ÉPATÉ
L’EMBOURGEOISEMENT:
FREUD, GENDER, AND THE
(DE)COLONIZED PSYCHE

DANIEL BOYARIN


The truly psychotic, rather than merely neurotic, idealization of a supremely evolved white male and the concomitant assumption that somehow all others were “degenerate” had, as Freud was writing [Civilization and Its Discontents], begun to reap its most evil harvest. Even the most casual reader of the theoretical disquisitions of the later nineteenth-century exponents of the science of man must at once perceive the intimate correlation between their evolutionist conclusions and the scientific justification of patterns of “inherent” superiority and inferiority in the relations between the sexes, various races, and the different classes in society.

—Bram Dijkstra, Idols of Perversity

I wish to thank Jonathan Culler, Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, Martin Jay, Donald Pease, and Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks for reading early versions of this essay and making very important comments. Research for this paper has been carried out with a grant from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture.
Is Love goyim naches? Cuddihy and Roith

Long live war. Long live love. Let Sorrow be Banished from the Earth.
—Giuseppe Verdi, The Sicilian Vespers

John Murray Cuddihy’s *The Ordeal of Civilization* inaugurated the discourse this essay continues, a discourse that we might call cultural studies in Freud. The book presents the most curious combination imaginable of brilliant insight into the modern Jewish situation and offensive crudity in its characterization of traditional Judaism. It is not anti-Semitic (as I thought on my first reading) but rather thoroughly neocolonialist. It grows out of a grudging but palpable adoration of Protestantism and capitalist imperialism and forms, in large part, an apology for them. We see where Cuddihy stands when he writes of all postcolonial peoples, “The values and life-style of the colonial power—or, for the indigenous minorities within a more general core culture, the meanings and beliefs of the ‘oppressive majority”—constitute a status-wound to the normal narcissism of peoples and nations. The defense (apologia) against this ‘assault’ we call ideology” [171]. “Ideology,” *mirabile dictu,* is produced not by the oppressor (no scare quotes for me) to justify and naturalize oppression but by the oppressed in bad faith to justify and naturalize their stubborn and atavistic resistance to an oppressive modernity. Cuddihy fully accepts the Durkheimian notion that there are superior and inferior religions and cultures. Like Parsons, he therefore considers the structuralist—Lévi-Straussian—and presumably poststructuralist insistence on the commensurate value of all human cultures as a “regression” [160]. It is, then, almost beside the point that Judaism is one of the inferior ones. This is Orientalism in the most precise sense of the word.

Take the following case of Cuddihan analysis. In 1908 Freud wrote a letter to Karl Abraham in which he imparts that he had been in Berlin for twenty-four hours and been unable to see him and wishes him not to misunderstand this as a sign of disfavor. Cuddihy glosses this passage: “to make oneself accountable for one’s appearances before strangers is the first step to social modernization” [99]. Cuddihy apparently finds it impossible to imagine that an Eastern European Jew (which he alleges Freud to have been) would have had “native” traditions of thoughtfulness to draw on. The Galician Jew, as a member of a “primitive” culture, could not possibly have cared that an associate might have been hurt through a misunderstanding. What Cuddihy seems unable to imagine is that the conflict is not between the uncivil and the civil but between alternative and different civilizations, that the cultures of the “East” and the past maintained their own civilities. At the risk of exaggeration or distortion (and perhaps offense), I would suggest that this is a peculiar consequence of the sociological (as opposed to anthropological) stance. Classical ethnography may have served the colonialist project *de facto,* but classical sociology seems best poised to justify it *de jure,* to the extent that it is still engaged in the Durkheimian, Weberian, Parsonian project of ranking cultures. It is not surprising, then, that Parsons considers Lévi-Strauss a “regression.”

The Orientalist gaze at Jews (and Others) that marks Cuddihy’s work is delineated in a much more significant way when he uses it to reduce Jewish socialism to a response to an inner Jewish social problem:

*German-Jewish socialism, in other words, in its deep-lying motivation nexus is a sumptuary socialism. It is tailor-made for a recently decolonized “new nation” indigenous to the West whose now-dispersed “nationals” have had neither time nor opportunity to internalize that system of informal restraints we are calling the Protestant Etiquette. Protestant interiority and internalization—in the triple form of an ethic, an aesthetic, and an etiquette—was the functional modernizing equivalent of what, for Catholics and Jews in the Middle Ages, had*
been a formally institutionalized set of legal restrictions on conspicuous consumption and behavior. (Jewry was in the nineteenth century exiting from its Middle Ages.) Feudal sumptuary laws—external constraints—took the modernizing form of internal restraints of moderation on consumption, trade, and commercial practices. [5]

Aside from revealing his position vis-à-vis socialism here, Cuddihy manifests once more the bizarre combination of the acumen that makes his book so powerful and the grotesque appreciation of German bourgeois culture that makes it so repulsive (to me). On the one hand, it marks perhaps the first time that the Jews of modern central Europe were seen as a recently decolonized people, an analogy that has proven very fruitful indeed. But on the other hand, read carefully, it can be seen to encode the following propositions: “Protestant interiority and internalization”—read “faith”—was the functional equivalent of the medieval sumptuary laws of both Jews and Catholics—read “works.” Cuddihy’s two intellectual heroes are Talcott Parsons, whom Cuddihy himself identifies “as an intellectual descendant of Calvin” [9], and Max Weber, who was certainly an intellectual descendant of Luther! I would suggest that the distinction between “ascribed” and “achieved” status upon which so much of Parsons’s theories are based is a recoding of the distinction between the Pauline descent according to the flesh and descent according to the spirit. This rather puts Cuddihy himself, as I imagine he would freely admit, into the ambivalent situation of the (de)colonized subject who perceives himself through the eyes of the colonizer, and the “ordeal of civility” is, at least in part, his own. One can be an Orientalist with respect to one’s own past as well.

The sumptuary laws, at least in their medieval Catholic (that is, state-ly) version, were laws that enforced class distinctions by restricting what could be worn by the members of different socioeconomic groups. Rather than seeing “Jewish socialism” as a protest against capitalism that in fact expanded and exploited such economic gaps, Cuddihy sees it as the Jewish response to the Jews’ inability to internalize and make instinctive those forms of “internal restraints of moderation on consumption, trade, and commercial practices” that characterized such Protestant capitalists as, presumably, Henry Ford or John D. Rockefeller. Is Cuddihy joking when he writes, “Not having undergone in his Marx’s upbringing the blessings of a properly installed Protestant Ethic, he would encounter and experience the informal sumptuary legislation of a Protestant Etiquette as a heteronomous tyranny” [128-29]? And this ridiculous comment is made with respect to an early article of Marx’s protesting activities of the Prussian censors. What would count as tyranny on Cuddihy’s account? Marxism à la Cuddihy is just another mode of Jewish embourgeoisement! As he explicitly remarks, “The socialist ideology that comes out of German Jewry, from Marx to the young Walter Lippmann, is rooted in the ‘Jewish question’ which, for German Jewry generally has always turned on the matter of the public

---

1. On Weber’s Protestant sociology of Judaism, see Abraham [passim, and especially 12n33]. For Weber on the place of Catholics in Protestant society, see passim, esp. 21, and for Weber on the Kulturkampf 61–63. This important book was brought to my attention by Martin Jay.

2. I had originally written here I. G. Farben, because I think it makes the example much sharper, but realizing the potential for misunderstanding decided to weaken the rhetoric. I am not, of course, suggesting any complicity between Cuddihy’s discourse—much less Cuddihy—and genocide.

3. My colleague Martin Jay suggests an ironic reading here, but it seems to me that such a reading would denude Cuddihy’s statement of any meaning. If Cuddihy thinks that the Prussian censorship was tyranny, then what is the point of this ironic statement? And if he doesn’t, then the statement is not ironic. Either way, it seems hard to escape the conclusion, particularly given the whole context, that Cuddihy takes seriously his description of the “Protestant Etiquette” as “informal sumptuary legislation.”
as sumptuary laws but rather by the implication that Protestantism achieved the same ends without legislation, while Jews had to be legalists about it. This Weberian stance on Judaism and Christianity seems rather a bizarre position to take for a man who declares himself glad to be a Catholic, and it is almost emblematic of the argument of the entire book with its consistent distinction between being “civil” and merely appearing so. Adapting Sartre, one could sum up Cuddihy’s argument as being another reflex of the anxious notion held by non-Jews that “behind [the Jew’s] feigned adaptability, there is concealed a deliberate and conscious attachment to the traditions of his race” [Sartre 100; see Abraham 24–25].

The point is that for Cuddihy the “Jewish Question” is entirely a question for Jews. “The intelligentsia ‘explains,’ ‘excuses,’ and ‘accounts’ for the otherwise offensive behavior of its people. All the ‘moves’ made in the long public discussion of the Jewish Emancipation problematic constitute, in the case of the detraditionalized intellectuals, an apologetic strategy” [Cuddihy 6]. Again, unpacking this claim yields the following proposition: Jews are not a problem for Europe, nor is Europe a problem for Jews. Only Jews are a problem for Jews.5 The entire problem of emancipation is an internal Jewish one of modernization. Anti-Semitism is totally irrelevant, if it exists at all:

The fact that Jews in the West are a decolonized and modernizing people, an “underdeveloped people” traumatized—like all underdeveloped countries—by contact with the more modernized and hence “higher” nations of the West goes unrecognized for several reasons. First, because they have been a colony internal to the West; second, because decolonization has been gradual and continuous; third, because of the democratic manners of the West (only Max Weber called them a pariah people, i.e., a ritually segregated guest people); and fourth, because the modernization collision has been politicized and theologized by the charge of “anti-Semitism” (as, in noncontiguous Western colonies, the charge of “imperialism” effectively obscures the real nature of the collision—namely, between modernizing and nonmodernized peoples). [47]

Here is the whole story of Cuddihy’s book: stunning insight on the one hand—the Jews as colonized and Emancipation as decolonization; on the other hand, the most malodorous opinions imaginable about Jews and other colonized peoples: (1) There is praise for the “democratic manners of the West” for its reticence in not calling a spade a spade. One might be tempted to read Cuddihy here in an ironic fashion, since, as Martin Jay points out to me, he, an Irish Catholic, ought to have resented English colonial control and its civilizing mission, but how, then, shall we read his claim that Anna O.’s reticence because “she wanted to be polite” is “a far cry from being polite” [42], something clearly only a truly civilized person (Protestant) is capable of? Bertha Pappenheim (Anna O.), like Freud in the Abraham incident, desires only to appear polite. She and he could not possibly be sincerely motivated here, as the Protestant would be by her “interiority and

4. Cuddihy himself seems finally (after more than 150 pages) to have been embarrassed by the vulgarity of his analysis. He writes, “beginning with particularist shame, it [Marxism] becomes in the end universalist and motivated by genuine passion for justice” [161n].

5. It is certainly revealing that perhaps the only part of Marx of which Cuddihy approves is On the Jewish Question, of which he writes, “the anti-philo-Semitism of Marx’s essay ‘On the Jewish Question’ will be misread, when it appears in 1844, as unadulterated anti-Semitism” [150].
internalization.” 6 (2) Cuddihy analyzes the “charge” of anti-Semitism (he calls it the charge of “anti-Semitism”) as a smokescreen to hide the real deficiencies of the Jews; and, similarly, (3) presents a parallel “demystification” of the charge of imperialism. Even more than he intends to, Cuddihy demonstrates—in spite of his being at some profound level philo-Semitic7—how intimately related the discourse of anti-Semitism is to other discourses of colonialism. 8

Freud’s behavior in the Abraham case is accounted for by Cuddihy as a kind of works righteousness, and a hypocritical one at that, reproducing the precise terms of Weber’s critique of “Ancient” Judaism. Cuddihy’s Christian bias is revealed in quite traditional theological terms as well, when, for example, he ends up reviving the patristic charges of carnality against the Jews:

The late Susan Taubes noted that “the Old Testament has had the benefit of the most sublime spiritualization through centuries of Christian interpretation.” Bourgeois-Christian love is just such a “spiritualization” of coarse sexuality. This literal level is the unspiritual level, it is the coarse, “given” Old Testament. It is like the id, understood “carnally” (carnaliter); but, as a “preparation” for the New Testament, it is read “spiritually” (spiritualiter). [74]

This analysis provides the basic term for Cuddihy’s account of Freud’s theories of sexuality which are summed up by his outrageous statement: “the id of the ‘Yid’ is hid under the lid of Western decorum (the ‘superego’)” [29]. Hid under the lid of this droll formulation is a doubly Orientalist fantasy: the Jew as Oriental and Eastern Europe itself as the Orient, the site of Dracula and his brethren: “Dracula may not officially have been one of those horrid inbred Jews everyone was worrying about at the time Stoker wrote his novel, but he came close, for he was very emphatically Eastern European, and hence, like du Maurier’s ‘filthy black Hebrew’, Sengalī (Trilby [du Maurier], 52), a creature who had crawled ‘out of the mysterious East! The poisonous East—birthplace and home of such an ill wind that blows nobody good’” [Dijkstra 343; see also 335].9

All of the theoretical problems of Cuddihy’s bizarrely reified notions of Eastern European Jewish life show up in the following crucial thesis, in which Jews, like women, manage to be both crude animals and “puritans” at one and the same time:

6. Cuddihy writes adoringly of Dietrich Bonhoeffer: “There is unbearable pathos in the figure of Pastor Bonhoeffer as he prepares to die: ‘Called to conduct his last worship service in prison shortly before his execution,’ Peter Berger writes, Bonhoeffer ‘held back, for he did not want to offend his neighbor, a Soviet officer’” [238]. This is referred to by Cuddihy as the “rites of love,” but Bertha Pappenheim’s disinclination to offend her family or Freud’s to hurt the feelings of his friend is bad faith!

7. For the connection between Weberian philo-Semitism and anti-Semitism, two seemingly opposite discourses, see Abraham [x–xi].

8. As with Marxism, Cuddihy somewhat ameliorates this position more than a hundred pages later, when he manages to write, “Needless to say, colonialism, like anti-Semitism, has worked its ugly will on defenseless peoples” [178]. His value system remains unchanged, however. For Cuddihy, modernization is an unmitigated good, and the problems of postcolonial people would be exactly the same with or without the colonial history.

9. How delicious the irony that the “scientists” invoked by Stoker to confirm the criminality of the visage of Dracula the crypto-Jew [Dijkstra 343], namely, Lombroso and Nordau, were themselves Jews, a fact discreetly left unmentioned by Dijkstra. This irony, however, though delicious, was not rare. To the extent that Dijkstra’s argument that Nazism was spawned by scientifized misogyny is convincing—and, by and large, it does convince me—Nordau and Lombroso are unwitting authors of their own people’s genocide (as was, certainly and explicitly, Weininger). The irony becomes less and less palatable.

diacritics / spring 1994 21
Freud paid scant attention to sexual foreplay. It either maneuvered the partners toward orgasm, or it was perversion. To Freud’s shtetl puritanism, fore-pleasure—like courtship, essentially, or courtesy—was a form of roundaboutness, of euphemism. To play with sexual stimulation, to postpone the intense endpleasure of orgasm, was a form of goyim naches, of games goyim play, endlessly refining themselves. Freud had a choice here. If the rules of that game genuinely transformed the old coarse “fuck” into something “rare and strange,” then he, Freud was missing out on something. “They” were experiencing something he wasn’t. He, most of the time, bore a grudge against their claim. [70]

If there were any evidence for this as Freud’s affect—that is, that foreplay is “goyim naches”—then one would simply conclude that Freud was delusional. (If anything, it seems that the Freud of the “Three Essays” considers the impulse to endless foreplay one of those instinctual delights given up—not discovered—in the civilizing process. My reasoning is that if the “perversions” are a regression to infantile sexuality and if ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, then it would follow that primitives are more perverse.) Is there any evidence whatever that Austrian Gentiles engaged in more or different foreplay than Galician Jews did? Has Cuddihy made any attempt to learn anything at all about the prescriptions for foreplay that Jewish culture insists on, going back to the Talmud? The term “goyim naches” refers to violent physical activity, such as dueling or wars, not to foreplay. I am prepared to grant Cuddihy that “goyim”—his vulgarism—invented romantic and courtly love, essentially misogynist formations, but not that they invented foreplay. Thus, just for example, we find the following bit of talmudic advice to wives—a father is speaking to his daughter: “When he takes the pearl in one hand and the furnace in the other, show him the pearl and not the furnace, until you [pl.] are suffering, and then show it to him,” which Rashi forthrightly glosses: “When your husband is caressing you to get excited for intercourse, and he holds your breast in one hand, and your vulva in the other, give him access to your breast, in order that his passion will be great, and not quickly to your vulva, in order that his passion and affection will be great, and he will feel suffering, and then give him access to it” [Babylonian Talmud Shabbath 140b]. It is interesting to note the sexist shift in the axis of the discourse from the Talmud to Rashi—in the former the desire is mutual, in the latter only the husband’s is relevant—but it is certain that neither the Talmud nor this French Jewish contemporary of courtly lovers was ignorant or disdainful of foreplay or even of its “sweet suffering” [for other relevant texts, see Boyarin, Carnal Israel 122–25]. To be sure, courtly love with its conventions (honored in the breach, perhaps?) of chaste adultery would have seemed silly and immoral to both sets of Jews, as romantic notions of “love at first sight” did to their nineteenth-century descendants. The problem, once more, is not anti-Semitism but the uncritical assertion of the superiority of Western bourgeois civilization over that of the “primitives”—whoever those primitives might be and particularly in the overvaluation of “romantic love.” There is something truly grotesque in Cuddihy’s claim that “In bourgeois-Western lovemaking, foreplay—‘love play’—foreshortens the ritual of courtly love into the space-time requirements of the bourgeois bedroom,” from which it follows, according to him, that if “Freud and his psychoanalytical heirs make short shrift of the

10. The Talmud even explicitly permits oral and anal intercourse between husbands and wives, acts that Freud would presumably regard as “perversions,” operating as he was, in part at least, on the teleological assumptions about sexuality that were current in his day. For the talmudic material and its ambivalences see Daniel Boyarin, Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture [109–22].
11. See Bloch, Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love. See also Dijkstra [188] on the virulent misogyny of late nineteenth-century renditions of “chivalry.”

22
‘rules’ of courtly love,” and Judaism has no patience for these rules either, then this adequately explains an alleged Freudian disdain for foreplay [72]. In fact, I would suggest that there is much in bourgeois (that is, post-Reformation) marriage (as opposed to its medieval Christian predecessors) that is similar to, and maybe even partly dependent on, talmudic marriage ideology as lived in medieval and early modern Judaism, including especially the valuation of foreplay, a practice entirely unlike the pseudocourtesies of courtly love.

This thesis of Cuddihy’s has had an afterlife in a work that goes even further in its valorization of romantic and courtly love and thus disparagement of traditional Judaism, which would have none of these. Thus, Estelle Roith writes:

*The Freudian doctrine of sexuality can be seen to be of a more ancient lineage, since, to reiterate the central theme of this book, Freud’s first and lasting culture was Jewish. . . .*

*It can therefore be no coincidence that Freud came from a long tradition that viewed as bizarre, hypocritical, and ultimately unhealthy, the aesthetic exhaliration and ritualized longing that characterized the spirit of Christian bourgeois romantic love. John Murray Cuddihy in his book The Ordeal of Civility is one of very few writers not merely to observe but also to consider the implications of the crucial fact that the Freudian sexual doctrine had its origins in the encounter between two cultures that differed radically in their sexual ideologies. Freud wrote that ‘the ascetic current in Christianity created psychical values for love which pagan antiquity was never able to confer on it’ (1912, SE 11: 188), and while this statement might seem to us to strike a faint personal note of envy, the phenomena of romance, courtship, and, indeed, forepleasure depend, as Cuddihy persuasively argues, on the principle of delayed consummation which, in both the Freudian and Jewish doctrines, is consistently deplored. . . . [126–27]*

I submit that there is not the slightest bit of evidence that in traditional Jewish culture delayed consummation is deplored, and I have cited evidence above that directly contradicts this absurd notion. The category error here involves simply identifying (as Cuddihy did) courtship with courtly love with foreplay—and courtly love with love, a series of identifications that simply accept in an uncontestted fashion the self-evaluations and mystifications of European ideology. Roith continues by asserting the correctness of what is perhaps the most egregious moment in all of Cuddihy’s work:

*Cuddihy quite rightly notes that courtship, like love, was seen from a traditional Jewish viewpoint as a Gentile refinement. He quotes Ernest van den Haag: “Love as ‘an aesthetic exhaliration and as a romantic feeling’ . . . never made much of a dent on Jewish attitudes towards the body or towards the opposite sex. Love as ‘sweet suffering’ was too irrational. If you want her, get her.” [126–27]*

The quotation from van den Haag cited by Cuddihy and then re-cited by Roith represents perhaps the silliest statement ever made about traditional Jewish culture. What on earth could “If you want her, get her” mean; hit her over the head with your club and drag her to your cave?!” In traditional Jewish culture the process of finding a spouse involved the

---

12. Altogether, the idea of serious scholarly works turning to a vulgar popularization such as van den Haag’s as a major source of information on traditional Jewish culture is simply staggering. As an example of the level of this book, I quote the following:
efforts of a matchmaker who sought to discover a suitable pairing. Both members of the potential couple, after having met the “intended” or even “fated” one had the absolute right to refuse the match. God himself was understood in Jewish folklore to pick out appropriate partners for people even before birth; indeed, according to the Talmud this is what God does for a full third of his time. How, I ask, does such a pattern, only sketched out here, get translated into “If you want her, get her?” The important point, of course, is that what was seen from a traditional Jewish viewpoint as Gentile (and not as a refinement) was not love but romance. This point is doubly significant when we pay attention to the gender politics of romance, especially its late nineteenth-century version. As Bram Dijkstra has made only too clear, much of the sexual imagining of Roith’s vaunted “Anglicism” in this period involved fantasies of women ripe and available for rape at any time, and this was typically expressed in representations of primitives of one sort or another: cavemen, barbarians—Galician Jews?—whose cultures permitted such “free” sexual behavior [Dijkstra 109–18]. Particularly telling is Dijkstra’s summation of this ideology: “Many middle-class men dreamed of those simple times when the sight of a male was enough to make a woman cringe, and when, if you wanted a woman, you

“Jewish girls are the world’s most boring women,” a friend of mine who is something of a Don Juan recently remarked to me. “They keep telling me that I’m not interested in their minds. They have a point. But when I tell them I’m interested in them as women, they burst into tears. Why don’t they want to be women? Why do they want to be less than a woman? That’s what a mind is, only part of a woman.” [152]

The whole book—at least the chapter on sex—is basically one long, humorless JAP joke presented as pop sociology. Van den Haag’s values, in many ways like those of Cuddihy and Roith, are precisely the values anatomized (and anathematized) in Dijkstra’s book. Referring to the misogynist writers of the fin de-siècle, Dijkstra writes, “They discovered the glories of the ‘gratuitous act’ as evidence of their power” [204]. Van den Haag writes, “Like a river that is regulated to avoid floods or drying up, love and even sex, carefully and usefully regulated, lose their wild, spontaneous, impractical beauty” [149]. I suggest that this “impractical beauty” of which van den Haag speaks owes much to the “glories of the ‘gratuitous act.’”

13. Roith’s critique of the androcentrism of traditional Judaism seems generally on the mark; women were extremely disenfranchised in traditional Jewish culture. She correctly observes, however, that “contrary to some feminist opinion, assumptions that women’s status has been generally lower in Judaism than in other religious and social systems, is without much foundation” [90]. But her apparent inability to read Hebrew sources in the original has occasionally led her disastrously off course. “The associations between women, sex, and sin can be clearly discerned in the powerful Talmudic edict kol be-ishah ervah—woman’s voice is an abomination—as well as in countless other warnings on the corrupting effect of the female and the dangers to male purity and piety of her presence” [92]. This conclusion is based on a gross mistranslation. “Ervah” does not mean “abomination.” It is simply a term for the nakedness of the genitals, male or female. A man is not allowed to pray in the presence of exposed genitals, male or female, his own or others’. What the Talmud is saying is that the female voice is so sexually stimulating to men that praying in the presence of a singing woman would be equivalent to praying in the presence of a naked one. There are, according to the Rabbis, places and times at which the exposure of the genitals is entirely appropriate, even praiseworthy, but prayer is not one of them. The text is undoubtedly sexist and androcentric, insofar as women are not discussed as subjects of desire or of prayer here at all. But it does not manifest the kind of misogyny, corrupting effects, or semi-demonic danger to piety or purity that Roith reads into it. Moreover, such representations and warnings of the “corrupting effect of the female” are rare, indeed nearly nonexistent, in talmudic culture, as I have argued at length in Carnal Israel [77–106].

14. Dijkstra’s exhaustive documentation of European fin-de-siècle images of women in both discourse and visual arts demonstrates eloquently the absence of any direct influence of Jewish gender ideologies on Freud’s theories of femininity. In further work, I plan to demonstrate, moreover, that premodern Jewish male fantasies bore little resemblance to those of the culture that produced Freud and Freud’s own fantasies.
simply reached out and took her” [111; my emphasis]. Whose fantasies are being played out when van den Haag describes Eastern European traditional Jewish sexual ethics as “If you want her, get her,” and Cuddihy and then Roith repeat this nonsense? This seems an almost embarrassingly classical case of racist projection, whether from the Gentile’s or the “evolved” Western Jew’s pen.

In general, Roith’s book, like Cuddihy’s, is firmly ensconced within the Orientalist Whig tradition of perceiving Protestant culture as some sort of ideal to which humanity is progressing. This is manifest particularly in the following invidious comparison between “the rabbis” and John Donne: “Marriage ‘keeps us from sin,’ the rabbis said (Epstein 1967: 15), an attitude that was roundly condemned in Anglicism by the poet John Donne, who spoke of men using their wives ‘in medicinam’ (my emphasis, Szasz 1981: 108)” [Roith 129]. This extends even to approbation of the violent performances of European masculinity. Thus, she manages to write: “Shtetl values held that physical superiority was appropriate only for goyim but even the far more sophisticated Berlin Jews, according to Reik, regarded military honours cynically as ‘Goyim Naches’ (Reik 1962: 61)” [Roith 132]. Roith is at least more accurate than Cuddihy in her identification of “goyim naches.” Violence was not particularly highly regarded in traditional Jewish culture. What is remarkable, then, is her uncritical valorization of the opposing values-system of the Protestant bourgeoisie, who saw fighting (for example, dueling) as fundamental to manly honor. Thus she is surprised that “sophisticated” Berlin Jews are still “cynical” about military honors. Presumably she would not be so cynical. I would.

In the light, then, of this astonishingly ethnocentric position, her account of Freud on sexuality and women is easily interpreted. If she has fully assimilated the ideology of war as manliness and sophistication, then it is not at all surprising that she has also fully assimilated the ideological mystification that romantic love (even courtly love) is somehow more respectful of women than are traditional cultures (nearly all) in which sexuality is understood to fulfill—not sublimate—physical desire and love to be the product of such mutual fulfillment and other joint effort and activity. It is only thus that she can arrive at such formulations as the following: “On the other hand, the Jewish sexual ethos has been described by Max Weber as being characterized by ‘the marked diminution of secular lyricism and especially of the erotic sublimation of sexuality’ (Weber 1964: 257), whose basis he finds in the ‘naturalism of the Jewish ethical treatment of sexuality.’ This, I suggest, is closely related to the ancient Jewish perception of women as spiritually and intellectually inferior” [Roith 5]. My mother (to be sure, only one generation from the shtetl herself) always used to tell me that love is what happens after marriage. Is this indicative of her coarseness, or perhaps of an attitude of disparagement toward women on her part? Once more, Roith’s failure here is the inability to imagine other civilizations, other cultural systems in which marriages are arranged by parents, as being just as worthy (and just as flawed) as “ours.”

Traditional Jewish culture may not have had room for romance (and was cynical about it when encountered in either its medieval or modern forms), but it was not cynical about love between married couples:

Our Rabbis have taught: One who loves his wife as he loves his own body and honors her more than he honors his body and raises his children in the upright fashion and marries them soon after sexual maturity, of him it is said, “And you shall know that your tent is at peace.” [Babylonian Talmud, Yevamoth 62b].

Roith’s thesis that Freud was influenced in his notions of female sexuality by Jewish culture is dependent on finding critical ways in which that culture is significantly different from the Christian culture that provides an alternative “source” for Freud’s thinking, and Roith completely fails at this task. Thus she writes: “Lacks correctly emphasizes,
contrary to the theologians’ view, that the early events of Genesis have, since the Christian era and its view of woman as temptress, also been associated by Jews at times with the Fall of Man (Lacks 1980:93–7). We can see this in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s The Family Moskat, for example, where the attending doctor announces to the expectant mother, “The curse of Eve is upon you” [Roith 92]. This passage simply does not carry the evidential weight assigned to it by Roith. The “curse of Eve” is that she will have pain in bearing children, as the “curse of Adam” is his necessity to work hard to eat. This is explicit in Genesis and therefore denied by no traditional Judaism. The doctor here is merely speaking allusively (and euphemistically, pace Cuddihy) of the onset of labor. Note that I am not denying the sexism of the formation. There is nothing here, however, that constitutes the Hellenistic Jewish (and Christian) myth of woman as temptress and a cataclysmic Fall in Eden [Boyarin, Carnal Israel 77–106]. Moreover, even if such notions are held “at times” by Jewish writers—I. B. Singer is hardly a sufficient source for generalization—this does not constitute a basis from which to constitute a description of Jewish culture in general, much less a foundation upon which to distinguish between Jewish and Christian culture, which is what Roith must do to make her thesis stick. My argument is not that if certain Jewish expressions are similar to Christianity then they are inauthentically Jewish but rather that they are certainly then not uniquely Jewish and, therefore, by the simplest canons of historical argumentation, cannot provide evidence for “Jewish influences on Freud’s theory of female sexuality.”15

Finally, the problem with Roith, as with Cuddihy, is that she treats Eastern European Judaism in perfect Orientalist tradition as a monolith, as a primitive, unchanging cultural entity.16 In this sense, I insist once more, both Cuddihy and Roith are neocolonialists, for colonization, as Chandra Mohanty observes, “almost invariably implies a relation of structural domination, and a suppression—often violent—of the heterogeneity of the subject” [52].

This assumption of homogeneity leads Roith into self-contradiction. In a paragraph that begins, “The adoption of masculine standards as the absolute norm is, of course, not restricted either to Freud or to Judaism. However, the linking of masculinity with the renunciation of wishes and obedience to the reality principle and their location at the root of all cultural endeavour, has a characteristically Mosaic ring to it.” And then continues a bit further on, “Ideal masculinity (although rarely achieved), is always associated with renunciation of submission to gods and to fathers as well as to the archaic libidinal strivings toward mothers. All intellectual, ethical, and spiritual achievements are associated with renunciation; it is renunciation that women, neurotics, and the religious are least capable of” [Roith 123]. There seems to me something fundamentally incoherent

15. This is in contrast to van den Haag, for instance, who writes,

The Jews have never accepted the Greek tradition of physical grace and beauty. Not only was that tradition alien; it was felt to be inconsistent with Jewish intellectual and moral values. Nor did the Jews ever accept the German cult of force, or the Roman cult of sex and cruelty. These ideals were irreconcilable with their own almost exclusively moral emphasis, though occasionally some Hellenistic ideas were at least temporarily fused with Judaic ones, ultimately to be repudiated in favor of the Jewish intellect and of Jewish ethics [147].

mobilizing images of an essential Jewish culture which can be contaminated by and purified of “influences” from outside. That is not the model of Jewish culture with which I work.

16. Even worse, Cuddihy refines all Jewry into a monolith. Thus, for him, “in the case of the Jews,” modernization was “an import situation” [179]. Some Western Jews, for example, in Italy, did, however, even have a Renaissance, and Jews were involved everywhere in western Europe in complicated ways in the invention of modernity.
in this sentence. First of all, “renunciation of submission,” that is, presumably, independence and self-assertion, is hardly the same thing as renunciation of archaic libidinal strivings; indeed, they may often be opposites. This self-contradiction has its objective correlate in the inclusion of the “religious” in this list. Is it being claimed that by not being capable of renouncing their submission to gods and fathers, the religious are therefore incapable of spiritual achievements? Is the “Mosaic ring” to be found in the demand to renounce submission to the father god? In what sort of Judaism is such renunciation an ideal? None that I know of. If Freud demands of men, as he indeed does, that they renounce religion, which may include or even be constituted by a failure to renounce submission to the father, then he stands against Judaism—not with it. Moreover, if Cuddihy’s thesis is that the “id of the Yid was hid under the lid of Western decorum,” and Roith approves of Cuddihy, then how is it now that “it is renunciation of archaic libidinal strivings” that establishes the Freudian Jewish influence? I argue that the self-contradiction that we observe here in Roith is the product of the maintenance of her thesis that Freud was directly and primarily influenced by “Jewish” culture and that Jewish culture was a self-consistent monolith. Cuddihy’s thesis is simple: There is the (Y)id and the superego(y).17 Its very simplicity constitutes both its coherence and its invalidity, but Roith cannot accept this. Both the id and the superego are Jewish for her, and it is this insistence that produces the fundamental incoherence that manifests itself in the surface contradictions of the above quotation. It simply cannot be that the same culture approved of immediate libidinal gratification—“If you want her, go get her”—and renunciation of libidinal strivings, at one and the same time, unless we assume a complex and contradictory culture, which this (like all others) was, but such an assumption would quite undermine the theories of both Cuddihy and Roith.18

There is no voice of the Eastern European Jew that speaks for herself here. Unimaginable to Cuddihy and Roith, perhaps, would be the notion that such Jewish “savages” could also provide a significant critique of the cultural and social patterns of their “evolved” Western brothers. I would close this section of my essay, then, with the following Eastern European yarn. God, on Yom Kippur, sends the Angel Gabriel to Earth to see what is going on. As it happens, it is the time for the prayer in which Jews sing, inter alia: “We are Your servants, and You are our Master. We are Your sheep, and You are our Shepherd. We are Your children, and You are our Father.” The somewhat dense angel, who only stays long enough to hear in each place one of these phrases (or perhaps, who has a very subtle sense of humor), reports back: “I was in London and there I found You have servants who dress like lords, and then I went to New York and discovered there that You have sheep as fat as pigs—but oh, what beautiful children You have in Berditchev!”19 And there are other such stories, even stories in which Eastern European “primitives” mock Moses Mendelssohn’s enlightened disciples—those same disciples who were so discomfited by Solomon Maimon’s uncouth behavior when he first arrived at their Salon. Certain Berlin Jews, having questions about faith, sent one of their number to Volozhin (the center of Lithuanian Jewish rationalist talmudism) to get answers. He returned after two years, and upon being asked if he had the answers, replied: No, but he had no more questions either. This anecdote, which I received through oral tradition, could be a double-edged sword. The context in which I heard it clearly read it as mocking the “Westerners.”

17. My pun is no worse nor any more valid for Freud’s language than Cuddihy’s.

18. That is to say, in Roith’s work it is implied but not thematized. What is thematized is a simple model of a univocal Jewish culture that “influenced” Freud. In Cuddihy, it is not even implied that Jewish culture might have had its own inner complexities and differentiations. It was too busy being tribal for that.

19. As related to me by my wife’s late uncle Daniel Ben-Nahum, originally from Lithuania.
Eastern European Jews were as capable, it seems, of criticizing the *bourgeoisement* of their Western confreres as these were of looking with disdain at the Ostjud’s “coarseness!” Already then the Empire talked back. The real point that needs to be made is that nineteenth-century Eastern European Jewry were not a morally degenerate people, as Cuddihy seems to simply assume [passim]. Like any other human group, there were different forces and tendencies within this community—I am not proposing a *Fiddler on the Roof* idealization—and much misery and degradation, but this was also a time of the highest cultural creativity for Eastern European Jews, both in the rationalist wing of Lithuania and in the mystical-literary wing of Galicia, Hungary, and further East. Particularly telling is a comparison of the notions of modernity as the product of “differentiation,” which Cuddihy emphasizes following Parsons [10], and the racist social Darwinism of a Herbert Spencer, as discussed by Dijkstra [165–66 and 170 ff.]: “There is a clear correlation, for instance, between the notion that with the progress of evolution men and women had become more unlike and Herbert Spencer’s famous dictum, in *First Principles*, that ‘evolution is definable as a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity’ (332)” [171]. Even if in 1974, Cuddihy conceivably could have been innocent of the implications of his own Social Darwinism, by 1987, when his book was republished and when he explicitly refuses to retract a single word, he certainly should have been innocent. I could assure Cuddihy that Rabbi Hayyim of Volozhin (and my grandmother) were just as capable of making differentiations—although to be sure different ones—as his modernized people are: “Differentiation on the level of the cultural system is the power to make distinctions between previously fused—confused—ideas, values, variables, concepts” [11; his emphasis]. Marx’s *On the Jewish Question* and Herzl’s disdain for these Jews are not to be read as accurate reflections of but as sickly, alienated disdain for these embarrassing others, a point I will make briefly in the last section of this paper. Volozhin was hardly a site strange to *theoria*, and that is, in a sense, my whole point.

**Freud and the Battle with Racism: Gilman and Geller**

In a series of quite stunning publications, two scholars, Sander Gilman and Jay Geller, have been pursuing closely related trains of thought regarding the question of how Freud’s analysis was materially generated out of the context of European anti-Semitism. The starting point of their view of the relation of psychoanalysis to “Jewishness” is perhaps best captured in the pithy quotation that Gilman provides from the work of Peter Homans, “Psychoanalysis emerged as the negative image, so to speak, of its Jewish surroundings”

---

20. Note also the affinities with Otto Weininger—an association that I am sure would repel Cuddihy—for whom, according to Dijkstra, “Women [and Jews] were, in essence, human parasites. They could not live without men or without each other [Gemeinschaft]. In a sense they were interchangeable, undifferentiated beings, for the capacity to differentiate was a characteristic of the intellect, of genius. True genius yearned for true individualism and stood sternly and ruggedly alone . . . , all of which served to show that regressive, materialistic anti-individualistic political philosophies such as communism were basically the weak conceptions of benighted men who, like Karl Marx, were suffering from terminal cases of effeminacy” [219–20]. I do not, of course, mean to associate Cuddihy with Weininger’s misogyny, only to show how deeply problematic the ideas of social evolution and “differentiation” to which he subscribes truly are.

21. In my work-in-progress, Antiphallus: Jewishness as a Gender, for which this essay is a prolegomenon, there will be a chapter entitled Edelkeit, in which I will argue that there was a “native” tradition of “civility” among Eastern European Jewish cultural elites. The ordeal was the product of conflict not between coarseness and civility but between two different cultures of gendering. Once more, I emphasize, Cuddihy is not anti-Semitic but neocolonialist in his ethos.
[71; qtd. in Gilman 4]. In other words, whatever the impression that Jewishness had made, somehow psychoanalysis defended against it by producing an opposite image point for point, as “a key to its wax impression.” Notice that this position is itself a negative impression of the Cuddihy-Roith notion that Freud was somehow directly representing Jewish gender/sex ideology in his positioning of the id and in his descriptions of female sexuality; in a sense, the Gilman-Geller line of thought is the antithesis to that of Cuddihy-Roith (in this aspect, of course; in many other ways Cuddihy and Roith are very distinct from each other). If Cuddihy-Roith perceive Freud as very much implicated in traditional Jewish culture and covertly responding to or reflecting it, Gilman-Geller perceive his Jewishness as virtually only a reactive reflex to anti-Semitism. (By setting this up as a dialectic, I prefigure the third section of this paper, in which a “synthesis” will be proposed.)

Although the research pursued by Gilman and Geller has many facets, in this essay I will concentrate just on the nexus of race, sex, and gender that they uncover as a salient factor in the generation of “Freud.” The first key result of their research is the recognition of just how powerful the linkage of male Jews with women was in European culture.22 An exemplary text is Jay Geller’s “A Glance at the Nose.” In this paper, Geller seeks to explain a parapraxis in one of Freud’s papers that has become a crux, namely, that when Freud is explaining the Glanz (shine) on the nose as a sexual fetish in a case history, he relates it to the English word glance, and not the Latin word for penis, glans, and this in spite of the fact that Freud himself theorizes that the fetish is a surrogate for the absent maternal penis. He ignores, moreover, a fact otherwise well known to him, namely, that noses are often a substitute for penises in popular culture and psychic substitutions [Geller, “Glance” 428–29].23 A further difficulty with this passage is that the entire case of the “glance on the nose” is cited apparently gratuitously and not at all worked into the argument. Geller sets out to solve this crux by “uncovering feminizing metonyms of the male Jewish body by which the Central European social and scientific imagination constructed the Jew” [429–30]. This construction of the Jewish male body had a profound effect, according to Geller, on Freud’s self-image:

Freud’s fetishized discourse, like his discourse on fetishes, betrays as well a concern about sexual difference. His account of the bloody aftermath of Eckstein’s operation and his reworking of the event in his dream of Irma’s injection, in which he clearly identifies with his patient Irma, reveal that these scenes problematized his own gender identity. Indeed Freud (1985) notes that Eckstein wielded the maternal phallus when she said to him when he returned to the near-death scene he had earlier fled: “So this is the strong sex” (117 [8 March 1895]). Both Freud’s subsequent letters to Fliess and his dreams find him attempting to respond to this taunt and to refute its implications of unmanning. [“Glance” 436–37]

Moreover, when read fully, as Geller does in his “(G)nos(e)ology” essay, the dream of Irma’s injection reveals as well that Freud was concerned not only with his own problematic gender identity but with that of all (male) Jews [“(G)nos(e)ology” 264–65]. For Geller, “Freud found himself embedded in a matrix of social discourses that increasingly associated (male) Jews with women” [“Glance” 437]. Thus we find Geller’s dazzling conclusion:

22. Excellent work on this topic has been done also by Garber [233] in quite a different context.
23. See also Sander L. Gilman, The Case of Sigmund Freud: Medicine and Identity at the Fin De Siècle [93–106].
In sum, the fetishized nose as the substitute for the circumcised penis belies that feminine-coded Jewish difference. On the one hand, Freud’s elision of odor and his failure to integrate his “most extraordinary case” into his argument may be an attempt to disavow the connection of Jews to the perverse sexuality and problematic gender identity which are constitutive of the notion of fetishism. On the other hand, his gratuitous example, like all fetishes, “remains a token of triumph over the threat of [Jewish difference] and a protection against it” (Freud 1927, 154). Freud’s nose leaves a trace of the inscription of ethnic—and gender—difference on the male Jewish body. [“Glance” 441]

Working from insights like these, both Geller’s and his own, Sander Gilman has produced a most extraordinary hypothesis to explain Freud’s gender theories, namely, that they are a defense against and displacement of statements about race. This is the leading argument of his Freud, Race, and Gender. The heart of the argument is contained in a section called “The Transmutation of the Rhetoric of Race into the Construction of Gender” [36–48], and since the question of gender is my theme here, it is on this section of the book that I will concentrate. Gilman’s major claim is encapsulated in the sentence “The rhetoric of race was excised from Freud’s scientific writing and appeared only in his construction of gender” [37]. Gilman is claiming that the key to femininity in Freud was molded via the “wax impression” of racial ideas about (male) Jews: “What Freud constructed in his image of the feminine was the absolute counterimage of the Jew” [47]. Freud both erases his racial specificity and effaces his anxiety about it by adopting in public the persona of the “neutral” scientist and the ideology that the mind has no race. The crux here is that Freud clearly held racial notions about the Jewish essence in private, so that if his ideas about women are a displacement of secret thoughts and fears about Jewish men, then (putting the best construction on it—and why shouldn’t we?) we have a case of persecution and the art of writing. “The language Freud used [in private] about the scientific unknowability of the core of what makes a Jewish male a male Jew was parallel to that which he used [in public] concerning the essence of the feminine” [37]. In perhaps the most stunning moment of the argument, Gilman claims that the use of the “Dark Continent” metaphor for female sexuality is specifically determined by the fact that Jews were considered blacks by European anti-Semites [38]. The bottom line is that “The Aryan is the ‘healthy,’ ‘normal’ baseline that determines the pathological difference of the male Jew. In Freud’s discussion of the nature of the female body, the distinction between male Aryan and male Jew is repressed, to be inscribed on the body of the woman” [40]. Gilman has discovered that in Viennese parlance of Freud’s time, der Jude was a usual slang term for the clitoris, most likely, as Gilman claims, because both the clitoris and the circumcised penis were read as truncated or reduced versions of the truly masculine organ. In other words, the Jew’s penis was inscribed by the anti-Semitic racial discourse as female. Freud’s reinscription of the clitoris as male, then, is a code or cipher for the reinscription of the circumcised penis as male, and thus of the Jewish man as male as well. Another way of saying this is that Freud, by erasing the essential, biological difference between male and female, as he does—contra popular opinion [Mitchell 8]—is erasing as well the biologized difference between Jew and Aryan. I submit that this is stunning stuff. It shows, moreover, how complicated cultural poetics is, for Freud’s greatest insight, that sexual difference is made and not born, and also his darkest moment of gross misogyny are both made to rest ultimately on a base of self-defense against anti-Semitic hostilities.

There are, however, other crucial moments in which I am much less convinced by Gilman’s arguments. Thus of Freud’s dissociation of sexuality from procreation and the assumption of a pleasure principle, Gilman argues, “By eliminating reproduction as the goal of the sexual, Freud destroyed the argument that Jewish sexual practices (circumci-
sion or endogamous marriage) were at the root of the pathology of the Jews” [42]. I don’t get it. This seems to me to be almost totally a non sequitur. Whether or not reproduction is the telos of sexuality, sex nevertheless results often enough in babies, or perhaps it is more appropriate to point out that in Freud’s time, at any rate, babies came from nowhere else, so whatever pathologies were identified as common to Jews owing to sexual practices would still be in place.

In its most compact form, Gilman’s thesis is double: a claim that both Freud’s ethnological writings and his writings on female sexuality are engendered by his concern for racism against Jews. In the ethnological texts (especially Moses and Monotheism, although to my recollection Gilman does not make this explicit), Freud

counters the charge of the special nature of the Jews by illustrating (using an ethnopsychological model) how the Jews, as a group, underwent the same Oedipal struggles as any other collective could have experienced. This view places the origin of Jewish difference in the past and understands it in terms of a universal model of experience. On the other hand, Freud explodes the charge of the inherent difference of the Jews by subsuming the qualities ascribed to the Jew and the Aryan into the female and the male. [43]

Another way of seeing and saying this is that Freud ends up in Moses and Monotheism masculinizing the Jews over against Christianity (in Future of an Illusion) as a defense against the anti-Semitic representation of Jews as female or feminized.24 Gilman never presents a clear moral position or critique of these strategies of Freud’s—which is not to claim (or even hint) that he assents to them. On the one hand, we should not forget that when the Moses book was written, the myth of the Jews as a degenerate third sex had already unleashed its murderous forces in Europe; on the other hand, we must now carefully separate out the politically (ethically) useful from the retrograde in Freud’s responses to the condition of the Jews and the ways that it impinged on his theorization of male and female. In particular, we cannot ignore the ways in which his transmutation of race into gender was not in opposition to the prevailing winds of the fin de siècle but fully complicit with them [Dijkstra 167]. If Jewish men were women in Europe, all women were also Jewish and “Negro” as well, and Freud’s “Dark Continent” begins to sound even more ominous. Race into gender and gender into race is a much wider (and more disturbing and dangerous) phenomenon than this text of Gilman’s would let us see. Insofar as it did not affect only Jewish men, Freud’s participation in it, in defense of himself as Jewish male according to Gilman’s thesis, is much more profoundly disturbing than Gilman allows. It is ultimately complicitous with both the extreme misogyny that

24. As Geller has brilliantly suggested, there is strong evidence within Moses and Monotheism to the effect that Freud’s entire description of Judaism’s advance in intellectuality through its insistence on the name-of-the-father over against the claims of the mother may be “a reaction formation—not by the ancient Hebrews against Egypt, but by Freud against the association of Jews with women made by his contemporaries” [Geller, “A Paleontological View of Freud’s Study of Religion: Unearthing the Leitfossil Circumcision” 62]; see also the much tamer version of this claim in Robert [107–08]. In his recent God’s Phallus and Other Problems for Men and Monotheism, Howard Eilberg-Schwartz has provided some more dramatic confirmation for this reading of Freud’s work. He shows that Freud draws back from a conclusion that seems ineluctable from his argument, namely that monotheism predicts representations of the male worshipper as feminized vis-à-vis the male God and as a fantasized erotic object for the male God, thus producing the tension that leads eventually to the abstraction—the unmanning, if you will—of the deity. Eilberg-Schwartz explains Freud’s reluctance to come to this conclusion as a product of his fear that it would amount to representing Jewish men as feminized, thus playing into the hands of that representation of himself as Jewish male that he was trying so hard to avoid.
marked the period as well as colonialist racism, both of which are finally to be found in Freud’s developmental theories and especially as encoded in his acceptance of the principle that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” [cf. Seshadri-Crooks]. Gilman is much too easy on Freud here.

Now one way that the negative aspect of Freud’s fin-de-siècle thought can be redeemed is, it seems to me, by retrieving and transvaluing the delineation of male Jews as female, arguing that historically Jewish men were indeed differently gendered from the general European ideal. This enables us to see that Freud’s elision of the borders between race and gender as well as his insistence that male and female are not fixed binaries (which Gilman reads as a further “desire to abandon them in a biology of race” [46] need not only be negative strategies of displacement and scapegoating but can also be positive contributions to a new theorizing of race/gender systems, systems in which we read race and gender not as independent variables but as coimplicating and covarying exigencies of identity formation. This gives another sense to Fanon’s famous cri de coeur, “At the risk of arousing the resentment of my colored brothers, I will say that the black is not a man” [8], reading it in the same way as Hortense Spillers’s “There is no such thing as a black woman.” On this reading, there is no such thing as a Jewish man or woman either, since “man” and “woman” as we (all of us) understand them are products of the dominant cultural system.

In the third section of this paper, I will outline a new way of approaching the question of the material base of Jewishness in the formation of the superstructure of psychoanalysis, one that I hope provides a combination of the best of the Cuddihy, Roith, and Gilman hypotheses while avoiding their pitfalls. It also adds, I trust, to the Geller position (which I accept in the main) by avoiding its “lachrymosity,” defined in Jewish historiography as the assumption that Jews were primarily or only victims and that their cultural productions are primarily or exclusively reactive in nature.

A Synthesis: Freud and the (De)Colonized Psyche

In this final section of the paper I wish to propose another model for looking at the relationships between Freud’s ideas about femininity and his Jewish situation. I suggest that if we combine different elements from all of the above models with each other and use them to correct each other, we will come up with a much suppler and more useful way of describing these connections. From Cuddihy I adopt the idea of the Jew as postcolonial subject. My account (and especially evaluation) of postcoloniality could not, however, be more different from Cuddihy’s.

In order to understand Freud on both gender and sexuality we have to consider the material conditions of his life as postcolonial male, that is, as the subject who has come into contact with the dominating society and is partly free to act out a mediation of one sort or another between the “native” and the Metropolitan cultures. In other words, following the practice of certain critics (and obviously not others), I am using the term “postcolonial” here to refer to a particular type of cultural situation. These are the people who live “lives in between,” in Leo Spitzer’s (the younger’s) evocative term. The reason

25. Some of the following argument is taken from another paper of mine, entitled “A Sharp Practice: Little Hans’s Circumcision and the Subject of Colonialism.” In that version I also pursue an elaborate comparison between Freud’s and Fanon’s writings on gender and sexuality, which has been dropped for the present context.

26. I prefer not to use the term “assimilation,” because of its implicit assumption that previously one could speak of an unassimilated, that is, pure cultural situation—on either side. In all but the most exceptional cases, it is now clear that cultures are always in contact to some degree or another and always changing in response to those contacts, thus always assimilating. This term,
for using this term is precisely because this cultural situation is generated par excellence by the political situation of postcoloniality, albeit not exclusively so. It should further be pointed out that the “post” in “postcolonial” refers to the psychological and cultural situation caused by colonization, including its effects during political decolonization, which does not imply, by any means, cultural decolonization [Nandy xi, xvi]. “Postcolonial” is, then, more like the anthropological term “postcontact” than like “postwar.” By using the term “postcolonial,” I do not mean to commodify a term that represents an extraordinarily vigorous critical discourse grounded in a certain political, historical situation, but rather to both acknowledge and enter into dialogue with that discourse through extension of the term to the significantly analogous Jewish situation in modern Europe. This move is perhaps parallel in an interesting fashion to the ways that the term “Diaspora” is being appropriated (in a fully positive sense) within postcolonial discourses.

The first step in the argument, then, is to assert that the Jews of premodern Europe are best described—for certain purposes—as a colonized people, as one of the internally colonized peoples of Europe. In “The Other within and the Other Without,” Jonathan Boyarin argues that Jewish existence in Europe bore significant analogies to the situation of colonized peoples outside of Europe. Thus the other Boyarin refers to “the contrast between Jewish carnality and Christian spirituality—one of the prime figures that will be carried forward into the thematics of colonialism [including Cuddihy’s!], with Christian remaining in place and ‘the savage’ being substituted for the Jew” [88]. A typical late nineteenth-century slur of the Jews is that they have no language at all, rendering Jews virtual Calibans, “reduced to the level of the beast” [Jewish Self-Hatred 215–16; cf. Greenblatt]. The analogy between “the Jew” and the colonized has also been actuated by Cixous in an explicit allusion to Fanon: “Me, too. The routine ‘our ancestors, the Gauls’ was pulled on me. But I was born in Algeria, and my ancestors lived in Spain, Morocco, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Germany” [Cixous and Clément 71].

If the Jews of premodern Europe are a colonized people, then the Emancipation is a decolonization and like any other produces that cultural condition referred to as postcoloniality. The postcolonial situation can be defined (even within the period in which the colonies had not yet been “granted” political independence) as the situation of the migrant, of the hybrid subject whose cultural world is doubled. It is in this sense that I will be using the term here:

Every colonized people—in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality—finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country. [Fanon 18]

Any Jew wishing to escape his material and moral isolation was forced, whether he liked it or not, to learn a foreign language. [Anzieu 203]

then, does not sufficiently evoke the particular cultural anxieties of the transition from colonial domination to emancipation. Furthermore, the term “assimilation” seems to imply a sort of stability in the “target culture” to which one is assimilating, whereas in reality, European culture at the time of Jewish Emancipation was more in flux than it was stable. Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to say (as Martin Jay has emphasized to me in a somewhat different context) that Jewish cultural activities played a role in the production of European modernity, just as we are coming to recognize more and more the crucial cultural role of colonialism and the colonies in producing European modernity. See also J. Boyarin [82].

27. But see the [only partially fair] critique of Cixous in J. Boyarin [“Other Within,” 102–03]; I too will return to a discussion of Cixous, arguing that the distortions of her position are yet another effect of the colonized/postcolonial Jewish situation.
Marthe Robert has eloquently delineated the situation of German Jewish intellectuals around the fin de siècle. She describes them as divided subjects, trying as hard as they can to wear German masks but inevitably revealing their Jewish skins. The harder such Jews tried to efface their Jewishness, the more rejected they were [Robert 17].

The success of this transformation is marked in great part through language: abandonment of Creole (Yiddish “Jargon”) for French (“High” German) with greater or lesser facility [Fanon 27–28; Hutton]. The internal hierarchy is created between the more “civilized” subject of the Antilles [Fanon 25–26] (Vienna, Berlin) and the still “native, uncivilized” subjects of Dahomey or the Congo (Vilna, Warsaw). Gilman evokes this moment eloquently:

In the eyes of the formerly Yiddish-speaking convert [who had described the Hebrew words in Yiddish as so deformed as to appear “Hottentot”!], Yiddish moved from being a language of a “nation within nations” to a language of the “barbarian.” But for the Jew, convert or not, these barbarians must be localized, like the Hottentot, in some remote geographic place to separate them from the image of the German Jew. Their locus is the East. [Jewish Self-Hatred 99]

The German-speaking Jew who applies the stereotypes of the anti-Semite to the Yiddish-speaking “Ostjude,” including Freud’s teacher Theodor Billroth [Jewish Self-Hatred 219], forms almost an uncanny analogue to the “evolved” colonial subject with his contempt for his native place, people, language, and culture. The “Ostjude” was for the German-speaking Viennese Jew what the “Unto Whom”—“the ignorant, illiterate, pagan Africans . . . unto whom God swore in his wrath etc.”—were to a Europeanized Yoruba, such as Joseph May [Spitzer 42].

In general, the prescriptions for solving the “Jewish problem,” whether of “evolved” Jews or of anti-Semites, involved a version of the civilizing mission. Thus Walter Rathenau “sees as the sole cure the integration of the Jew into German education (Bildung)” [Gilman, Jewish Self-Hatred 223; Cuddihy 25; see also Spitzer 26; Berkowitz 2–3, 99]. Even more pointed are the ideas of another assimilated Jew who holds that “the Jew, like Nietzsche’s Superman, is progressing from a more primitive stage of development, characterized by religious identity, to a higher stage of development, characterized by the present identification with cultural qualities of the German community, to eventually emerge whole and complete” [Jewish Self-Hatred 225]. Gilman clearly notes the analogies between this situation and the discourse of colonialism: “By observing the Ostjude, says the Western Jew, we can learn where we have come from, just as Hegel uses the African black as the sign of the progress of European civilization” [Jewish Self-Hatred 253]. We can imagine the effect that such internalized representations would have had on the transplanted Freud whose mother spoke only Galician Yiddish all of her life [Hutton 11; contra Anzieu 204 and passim].

Although the (br)other Boyarin explicitly mobilizes the paradigm of the other within in order to interrupt the spatial figurations of some postcolonial discourses—the West and the rest—[“Other Within” 81–82], the move of Freud’s family steadily westward, from

---

28. A point I came to appreciate only after a seminar with Homi Bhabha at the School of Criticism and Theory in the summer of 1993, which inspired much of the thought in this essay. J. Boyarin is particularly useful on the problematics of identifying time and space as separate coordinates: “There are close genealogical links between the ‘Cartesian coordinates’ of space and time, and the discreet, sovereign state, both associated with European society since the Renaissance” (“Space, Time”). This is not to trivialize the effects of either anti-Semitism or imperialism, à la Cuddihy.
Latvia and Galicia [Hutton 11], to Přibor (Freiberg) in Bohemia, and then in Freud’s childhood to Vienna, can be read as a move through time from the colonial to the transitional postcolonial situation. Time and space here are not independent coordinates in a Cartesian system but strangely equivalent to or mappable onto each other. “We speak of distant times; we also think of long ago places, if not in so many words” [J. Boyarin, “Space, Time”; see also Dijkstra 343]. Galicia was, for Freud, a long-ago place. “Bildung” as a move through time into “modernity” is thus the functional equivalent of an imperialist move through space that imposes the Kantian European universal on all of the world [Lloyd 36].

It was in this context that the crisis of gender and sexuality was produced in Freud (as in Weininger). I am suggesting that the internalized self-contempt that the colonized male comes to feel for his disempowered situation—represented in the case of Jews by the affect surrounding circumcision—is a powerful force for the production of the twin diseases of misogyny and homophobia in the postcolonial situation, precisely because their situation has been misrecognized as feminized. The intrapsychic mechanism is a kind of splitting occasioned by the “move” from one subject position—that of the colonized—to another in which there is a partial identification with the colonizer. The subject begins to see himself with the eyes of his oppressor and thus to wish to abject that in himself which he now identifies as contemptible by projecting it onto women and gay men.

There is a remarkable passage in “Little Hans” in which I think Freud reveals willy-nilly (as it were) the connections between internalized anti-Semitism, the postcolonial situation of the Jews of fin-de-siècle Vienna, and misogyny:

*I cannot interrupt the discussion so far as to demonstrate the typical character of the unconscious train of thought which I think there is here reason for attributing to little Hans. The castration complex is the deepest unconscious root of anti-semitism; for even in the nursery little boys hear that a Jew has something cut off his penis—a piece of his penis, they think—and this gives them the right to despise Jews. And there is no stronger unconscious root for the sense of superiority over women. Weininger (the young philosopher who, highly gifted but sexually deranged, committed suicide after producing his remarkable book Geschlecht und Character [1903]), in a chapter that attracted much attention, treated Jews and women with equal hostility and overwhelmed them with the same insults. Being a neurotic, Weininger was completely under the sway of his infantile complexes; and from that standpoint what is common to Jews and women is their relation to the castration complex.* [198–99]

This text could be interpreted to mean that the castration complex, in the sense of attribution of castration to women, is that which is “the unconscious root for the sense of superiority over women.” However, the text is also readable as meaning that hearing about circumcision is the unconscious root of misogyny, just as it is the root of anti-Semitism. Here (inadvertently, I think) Freud is suggesting the deepest unconscious root for his own (Jewish) misogyny, namely a Jewish male reaction to the accusation from outside of their own “castration” or “feminization.” The key to my reading is the occlusion of Little Hans’s Jewish identity in Freud’s account. I suggest that this occultation of the little boy’s identity is a cipher for Freud’s own attempt, through the theory of castration, to elude the psychic effect that his own circumcision had on him. For Gilman, Otto Weininger is cited by Freud as “an example of the problematic relationship of the Jew to his circumcised penis” [Freud, Race, and Gender 77], that is, as a sort of analysand. Thus, “Freud has evoked the Jewish ‘scientist’ Otto Weininger as an anti-Semite.” Gilman goes on to argue that
Weininger is like the little (non-Jewish) boy in the nursery who hears about the Jews cutting off penises, except that he, of course, knows that it is true. His hatred of the Jew is “infantile,” according to Freud, since it remains fixed at that moment in all children’s development when they learn about the possibility of castration. Jewish neurotics like Weininger focus on the negative difference of their bodies from ones that are “normal,” and use this difference, like their evocation of the bodies of women, to define themselves. [80]

This strikes me as altogether too benign a reading of Freud’s text (although by no means an impossible one). Where Gilman reads Freud’s Weininger as an analysand, I will read him as a fellow analyst. Another way of saying this would be that both Little Hans in Freud’s text and indeed Freud himself are like the little non-Jewish boy in the nursery.

How can this reading be validated over against Gilman’s suggestion that only Weininger is that little “non-Jewish” boy? It is the possession of the penis that is the unconscious root of misogyny, than which there is no stronger. Weininger treated women and Jews with equal hostility, because neither of them possesses the penis; they are both castrated “from the standpoint of the infantile complexes,” the stage at which Weininger was fixated. So far, so good. This paraphrase supports Gilman’s reading perfectly. Freud is an anatomist of anti-Semitism and of Jewish self-hatred as well. However, when we delve more deeply into the text, we will see that not all is nearly that smooth. The operative question is: What about Freud? Where is he in this picture? The key, again, is “Hans’s” suppressed circumcision.

Freud argues that in the young boy, hearing about the circumcision of Jews would arouse fears of being castrated, just as knowing about women would arouse similar fears. These two parallel anxieties produce the twin affects of misogyny and anti-Semitism. As the castration complex is “resolved,” or “dissolved,” these unrealistic fears, one would think, ought to give way then to a “normal” (noninfantile) appreciation of the equality of women and Jews. However, on Freud’s own account, the castration fantasy—the assumption that women have something missing and are inferior—remains the unconscious root of misogyny and clearly not only in infants, since Freud considers the sense of male superiority to be a given in adult males and not a marginal and pathological form. After all, it is the “repudiation of femininity that is the bedrock of psychoanalysis,” in Freud’s famous 1937 formulation. As Jessica Benjamin has put it, “We might hope that the boy’s ‘triumphant contempt’ for women would dissipate as he grew up—but such contempt was hardly considered pathological” [160]. Similarly, as Freud projects it, the fantasy that Jews have something missing remains the unconscious fantasy that produces anti-Semitism in adults as well. Neither of these neuroses is ever completely resolved in adulthood. Now the Jewish boy, even more than the Gentile boy, obviously knows that something has been cut off his penis, which is not to say, of course, that I am in agreement with the concept that he would interpret this as a castration. Not only has he heard in the nursery about circumcision, it has undoubtedly been explained to him and, moreover, he has most likely attended circumcision ceremonies for other Jewish infants. This could very well have been the case for Little Hans—although, to be sure, he had a little sister and no brother—and almost certainly for Freud himself. Not only of Weininger but of Freud could we say that “he, of course, knows that it is true” that Jews have a piece of penis cut off. By obcluding the fact of Hans’s Jewishness, and by obscuring the role of his own here, Freud is hiding something. I would suggest that what he is hiding is a claim that Jewish knowledge of their own circumcision must inevitably produce in the Jew a sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the Gentile—and that Freud himself shares that sense of inferiority. We have here not only an anatomy of misogyny and of anti-Semitism—both read as near inevitabilities—but also of Jewish self-contempt, also read as a sort of inevitability. In other words, I am suggesting that Freud essentially accepts Weininger’s argument, indeed
that that is why Freud cites him here and not as an example of the pathology of anti-Semitism in Gentiles, for which he would be a rather strange example indeed. According to my reading, then, once again, Freud is more identified with than differentiated from Weininger. If indeed as Gilman claims, “Freud seems not to have responded to Weininger’s self-hatred as the reflection of his identity crisis” [Jewish Self-Hatred 251], this would be, on my reading, a classic example of denial and defense. Hidden behind the figure of Weininger in Freud’s note and even of the incognito Jew Little Hans is none other than Freud, “the specialist on the inner nature of the Jew” [Jewish Self-Hatred 242], and thus he, Freud, effectively reveals one strand of his own complex and conflictual “inner nature” as the “Jewish anti-Semite.”

I suggest that Freud, looking at his circumcised penis from the position of the “whole” man’s gaze, recovers his “maleness,” as this is defined within the dominant culture, by pathologizing his male and female enemies as “feminized.” In other words, the very misogyny and homophobia of the colonizer that have been directed against the colonized become internalized, then projected out, and ultimately turned against women and gays. It is not I who have these despised characteristics; it is they! This move cannot but have effects on women and gays within the dominated group. I think the psychic mechanism here is clear enough. They demasculinize us; we will assert our value by abjecting everything that stinks of the effeminate, the female, the homosexual. Freud’s self-described “overcoming [Übermannung ]” (literally, over-manning) of his “homosexual cathexis” [qtd. in Jones 2: 83] seems to me to be cut of the same psychic cloth as his psychic “bedrock” of the repudiation of femininity.

It is here that Gilman’s and Geller’s work must be mobilized, for Freud’s insistence on the repudiation of femininity is best read, I would suggest, as the repudiation of that feminized position into which Jewish men are put by European culture. I have already mentioned Gilman’s stunning citation of the clitoris as “the Jew” and its implications for Jewish self-imaging:

Thus the clitoris was seen as a “truncated penis.” Within the turn-of-the-century understanding of sexual homology, this truncated penis was seen as an analogy not to the body of the idealized male, with his large, intact penis, but to the circumcised (“truncated”) penis of the Jewish male. This is reflected in the popular fin de siècle Viennese view of the relationship between the body of the male Jew and the body of the woman. The clitoris was known in the Viennese slang of the time simply as the “Jew” (Jud). The phrase for female masturbation was “playing with the Jew.” [Freud, Race, and Gender 38–39]

The Jew is a clitoris. He has no phallus. Freud’s project can be described, at least in part, as getting the phallus for his male self/People. Freud’s now famous reaction to his father’s story of having “passively” picked his hat up after it was knocked off by a Christian anti-Semite is certainly relevant here. Freud explicitly refers to this incident as an example of “unheroic conduct on the part of a big, strong man” [SE 4: 197]. In a perceptive interpretation, William J. McGrath argues that the hat in the story would have been understood by Freud as a symbol for the phallus, so “the knocking off of his father’s

29. See Gilman [Jewish Self-Hatred 268], where he writes, “Freud’s scientific German, at least when he sits down to write his book on humor, is a language tainted by Weininger’s anti-Semitism,” a claim that seems to contradict his later argument that Freud pathologized and thus rejected Weininger’s anti-Semitism. In 1986, it seems, Gilman was closer to the perspective on Freud that I am adopting here than he is in his latest work.

30. As can Roith’s, paradoxically, with her apparent valorization of the high regard for “military honors.”
hat could have directly symbolized to him the emasculation of Jakob Freud” [McGrath 64]. Here we have, I hypothesize, a (the?) source of the castration (circumcision?) complex and penis (foreskin) envy. What Gilman understands as the development of normal Jews who “overcome their anxiety about their own bodies by being made to understand that the real difference is not between their circumcised penises and those of uncircumcised males, but between themselves and castrated females” on this reading is precisely the root of the misogyny of the (de)colonized Jew, including that piece of psychoanalytic misogyny known as the castration complex/penis envy.

I am suggesting that the binary opposition phallus/castration conceals the circumcised penis. Both the “idealization of the phallus, whose integrity is necessary for the edification of the entire psychoanalytical system” [Johnson 225] and the flight to Greek cultural models and metaphors signal the imbrication of this production in the affect of the colonized person. In psychoanalytical terms, the Oedipus complex is Freud’s “family romance,” in the exact sense of the term. He is fantasizing (unconsciously) that he is not the circumcised Schelomo, the son of Jakob, but the uncircumcised, phallic, and virile Greek Oedipus, the son of Laius [cf. Anzieu 195], just as earlier he had consciously fantasized that he was Hannibal, the son of the heroic Hamilcar, and not the son of his “unheroic” Jewish father.31

In my account of Roith’s work above, I have discussed (and rejected) only one of its themes, namely the thesis of “direct” cultural influence, or adoption by Freud, of allegedly traditional Jewish ideologies of gender. There is another theme, however, that runs through her book, integrated only with difficulty with the first one, namely, that it was the conflict between traditional Jewish gendering and the gendering of the dominant culture that gave rise to the tensions that produced Freud’s ideas. This “other” thesis in Roith is much closer to my own construction. Roith cites the views of Percy Cohen from personal interviews [79, 82] and then builds on them [85]. Thus where Roith writes that “the exilic Jew, because he lacked political autonomy and national rights to self-defense, felt himself to be seen as—and at some profound level to be—castrated” [88], I argue that this gaze of the Jew on “him”self is not a product of the exilic situation but of a misrecognition of Jewish cultural difference in the transition to the postcolonial situation. Jewish maleness, I suggest, was different, in part precisely in the rejection of such performances of masculinity asueling and courtly love. What is perhaps most novel about my argument is my assertion that the Jewish pattern of male subjectivity was not just a reactive artifact of the “unnatural” situation of Diaspora Jews but a positive cultural product. It felt like a castration only when Jews began to look at themselves with the eyes of the dominant culture.

Demystification or Reduction?

I do not mean this suggestion to be reductive. In another place I have argued that Freud’s account of sexual differentiation as nonbiological in its foundations is in some ways much more liberatory than, for instance, the account of Karen Horney, whereby people are born male and female. The castration complex thus represents a theoretical advance over naturalized views of sexual difference, which are also necessarily heteronormative in ways that Freud’s theories allow us to avoid. The point, then, is certainly not to disqualify Freud’s contribution by locating it in a particularly social circumstance. Rather, it would seem that the function of an argument such as this is to help contextualize those places where Freud’s thesis seems incoherent, unnecessary, or otherwise unhelpful, that is, not its moments of insight but its moments of blindness. There seems to be a signal blindness

31. In another essay, “Freud’s Baby, Fliess’s Maybe,” I will discuss the particulars of this theory.
in Freud’s unwillingness to see any possibility for figuring sexual difference other than the phallus, which, as Lacan has correctly interpreted, is equivalent to the name-of-the-father. Why, I am asking, was a thinker who was in so many ways so willing and able to break the paradigms of his culture here seemingly unable to do so? As I have suggested above, Roith’s thesis that he is directly reflecting Jewish gender ideology simply does not hold up (this point will be further developed throughout my current research). As Malcolm Bowie remarks (of Lacan, but the same point could be made of Freud), he shows a “monomaniacal refusal to grant signifying power to the female body”; “the drama of possession and privation, of absence and presence, of promise and threat, could be retained and perhaps even enhanced if the principals were breast, clitoris, vagina, and uterus.” But Lacan himself, Bowie continues, “tirelessly suggests that any such transfer of symbolic power to the female would be heresy, and bring the Symbolic order itself to the verge of ruin” [Bowie 147]. Lacan’s “monomania” is his own; Bowie’s use of the term “heresy” is telling. What requires and enables a cultural explanation, however, is Freud’s prior refusal. The description adopted here has, I think, the virtue of providing a technique for condemning the misogyny and homophobia that postcolonial male cultures often manifest without essentializing them in a racist fashion. We, “in theory,” must find ways of thinking about gender domination that do not reinstate racist, colonialist cultural Darwinisms and also ways of thinking about anti-imperialism and postcoloniality that do not reinstate gender domination and homophobia. Our daily political lives demand this move forward. The “consequences of theory” here are palpable.32

WORKS CITED

Abraham, Gary A. Max Weber and the Jewish Question: A Study of the Social


Benjamin, Jessica. The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of

Berkowitz, Michael. Zionist Culture and West European Jewry before the First World

Bloch, R. Howard. Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love.


Boyarin, Daniel. Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture. Berkeley: U of

———. “A Sharp Practice: Little Hans’s Circumcision and the Subject of Colonialism.”

Boyarin, Jonathan. “The Other Within and the Other Without” Storm from Paradise: The

———. “Space, Time, and the Politics of Memory.” Space, Time, and the Politics of
Memory. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, in press.


Eilberg-Schwartz, Howard. God’s Phallus and Other Problems for Men and Monothe-

32. Donald Pease, “Toward a Sociology of Literary Knowledge: Greenblatt, Colonialism,
and the New Historicism,” describes the problem well, but has, I think, no solution to offer. Several
thorists, Gayatri Spivak prominently among them, are actively working on this problem.


