleuropa: “Moses Julius Gutmann observes that ‘all of the comments about the supposed stronger sexual drive among Jews have no basis in fact; most frequently they are sexual neurasthenics. Above all the number of Jewish homosexuals is extraordinarily high.’ This view is echoed by Alexander Pilcz, Freud’s colleague in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Vienna, who noted that ‘there is a relatively high incidence of homosexuality among the Jews’” (“Sigmund Freud” 59–60). The literary locus classicus, however, for this association is, of course, Proust, for whom both Jews and queers are the “accursed race.” Both of these conditions constitute, for Proust, “incurable diseases” (Garber 226; Sedgwick). All of the features that construct the figure of the homosexual construct the Jew as well, namely hypersexuality, melancholia, and passivity. It was this factor and the hystericization of the Ostjude, I suggest, that led to the relative abandonment of hysteria together with its etiology in childhood seductions, that is, fantasies of seduction of the son by the father, and to the production of the inexorably heteronormative Oedipus narrative (Brenkman). “To say to a man ‘You are hysterical’ became under these conditions a form of saying to him ‘You are not a man’” (Showalter, “Hysteria” 291). Since within this culture, male hysteria and homosexuality are both symptoms and products of gender inversion, there is a slippage between them: the Jew was queer and hysterical—and therefore not a man. In response, the normatively straight Jewish man was invented to replace the bent Ostjude, and his hysteria—his alternative gendering—was the first victim: “All psychoanalytic theory was born from hysteria, but the mother died during the birth” (Etienne Trillat, qtd. in Showalter, “Hysteria” 291).
The Oedipus complex is Freud's family romance of escape from Jewish queerness into gentile, phallic heterosexuality.

With the shift in the discourse of sexuality in the 1890s, with homosexuality identified as a Jewish problem—not least via Magnus Hirschfeld's prominence—

— with the growing homophobia and anti-Semitism—indeed with the virtual identity of these two discourses—in the Christian Values movement documented by John Fout, Freud needed desperately to hide this dimension of his personality. As Fout has observed of one of the leading exponents of the "moral purity" (family values) movement in Germany, "Adolf Stoecker was a rabid anti-Semite, and many of the moral purity attacks on Hirschfeld were of a fundamentally anti-Semitic character—homosexuals were always depicted as outside the bounds of society" (405). Freud had good reason to be scared; the persistent association of Jews with homosexuals and homosexuals with Jews was to turn not half a century later into the most murderous practice against both that the world has ever known. In 1928 a typical Nazi newspaper referred to the "indissoluble joining of Marxism, pederasty, and systematic Jewish contamination" (Völkischer Beobachter, qtd. in Moeller 400), and in 1930 Wilhelm Frick, soon to be minister of the interior of the Nazi government, called for the castration of homosexuals, "that Jewish pestilence" (Mosse 158). The Oedipus complex, the fantasy of a masculinity rendered virile through both of its moments, the desire for the mother (not the father) and violent hostility towards the father, provided Freud with psychosocial/cultural cover for his dread.

FREUD AS SCHREBER

A look at Freud's analysis of the Schreber case shows the difference this reading of the epochal event during the 1890s makes for our understanding of Freud. My argument here is dependent on the perspicacious analyses of Freud's texts by Geller, who nevertheless does not draw the conclusions from his readings that I do. A core term within the text is the Entmannung, the unmanning, that Schreber fantasizes himself undergoing. Geller points out that this core term is equivocal. In Freud's usage, and especially as translated in the Standard Edition, it comes out as emasculation, physical and figurative castration: "Emasculation evokes the castration complex, the matrix of childhood phantasies and theories which leads to the recognition of sexual differences and the interpellation of the child into normative structures of symbolic differences." On the other hand, Macalpine and Hunter, in their translation of Schreber's original text, emphasize the attainment of femaleness that Entmannung implies: "The choice of 'unmanning,' by privileging women's necessary activity, here the female-specific capacity to repro-
duce, questions the authority of castration as the determinant of difference. The ‘unmanned’ Schreber, for Macalpine and Hunter, is a pregnant Redeemer. ‘Emasculation’ and ‘unmanning’ converge on *Entmannung* in Schreber’s text” (Geller, “Freud, v. Freud” 181). Geller’s argument hinges, as he says, on an ambiguity in the word *Entmannung* itself. It may either mean “emasculaton,” that is castration, or it may mean exiting from the category of men and entering into the category of women. For Freud, strangely enough, the two are explicitly equated in the later oedipal theory. However, they are most definitely not the same thing, and their lack of equivalence comes to the fore in Schreber’s text, where emasculation would have meant sterility while “unmanning” as feminization means the exact opposite, the attainment of female superfecundity. Freud’s elision of the positive desire in *Entmannung* is of a piece with his reading of femininity as castration. They both constitute an attempt to deny his own desires and fantasies of feminization, his own hysteria (cp. Sprengnether 71).

Geller elegantly argues that “Freud’s deployment of *Entmannung* in ‘Psychoanalytic Notes,’ particularly his separation of Schreber’s ‘emasculaton’ from his pregnancy phantasies, endeavors both to constrain the overdetermination of the term and to elide the mixture of personal concerns and competing theories betrayed by that polysemy” (“Freud v. Freud” 182). What were those personal concerns of which Geller speaks that led Freud at this time (c. 1910) to deny completely the positive aspects of Schreber’s fantasies? Geller himself “suggests a relationship between the ‘emasculated’ Schreber’s problems with his sexual identity and the circumcised Freud’s own concerns about his ethnic identity. *Entmannung* reproduces a Jewish difference Freud would disavow” (“Freud v. Freud” 182). I might put it in the following fashion: *Verjudung* is equivalent to *Entmannung*. This relationship becomes particularly clear because Schreber imagines himself as the Eternal Jew, and this Jewish identity constitutes the unmanning that makes it possible for him to reproduce as a female. As Geller notes, where for Schreber himself the unmanning is an epiphenomenon of becoming a woman, for Freud the opposite is true: becoming a woman is a mere side effect of castration (“Freud v. Freud” 184).

Geller suggests as well the connection between Freud’s curious ostracization of *Entmannung* and “his lingering homosexual affect for Fliess” (“Freud v. Freud” 198). We can go further than Geller in analyzing this motive, however, for the *Entmannung* of the Schreber text recalls (in both senses) the overcoming of Freud’s homosexual investments of which he writes in a letter to Ferenczi, written at the same time that he was working on the Schreber text (Jones, *Years of Maturity* 92–93). Indeed, it could be read as its very antithesis or inversion. It was just about at this time, moreover, that Freud “discovered” the negative (or inverted) Oedipus complex and thor-
oughly pathologized it (Davis 10). Freud's concern was not only with his Jewish difference but with the particular way that difference configured him at the fin de siécle as feminized and especially as queer. His "overcoming" was thus an attempt to conquer the unmanning that all Jewish males suffer. Weininger is very important here, for it was he who wrote obsessively of the necessity to overcome the Jewish spirit, that abject female element within everyone (Heller 101), but especially in Jews. As I have argued at length elsewhere, Freud had much more in common with Weininger than he was prepared to admit (Boyarin, "Freud").

Freud's comment to Ferenczi, "since Fliess's case, with the overcoming of which you recently saw me occupied..." (letter dated October 6, 1910, qtd. in Freud and Ferenczi, 221; emphasis added), lets us know that just about the time he was writing about Schreber he was involved with his "overcoming" of Fliess. He continues in the same letter: "A part of homosexual investment has been withdrawn and made use of to enlarge my own ego. I have succeeded where the paranoiac fails." At the end of the letter he writes, "I surely have not yet written that I have worked through the Schreber once, that I have found the core of our paranoia hypotheses corroborated." The "paranoiac" is accordingly Fliess, but also Daniel Schreber. For Freud, recognition of the positive attraction that femaleness and being transformed into a female held for Daniel Schreber would have involved the psychological necessity for him of facing again his own unresolved desires for femaleness, which in his culturally conditioned eyes was equivalent to homosexuality. Both of these, feminization and homosexuality, were "Jewish diseases" that Freud was anxious to overcome.

This connection between the texts (of Freud's "life" and his interpretation of the Schreber case) suggest, moreover, another powerful intertextual nexus. In perhaps the most famous passage of that text, Freud writes that in a homophobic regime, the sentence, "I (a man) love him (a man)" must be transformed in the following ways: "First, 'I do not love him—I hate him'; second, 'I do not love him, I love her'; third, 'I do not love him; she loves him'" ("Psychoanalytical Notes" 201-03). Note what a perfect analogy this provides to the shift from the negative Oedipus to the positive Oedipus complexes. The so-called "negative" homoerotic desire, "I wish to be penetrated by my father and have his baby" is replaced by "I do not love him (my father); I love my mother and hate my father, even to the point of desiring to kill him, because, after all, it is he whom my mother loves and he who threatens me with castration"—paranoia! I propose, therefore, that in describing the etiology of Schreber's paranoia in homosexuality, or better, as clearly pointed out by a recent writer, in internalized homophobia (Thomas 34), Freud was writing about himself, consciously or unconsciously writing another chapter of his psychosexual-intellectual autobiography. As O'Neill...
has quite stunningly remarked, “In his struggle to reduce Schreber’s divinity, Freud for once was prepared to make himself sound perfectly boring—indeed, to crackle like the miracled-up voices, everything belongs to the Father, the father is behind everything, behind God, behind Fleschig, behind your bum!” (243).

If Freud was not able to cure himself of his desire for the passive, “feminine,” hysterical role of male birth-giver, however, he was able to cure his theory, the part of himself that he showed the world. In that discourse, he shifted the main male protagonist from hysterical to paranoiac, from what was gendered female, bent, and Jewish in his fin-de-siècle world to what was gendered male, straight, and Aryan. After the 1890’s no longer would a feminized male, father-desiring, pathic, hysterical Jewish queer be at the center of his thinking but an active, phallic, mother-desiring, father-killing, “normal” (that is, gentile) man.41

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NOTES

1. I would like at this point to distinguish the method of this inquiry from two others with which it might be confused: wild analysis and applied analysis. Both of these are practices defined entirely from within the discourse of psychoanalysis: wild analysis is the application of psychoanalytic ideas to the understanding of individual behavior by people who are not properly trained and especially who have not undergone an analysis of their own, while applied psychoanalysis involves the assumption of the truth of psychoanalytic theory for the understanding of literature, religion, and other cultural products. My commentary, in contrast to these, puts psychoanalysis itself on the couch, necessarily, then, not the psychoanalytic couch but rather a Foucauldian couch of cultural poetics and critique (see Brenkman 111 and throughout). This does not mean that all psychoanalytic ideas are ipso facto rejected for this inquiry. Certain psychoanalytic hermeneutic meta-
notions, such as the notions of screens, repressions, and supervalent thoughts, are employed here (albeit in a somewhat politicized mode), together with other methods of historical cultural criticism, to interrogate aspects of Freud's theories of the formation of the sexually differentiated subject, namely, the theory of the Oedipus complex and its related castration complex and penis envy. (Cp. Sprengnether, who also remarks, "The developmental theory that Freud regarded as essential to his thought introduces a certain warp into an otherwise neutral array of hermeneutic strategies—a warp that reproduces some aspects of Freud's own culture." [x]) Freudian categories of symbolization are usable in the interpretation of Freud's texts in another way as well. Whether or not we accept them as universal categories of the human mind as Freud wished us to do, they certainly are categories that operated in his mind, and as such valid interpretative constructs for understanding his texts. I am truly not sure that this critical principle for reading Freud, which seems to me obvious—and would be trivial for any other thinker/writer—has ever been articulated before. To put a point on it, the less that we are convinced by Freud's interpretations of, say, the Wolf Man, the more I find those interpretations persuasive for understanding Freud's historical situation. In other words, in reading Freudian slippages, I claim that I am doing nothing different than the symptomatic reading that I normally engage in. Interestingly enough, Freud himself, primarily in Moses and Monotheism, developed the principles of symptomatic reading by analogy from—not identity to—his methods of decoding psyches. See the illuminating discussion of Bluma Goldstein (98 and passim in her chapter on Freud). Once again, this statement is not the same as psychohistory or applied psychoanalysis, because one can accept (as I do) that in a text, "There have come about almost in all sections conspicuous gaps, disturbing repetitions, tangible contradictions, indications which betray to us things never intended to be communicated" (Standard Edition 23: 43, cited by Goldstein 98), without any commitment whatsoever to particular theories of psychosexual development. Indeed, this methodology for reading texts against the grain may be the most lasting contribution of Freud's last work. See also Boyarin, "Sea Resists," and Pardes for other examples of the application of Freud's method for symptomatic (historicized) readings of the Bible.

2. When I delivered this paper at the School of Criticism and Theory, Professor Showalter pointed out that other psychiatrists in Freud's time publicly suppressed an awareness of male hysteria that they recognized in private. The famous story of Meyner's "confession" to Freud of his male hysteria after having opposed him in public would be a case in point. The question remains: Why was a thinker who was in so many ways so willing and able to break with the paradigms of his culture here seemingly unable to do so?

3. "Today I am able to add that one of the cases gave me what I expected (sexual shock—that is, infantile abuse in male hysteria!)" (Freud, Complete Letters 149). Of recent writers, only Sprengnether (37) has emphasized this point. For the ways that my reading converges and diverges from hers, see below.

4. See, for instance, how this trenchant avoidance of historicizing interpretation impacts on her correct understanding of Freud's avoidance of anything that appears to put him into a "feminine" position. A good example of this is Sprengnether's insight that in the Dora case Freud "produces a fantasy of an impotent father, whose daughter not only nurses him in a conventional sense but who also wishes to 'nurse,' or suck at his penis. Superimposed on this fantasy of ambiguous sexual identifications, however, in which the father plays a passive, quasi-maternal role, Freud offers a more stereotyped image, that of virile, phallic male who pursues a young girl in spite of her resistance. Gradually, his fascination with the fortunes of Herr K. appears to overtake his interest in the more threatening and volatile scene of father-daughter incest." After this acute insight, however, the best that Sprengnether can offer in explanation is to claim that "the subject
Freud avoids in this instance is his own vulnerability, his implicitly feminine role in relation to his daughter" (175), even though this was decades before the fact of any such role for Freud with respect to his daughter. It is not inapposite to point to the fact the neither the word “Jew” nor “Judaism” appears in the index to Sprengnether’s book.

5. Obviously this does not preclude further gender differences within cultural groups; power, powerlessness, speech, and silencing are all relative, not absolute, conditions. The ways that the female gendering of Jewish men in Europe is itself productive of oppression of Jewish women in that society itself is one of the subthemes of this project of mine, although one that will be muted in this particular text.

6. Sabine Hake, writing in 1993, still asserts with reference to this essay: “At the center of this reading formation stands the female body, which is always the hysterical body and which brings together seemingly disparate elements: the woman as archaeological site, archaeology as the paradigm of interpretation, and the problem of femininity as the test case of psychoanalysis” (148). The second and the third points stand in my opinion; the first does not—quite—hence my dissociation of femininity from the female body in what follows.

7. Freud’s apparent renunciation of all sexual contact early in his forties takes on a new meaning in this light. He would not be the first married man not meant to be of the marrying kind for whom celibacy ends up being the only psychologically tolerable solution. His famous fainting incident with Jung in 1912 was interpreted by Freud himself in a famous letter to Jones as powerful evidence for continuing homoerotic desire on his own part (Jones, Young Freud 317).

8. I accordingly disagree with Downing, who claims that Strachey and Jones are denying or ignoring here the evidence for Freud’s homoeroticism (19). I think they are directly recognizing it.

9. This, of course, quite problematizes Masson’s theory in The Assault on Truth. It is perhaps no wonder then that he takes no notice of this crucial sentence. Furthermore, right after Freud’s most famous letter in which he abandons his neurotica (Complete Letters 264), indicating his reason as incredulity at the fact that so many fathers, including his own, were “perverts,” he is still pursuing child abuse, albeit not by the father, as the etiology of his own hysteria (268) and in December (three months later) still producing evidence for the “paternal etiology” (Complete Letters 286). This is clearly not consistent with a man abandoning a theory that he knows to be true because he fears the reactions of his surroundings but rather with a man in a conflicted and ambivalent state produced by the implications of his thinking.

10. Shuli Barzilai called my attention to the oddness of the term “pederastic” here.

11. Cp. the quite different way of formulating this issue in Borch-Jacobson: “Freud, in his diverse presentation of the Oedipus complex, almost always privileges the example of the positive complex of the young boy. In that case, in fact, the desire object is clearly objectal and heterosexual” (269). For all the differences in approach, it is the same problem that we have identified. The difference between my approach and Borch-Jacobson’s is that where he (like Brenkman) sees the point as the construction of the heterosexual male, on my reading the point is the invention of the male Jew—Freud—as heterosexual. These two motifs are entirely compatible, even conspiratorial, with each other. I am trying to identify some more of the historical pressures that led to Freud’s particular collaboration with the political project of heterosexuality, i.e. with his own domination.

12. My attention was focused on this question by Juliet Mitchell. It will be a major theme of her forthcoming book.

13. Freud never denied the possibility of real child abuse nor minimized its traumatic effects (see below, n. 16.) What he abandoned was a theory that located virtually all neurosis in such abuse, a theory that he very likely had generally imposed on the patients.
14. In this regard, I agree with the facts as given in Esterson 17–21; Crews 62. Our judgments as to the consequences of these facts for an evaluation of Freud could not be more different. See also Fish, especially 552–53, and below, n. 16. It must be admitted that the question of integrity will come up when Freud’s later accounts of the discovery of psychoanalysis, in which he insists that the patients had indeed reported rapes and seductions, are contrasted with these contemporaneous ones, which seem so much more frank (Esterson 22–23). Other explanations, however, than deliberate attempts to mislead are adduceable for this discrepancy (cf. Esterson, who allows that Freud may have “come to believe his own story”: 24). Since being Freud’s defense attorney is not my mission, I can leave the matter here.

15. I am, of course, not denying even now the possibility that this particular patient, or any other, was indeed abused.

16. In 1917 in his introductory lectures Freud stated, “You must not suppose that sexual abuse of a child by its nearest male relatives belongs entirely to the realm of phantasy. Most analysts will have treated cases in which such events were real and could be unimpeachably established.” In 1924 Freud added a note to the Katherina case in Studies in Hysteria, in which he wrote that Katherina had fallen ill as a result of paternal sexual abuse (Robinson 168). This is simply not consistent with the picture of Freud as the big bad wolf doctor who thinks girls are liars and only patriarchs tell the truth. Nor does it support the Massonic construction of a Freud who knows and admits the truth but hides his knowledge out of cowardice. In fact, Freud gets attacked coming and going. His other great Berkeley-based antagonist Frederick Crews holds him responsible for the exact opposite crime: not for causing disbelief of girls who were abused but for causing false accusations of fathers and child-care workers who are innocent victims (65)! Catch 22. If Freud finally disbelieved true stories, then he is an abuser of women, but if he had previously believed untrue ones (or rather, as I agree, induced them—I think in good faith), then he is a traducer of men. How could Freud possibly escape from being a moral monster with antagonists like these?

17. It should be carefully noted here that the terms “active” and “passive” and their correlations with masculine and feminine and notions of inversion invoked throughout this text are Freud’s—not mine. In fact, of course, they are not Freud’s but a general aspect of his sociolect. The best study of this issue is Davis. In this context it is worth noting that my account is in at least one regard directly contrary to Davis’s. He claims that “the active oedipal aim, ‘I want to copulate with my mother,’ by reversal and turning round becomes the passive aim, ‘I want to be copulated with by my father’” (97). I am, of course, suggesting the exact opposite.

18. See also Davis, who has written, “Freud, it seems, feared certain forms of passivity and tried to avoid it through a phallic stance: being on top of it, subduing it” (13).

19. Perhaps Slipp was merely being delicate, leaving it to the reader to draw her own “conclusion.”

20. To be sure, as Jay Geller notes, the word Kongress in German does not have the sexual meaning that it can have in English. The erotic nature of these tête-à-têtes is not dependent on the semantics of “congress,” however.

21. The notion of bearing spiritual children to each other was a topos of homosexual discourse at this time, drawn from readings of the Symposium. See Showalter, Sexual Anarchy 174–76.

22. For further discussion see Koestenbaum 36–37.

23. Brenkman is excellent on the heteronormative enforcement that the Oedipus complex enacts. See however below, n. 41.

24. The friendship was largely over by August 1901 (Freud, Complete Letters 447), although it could be plausibly argued that at that point it was Fliess who was motivated by homo-
sexual panic to separate from Freud and not the other way around. Freud still seems at this point to be affirming the value of homoeroticism, and it is only in the next decade that he will finally claim to “overcome” it.

25. See now also the important discussion in Eiberg-Schwartz 40-42 and below, n. 37.

26. Cp. Davis 130–36 for an example of the precise obverse of my practice. For Davis, Freud’s repudiation of passive aims is totally explicable as a function of inner-psychic conflicts having to do with death. Freud could have lived anywhere and anytime and been anyman (i.e. not Jewish) and have produced his symptoms and theories.

27. Although I am dependent on Gilman’s rich scholarship, it will be noted that my interpretation is quite different from his. For Gilman, already in the late 1880s Freud had rejected those views of hysteria—Charcot’s heredity—that put the Jew at risk (“Image” 416). While I agree, of course, that Gilman is correct on this point, this view does not pay attention in my view to the extent to which the trauma theory was also putting Jews at risk. Any theory of male hysteria had that potential, simply because of the prevailing myth, of which Gilman himself has taught us, that male hysterics are almost always Jews.

28. I thank my student, Willis Johnson, for calling this text to my attention. Gilman, somewhat bizarrely in my opinion, theorizes a factual, historical basis for the myth of Jewish male menstruation, referring to a parasite that does cause genital bleeding in men around the time of puberty (“Struggle” 304, n. 32). There does not seem to be any evidence that Jews in particular ever suffered from this disease.

29. Indeed, circumcision was often read in European culture as partial castration. Roman law forbade it under the same rubrics as castration.

30. In another chapter of the present research I intend a portrait of this Jewish male ideal type.

31. Sprengnether finds it possible to write, “Looking at Freud’s own pre-oedipal phase in Freiberg, for instance, we find a family structure that differs significantly from the one that characterized his subsequent years of development in Vienna. Freud appears to favor the latter, more conventional model—a preference that has the effect of displacing or repressing questions regarding his mother’s desire” (13; emphasis added). It is simply astonishing to me that the Viennese bourgeois nuclear family structure—dominant father, passive mother—is figured here as “the more conventional” in contrast to a traditional East European-Jewish family structure—dominant mother, passive father—which is what? Unconventional? Robert Holt also, in an otherwise stimulating paper, refers to Jacob and Amalie Freud as “an atypical couple in that their actual personalities reversed a number of standard sex-typed expectations. In certain key ways, Freud did share his parents’ characteristics, probably on the basis of fantasised incorporation or identification. Yet his conscious, verbalized ideas about what was male, what female, are transparently derived from general cultural sources and bear little relation to the traits of his own parents” (1; emphasis added). There is absolutely no recognition that this “standard” and “general” set of expectations is culture-bound. Ann Pellegrini’s formulation is much more successful. She proposes “a structural analogy between the more dominant household role played by Jewish women in Eastern Europe (as opposed to the ‘angel in the house model’ of Victorian, Christian womanhood), on the one hand, and the masculinization of early childhood femininity, on the other. The achievement of proper passive and vaginal female sexuality would then be structurally analogous to the ‘westernization’ of Jewish household dynamics, in which the male assumes the normative and Christianized role of head of household, and the female recedes to the background.” And, “In Freud’s subterranean geography of Jewishness, gender, and race, East is to West as phallic women are to angels in the house. . . . In Freud’s own ‘case history,’ East was to West as his Galician mother, Amalie Nathanson Freud, was to his German wife,
Martha Bernays Freud.” Thus if, as Slipp writes, “in patriarchal Victorian society, women were deprived of an individual identity and needed to achieve a sense of self by identifying with the social and economic successes of their husbands,” and if “Freud’s father was considered a failure,” both of these factors would have held, in large part, owing to conflict between the gender performances of Ostjuden and those of Victorian Vienna. And if Freud failed to identify with his father, this was also because his father was a migrant from one gender-culture to another (Boyarin, “Freud”). In this respect he was only behaving like many other immigrant sons (and daughters).

32. The timing seems slightly off on this latter suggestion, since Weininger’s book was published in 1903, but Freud had read it in manuscript before and undoubtedly was aware of Weininger’s thinking even before that. Freud was, in fact, the first reader of Weininger’s manuscript, probably sometime late in 1900 (Heller 99 and passim). Since I am not arguing for a one-time sudden development but a complex process within Freud’s thinking from the first mention of Oedipus in 1897 to the hardening of the developmental theories into their fully heterosexist form in the first decade of the twentieth century, Weininger could have been a factor. Even more to the point, the sort of ideas that Weininger was spouting were very likely in some sense “in the air.” The Oscar Wilde trials would certainly have been a factor, for they had enormous impact in Germany as well (Showalter, Sexual Anarchy 172). It should also not be ignored that the Dreyfus case was at its climax in the crucial year 1897 (cf. Freud, Complete Letters 299) as well, and that that was the year that the anti-Semitic Karl Lueger finally became mayor of Vienna.

33. There was even an anti-Semitic homoerotic movement in Germany, Hans Blüher’s Bund, which promoted an ideal of the homosexual as supermanly, not degenerate and effeminate like the queer Jew (Mosse 87). As Garber has written: “Here, too, definitions of ‘homosexuality’ cross with stereotypes of Jewish male identity, for the ‘homosexual’ could be either super-male, especially manly and virile, and therefore associating only with other men (rather than with polluting and ‘effeminizing’ women), or, on the other hand, a ‘degenerate’ ‘aesthete,’ blurring the boundaries of male and female” (227). See also Mosse 201n83, who notes that Benedikt Friedländer, a Jewish homosexual-rights advocate, was careful to note that all of the “effeminate” homosexuals were in the other movement, that of Magnus Hirschfeld. Friedländer was associated as well with the most vicious of anti-Semitic racists (Mosse 41). It would not be entirely wrong to suggest that it was passitivity and effeminacy that were more problematic at this period than homoeroticism itself—i.e. homophobia is, at this time, almost subsumed under misogyny, to which anti-Semitism bears then a strong family connection as well.

34. On March 10, 1898, Freud declared that his and Fliess’s periods had become synchronized (Complete Letters 301). See also Koestenbaum, who, overlooking the historical career of Jewish male menstruation, interprets this fantasy somewhat differently, as being a “figure for the distressing anal bleeding that would have been the likely consequence of their intercourse—if we postulate the existence of a symbolic anal hymen, broken upon first penetration” (74–75). Interestingly enough, I think that the two explanations can converge in one overdetermined moment.

35. Past this point, however, I find myself in disagreement with Sprengnether. Thus she writes, “First he absolves Fliess of culpability by interpreting Exkstein’s bleeding as hysterically motivated, while affirming his renewed faith in Fliess’s medical diagnoses in regard to his own symptoms. The latent contradiction in this position gives rise, in turn, to a thesis concerning infantile eroticism, which has the double advantage of emphasizing the boy’s active desire for his mother and further absolving adult male figures of blame” (37). By thus acceding to the canonical interpretation of the gender politics here, namely that exoneration of male adults is what is at stake for Freud and that this is fully ano-
ous with and indeed provoked by his desire to exonerate Fliess, another male adult, Sprengnether almost loses sight for the moment of the radicality of her recognition that adult females and immature males were just as much at issue in the “seduction” theory as the opposite. Sprengnether argues (like Masson, Assault) that Freud’s defense of Fliess “prepares the path for his subsequent exoneration of fathers (including himself and his own) of the charge of sexual violation of their children” (33). But surely by the time that Freud had (even according to the view that he had) fully “exonerated” the fathers, he had broken with Fliess and admitted his guilt. In contrast, I would interpret Freud’s initial desperate attempts to exonerate Fliess as whistling in the dark as he increasingly realized the implications of his passive dependence on Fliess and what it implied about his own gendering. My interpretation of this point is, then, more similar to Schur’s (“Some Additional”) than to Masson’s or Sprengnether’s, and it is, to be sure, a matter of interpretative protocols and tact.

36. For the ways that Hirschfeld was experienced as threatening by Jews (and especially gay Jews), see Garber 227–28.

37. My initial thinking about the Schreber text was stimulated by reading a draft of Howard Eilberg-Schwartz’s The Divine Phallus and Other Problems for Men and Monotheism. I wish to thank him for sharing that work with me prior to publication. Incidentally, there is one point at which I quite disagree with Eilberg-Schwartz, who writes: “Because Freud was reading homosexuality within a heterosexual framework, he mistakenly assumes that homosexual desires necessarily feminized the male who has them” (37; emphasis added). I would argue quite the opposite, that it is precisely the residue of a mode of thinking “before sexuality,” wherein there is not yet sex but only gender that underlies the association of passive homoeroticism with feminization. In general, this is the one area of major theoretical disagreement between my work and Eilberg-Schwartz’s. He reads biblical religion as condemning homoeroticism, while I would argue that it is only the gender-bending of male anal intercourse that is maligned there and not homoeroticism in general—male or female—thus consistent with the Foucauldian view, directly opposed by Eilberg-Schwartz (243n3), that sees “heterosexuality” as the exclusive invention of modern Western culture (Boyarin, “Any Jews”).

38. Eilberg-Schwartz points out as well how in Moses and Monotheism the positive aspects of God’s love for humans are also completely elided in the account of monotheism and suggests that there also it is homoerotic implications that are being denied, once again a marginalization of the so-called negative Oedipus complex. When I delivered this text at the School of Criticism and Theory, Naomi Schor asked about the relevance of the fetish. Although at the time, leider, I didn’t think of it, I would answer her that the castration complex is itself a fetish, both recognizing and denying the lack of a vagina (see Boyarin, “Jewish Masochism” 15–16).

39. See also the powerful argument of O’Neill, which I shall be taking up further in a chapter of the present research entitled, “Schreber, Bloom, and the Deterriorialized Jewish Male Body.”

40. Note again how completely different my model of such a nexus is from that of Freudian interpreters of Freud who connect “the content of his theory and the dynamics of his self-analysis” (Davis 84). Davis himself regards his work as “psychohistory” and justifies it by referring to Freud’s own psychohistories of Leonardo, Dostoevsky, and Schreber.

41. I do not mean this suggestion to be reductive. In another place, I will argue that Freud’s account of sexual differentiation as nonbiological in its foundations is in some ways much more liberatory than, for instance, the account of Karen Horney, whereby people are born male and female (cf. Ramas 480–81). The castration complex thus represents a theoretical advance over naturalized views of sexual difference. Freud’s greatest insight,
namely that sexual difference is made and not born, and also his darkest moment of gross misogyny, are generated out of precisely the same point in his discourse. Barratt and Straus have gotten this just right in my opinion:

Freud's psychology both stands as the apotheosis of modern reason, the heir to enlightenment values grounded in reflective-subjective and scientific-objective practices, . . . and it stands as the harbinger of postmodern inspiration, the exemplar of discursive practices that emancipate whatever may be excluded or repressed by the totalization of analytico-referential reason. In this sense, the discipline of psychoanalysis occupies a very significant but disconcertingly ambiguous position in relation to the critique of patriarchy, . . . In one frame, psychoanalytic doctrine can be seen as one of the last manifestos of patriarchal legitimation, an ideological structure that systematically rationalizes masculinism [heteronormativity]. In another frame, psychoanalytic method can be seen as an inspiration for feminist [queer] critique, an enigmatic and extraordinary challenge to the hegemonic structuration of masculinist [heterosexist] discursive practices.

See Fish 593n11 for very important considerations with respect to stratagems for reading Freud. I would be somewhat less sanguine, however, in asserting what is or is not "this text," preferring, rather, to refer to specific strategies for reading that serve particular discursive purposes. Thus, even that structure which seems most resolutely heteronormative in its form, the oedipal triangle, can also be recovered for a queer reading, as was pointed out to me at the School of Criticism and Theory colloquium. Again without asserting what is and what is not Freud's "text" (pace Fish), I would predicate separate-but-equal value to different interpretative modalities, diachronic and synchronic. The question is, once more: What discursive aim is the reading meant to serve? This particular reading is meant to serve as a move in a critical historical study of "The Invention of the Jewish Man" at the fin de siècle, and ultimately as a chapter in my book in progress, tentatively entitled Judaism as a Gender: an Autobiography.

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