Jacques Derrida has written of the frontier between “speech” and “writing” as “the limit separating two opposed places. Like Czechoslovakia and Poland, [they] resemble each other, regard each other; separated nonetheless by a frontier all the more mysterious . . . because it is abstract, legal, ideal.”¹ This metaphor can be extended into a virtual allegory to sketch a picture of the historical situation of Judaism and Christianity in the second, third, and fourth centuries, as the borderlines between them came to be instituted. Like Czechoslovakia and Poland, they too resembled each other and regarded each other, eventually coming to be separated by a frontier that is abstract, legal, and ideal.

Heresiology— the “science” of heresies— inscribes the borderlines, and heresiologists are the inspectors of religious customs. Authorities on both sides tried to establish a border, a line that, when crossed, meant that someone had definitively left one group for another. But, extending Derrida’s metaphor, Paul de Man wrote, there is “no way of defining, of policing, the boundaries that separate the name of one entity from the name of another; tropes are not just travelers, they tend to be smugglers and probably smugglers of stolen goods at that.”² The heresiologists tried to police the boundaries so as to identify and interdict those who respected no borders, those smugglers of religious ideas and practices newly declared to be contraband, nomads of religion who would not recognize the efforts to institute limits, to posit a separation between “two opposed places,” and thus to establish clearly who was and who was not a “Christian,” a “Jew.”³ They named such folk “Judaizers” or “minim,” respectively, and attempted to declare as out of bounds their beliefs and practices, their very identities.

Heresiologists don’t describe and classify heresies so much as produce them as such, or perhaps more subtly put, in studying heresiology, we are investigating a sort of “feedback loop,” within which social difference is
being rationalized as ideological difference and the ideological difference, in turn, reproducing and intensifying the social difference. This notion of the “feedback loop” is closely related to the concept of “dynamic nominalism” elaborated by Arnold Davidson and Ian Hacking. As Hacking puts it, “categories of people come into existence at the same time as kinds of people come into being to fit those categories, and there is a two-way interaction between these processes.” We could say with some justice that “Christianity” and “Judaism” were invented in order to make sense of the fact that there were Jews and Christians. Groups that are differentiated in various ways by class, ethnicity, and other forms of social differentiation become transformed into “religions” in large part, I would suggest, through discourses of orthodoxy/heresy. Heresiology, whatever else it is, is largely the work of those who wished to eradicate the fuzziness of the borders, semantic and social, between Judaism and Christianity and thus produce them as fully separate (and opposed) entities—as religions.

For nearly two decades now, scholars of early Christianity have been advancing a major revision of the history of Christian heresiology. Working within a Foucauldian paradigm, Alain Le Boulluec has been central—even the prime mover—in this shift in research strategy. Aside from his specific historical achievements and insights, Le Boulluec’s most important move was to shift the discourse away from the question of orthodoxy and heresy, understood as essences (even constructed ones) as had Walter Bauer before him, and to move the discussion in the direction of a history of the representation of orthodoxy and heresy, the discourse that we know of as heresiology, the history of the idea of heresy itself.

Similarly, where scholars of rabbinic Judaism have looked for evidence of response to Christianity at specific points within rabbinic texts—e.g., denunciation in the form of minut or imitation of or polemic against certain Christian practices and ideas—we can follow Le Boulluec’s lead in taking up Foucault’s notions of discourse and shift our investigation from the specifics of what was thought or said to the episteme or universe of possible knowledge within which heresiological concepts and expressions could be thought or said. Continuing Derrida’s “border” conceit and invoking a well-known joke might help to make clearer the shift that I’m talking about here. Every day for thirty years a man drove a wheelbarrow full of sand over the Tijuana border-crossing. The customs inspector dug through the sand each morning but could not discover any contraband. He remained, of course, convinced that he was dealing with a smuggler. On the day of his retirement from the service, he asked the smuggler to reveal what it was he was smug-
gling and how he had been doing the smuggling. The answer, of course, was that he was smuggling wheelbarrows. Where until now, it might be said, scholarship has been looking for what is hidden in the sand (with more success than the customs inspector), I prefer to look at smuggled wheelbarrows as the vehicles of language within which identities are formed and differences are made. If Bauer, we might say, was still looking for some contraband treasures in the sand, it was Le Boulluec who taught us to look for smuggled wheelbarrows. But, of course, it wasn’t only the modern scholar who was searching for the contraband but the heresiologists themselves. Little did they suspect, I warrant, that in struggling so hard to define who was in and who was out, who was Jewish and who was Christian, what was Christianity and what was Judaism, it was they themselves who were smuggling the wheelbarrows, the discourses of heresiology and of religion as identity.

Hybrids and heretics

Generally, scholars have seen the orthodox topos that Christian heretics are “Jews” or “Judaizers” as a sort of side-show to the real heresiological concern, the search for the Christian doctrine of God, to put it in Hanson’s terms. According to this view, heresiology is primarily an artifact of the contact between biblical Christian language and Greek philosophical categories, which forced ever more detailed and refined definitions of godhead, especially, in the early centuries, in the face of the overly abstract or philosophical approaches of the “Gnostics.” The naming of heretics as Jews or Judaizers is treated, in such an account, as a nearly vacant form of reprobation for reprobation’s sake. Without denying that interpretation’s validity for the history of Christian theology, I nonetheless hypothesize that it is not epiphenomenal that so often heresy is designated as “Judaism” and “Judaizing” in Christian discourse of this time, nor that a certain veritable obsession with varieties of “Jewish-Christianity” (Nazoreans, Ebionites) became so prominent in some quarters precisely at the moment when Nicene orthodoxy was consolidating. Furthermore, it is not a necessary outcome that even a very refined theological discourse and controversy (on such issues as the relations of the persons of the trinity) produced a structure of orthodoxy and heresy without some other cause or function intervening. At least one major impetus for the formation of the discourse of heresiology, on my reading, is the construction of a Christianity that would not be Judaism. The “Jews” (i.e., for this context, heretics so named), the Judaizers, and the Jewish-Christians—whether they existed and to what extent is irrelevant in this
context—thus mark a space of threatening hybridity, which it is the task of the religion-police to eliminate.\textsuperscript{16}

Note that these religion-police, the border guards, were operating on both sides; hybridity was as threatening to a “pure” rabbinic Judaism as it was to an orthodox Christianity.\textsuperscript{17} An elegant example is the fair of Elone Mamre, which, according to the church historian Sozomen, attracted Jews, Christians, and pagans, who each commemorated the angelic theophany to Abraham in their own way: the Jews celebrating Abraham; the Christians the appearance of the Logos; and the pagans, Hermes.\textsuperscript{18} Here is, perhaps, the very parade instantiation of Bhabhan “interstitial” spaces that bear the meaning of culture. The rabbis prohibited Jews from attending at all,\textsuperscript{19} thus reinscribing the hybridity as something like what would later be called “syncretism,” and banishing it from their orthodoxy. This is an oft-repeated phenomenon at this particular time.\textsuperscript{20}

A recent writer on the history of comparative religion, David Chidester, has developed the notion of an “apartheid comparative religion.” By this (working out of the southern African situation as a model for theorization), Chidester means a system that is “committed to identifying and reifying the many languages, cultures, peoples, and religions of the world as if they were separate and distinct regions.” The point of such a knowledge/power regime is that “each religion has to be understood as a separate, hermetically sealed compartment into which human beings can be classified and divided.”\textsuperscript{21} I locate the beginnings of such ideologies of religious difference in late antiquity. Following Chidester’s descriptions, I want to suggest that the heresiologists of antiquity were performing a very similar function to that of the students of comparative religion of modernity, conceptually organizing “human diversity into rigid, static categories [as] one strategy for simplifying, and thereby achieving some cognitive control over, the bewildering complexity of a frontier zone.”\textsuperscript{22} Heresiology is, I might say, a form of apartheid comparative religion, and apartheid comparative religion, in turn, a product of late antiquity.

One of the most important themes of postcolonial theorizing is its emphasis on the hybridity of cultural identifications and the instability of dominating cultural paradigms, paradigms that must be constantly reproduced, that must constantly assert their own naturalness while asserting hybridity as unnatural, monstrous.\textsuperscript{23} Homi Bhabha has written that cultures interact, not on the basis of “the exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s
hybridity.” Bhabha concludes, “it is the ‘inter’ — the cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the in-between space — that carries the burden of the meaning of culture.”

The instability of colonial discourse makes possible the subaltern’s voice, which colonizes, in turn, the discourse of the colonizer. As Bhabha puts it, “in the very practice of domination the language of the master becomes hybrid — neither the one thing nor the other.”

Robert Young glosses this insight: “Bhabha shows that [the decentering of colonial discourse from its position of authority] occurs when authority becomes hybridized when placed in a colonial context and finds itself layered against other cultures, very often through the exploitation by the colonized themselves of its evident equivocations and contradictions.”

Bhabha focuses on the faultlines, on the border situations and thresholds, as sites where identities are performed and contested. Borders, I might add, are also places where people are strip-searched, detained, imprisoned, and sometimes shot. Borders themselves are not given but constructed by power to mask hybridity, to occlude and disown it. The localization of hybridity in those others who are called hybrids and heretics serves that purpose.

I thus argue that hybridity is double-edged. On the one hand, the hybrids “represent . . . a difference ‘within,’ a subject that inhabits the rim of an ‘in-between’ reality,” but on the other hand, the literal ascription of hybridity on the part of hegemonic discourses to one group of people, one set of practices, disavows the very difference within by externalizing it. Hybridity itself is the disowned other. It is this very disowned hybridity that supports the notion of purity. Following this mode of analysis, the commonplace that orthodoxy needs heresy for its self-definition can be nuanced and further specified. “Heresy” is marked not only as the space of the not-true in religion but also as the space of the syncretistic, the difference that enables unity itself. A similar point has been made in another historical context by Young who writes, “The idea of race here shows itself to be profoundly dialectical: it only works when defined against potential intermixture, which also threatens to undo its calculations altogether.”

Young helps us see that it is not only that “white” is defined as that which is “not-black” but that the very system of race itself, the very division into white and black as races, is dependent on the production of an idea of hybridity, over against which the notion of the “natural” pure races comes into discourse. This way of thinking about hybridity in the classification of humans into races can be mobilized in thinking about heresy and the classification of people and doctrines into religions as well. This provides a certain corrective, then, to those ver-
sions of a postcolonial theory that would seem to presuppose pure essences, afterwards “hybridized,” thus buying into the very activity of an apartheid they would seek to subvert.30

Historian Seth Schwartz, providing us with a nonessentialist model for approaching the question of hybridity, has urged us to think about the constructedness of religious identities:

We should not be debating whether some pre-existing Jewish polity declined or prospered, or think only about relatively superficial cultural borrowing conducted by two well-defined groups. In my view, we should be looking for systemic change: the Jewish culture which emerged in late antiquity was radically distinctive, and distinctively late antique—a product of the same political, social and economic forces which produced the no less distinctive Christian culture of late antiquity.31

By systemic change, Schwartz means changes in entire systems of social, cultural, and, in this case, religious organization that affect Jews, Christians, and others equally, if not identically. This seems just right to me, but calls for a bit more emphasis on the differentiating factors in that very same productive process, in addition to highlighting the forces tending toward similarity.

In looking at that differentiating process within the context of a shared systemic change, I will propose a tentative hypothesis for understanding one of the factors that set this systemic change in motion; in other words, I will suggest an answer to the question “Why was that border written?” In my historical construction, a serious problem of identity arose for Christians who were not prepared (for whatever reason) to think of themselves as Jews, as early as the second century, if not at the end of the first. These Christians, whom I will call by virtue of their own self-presentation, Gentile Christians (“The Church from the Gentiles, ek tōn ethnōn”), were confronted with a dilemma: thinking of themselves as no longer “Greeks” and not “Jews,” to what kind of a group did these converts belong? We are told it was in Antioch that the disciples were first named “Christians” (Acts 11:26).32 I think it no accident that this act of naming occurs in a context where the entry of “Greeks” into the Christian community is thematized. Nor is it an accident that Justin is our earliest source for both heresiology and the notion that the Gentile church has replaced the Jews as God’s “Israel.”
These Christians had to ask themselves: What is this *Christianismos* in which we find ourselves? Is it a philosophical party, a new *gens*, a new *ethnos*, a third race that is neither Jew nor Greek, or is it an entirely new something in the world, some new kind of identity completely? One important strand of early Christianity, beginning with Ignatius and Justin Martyr, decided to see *Christianismos* as an entirely novel form of identity. Christianity was a new thing, a community defined by adherence to a certain canon of doctrine and practice. For these Christian thinkers, the question of who’s in and who’s out became the primary way of thinking about Christianicity. And the vehicle for answering that question was the determination of orthodoxy and heresy. “In” was to be defined by correct belief, “out” by willful adherence to false belief.

In adopting the language “had to ask themselves,” I don’t mean to ascribe actual inevitability to the question. There are particular class-like interests that are served by the ideological posing of the question itself and the production of particular answers. The interests that are served by the ideological discourse (by ideological nonstate apparatuses, to adapt Althusser) can be investments in other sorts of power and satisfaction for elites of various types within a given social formation. The discourses of orthodoxy/heresy, and thus, I will argue, of religious difference, of religion as an independent category of human identification, do not necessarily serve the interests of an economic class—it would be hard to describe the rabbis of late Roman Palestine or Sassanid Babylonia or the bishops of Nicaea as an economic class—but they do serve in the production of ideology, of hegemony, the consent of a dominated group to be ruled by an elite (hence “consensual orthodoxy,” that marvelous mystification). This makes an enormous difference, for it leads to the Althusserian notion of ideology as having a material existence, as having its own material existence in that it “always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices.” Ania Loomba’s statement of the current theoretical position that “no human utterance could be seen as innocent,” that, indeed, “any set of words could be analysed to reveal not just an individual but a historical consciousness at work,” is crucial for me, for it is this postulate that enables my work as a historian. This set of notions, to which I can more or less only allude in this context, does not quite dissolve completely (as sometimes charged) but surely renders much more permeable any boundary between linguistic (or textual) practice and “the real conditions” of life within a given historical moment and society, thus empowering the study of texts not as reflective of social realities but as
social appurtenances that are understood to be complexly tied to other apparatuses via the notion of a discourse or a dispositif. In the case study that follows, I hope to make a contribution to the genealogical study of the discourse of orthodoxy, or, more generally, of “religion.”

Ignatius and the invention of Judaism

One of the earliest of the religious customs inspectors was the first-century “bishop” of Antioch, Ignatius. Ignatius was one of the first thinkers to attempt to name and define what is (and what is not) Christianity, and, as such, one of the first (perhaps the first) to define a “Judaism,” as well. C. K. Barrett has observed, “Ignatius was one of the most notable representatives of the first age to understand Christianity, and especially Christian controversy, in terms of orthodoxy and heresy, catholicism and schism, and the relation of Ignatius to Jewish Christians is a significant part of this development.” Barrett goes too far in ascribing to Ignatius the concept of orthodoxy and heresy, for, as Walter Schoedel has written, “disunity, not false teaching is uppermost in Ignatius’ mind.” The letters of Ignatius, nevertheless, provide us with some rich bread to chew on, as these are arguably the earliest documents that would prefigure Christian heresiology. In Ignatius we find, too, one of the first attempts to make a difference between Christianismos and Ioudaismos, which is not surprising since he is the earliest known writer to use the term Christianismos as the name for his “religion.”

From its very conception, then, the word Christianismos has been defined over against Ioudaismos, a term which, like Hellenismos or Medismos, had earlier signified political, ethnic, and cultural entities.

In terms of the most elementary structuralist notions of language (and even without these), it will be seen that the invention of Christianismos as the binary opposite of Ioudaismos completely re-signifies the latter term as well. The point (worth repeating) is not, of course, that there was no religion in Ioudaismos but rather that Ioudaismos included much that we would not call religion, or rather, as Elizabeth Castelli has well phrased it,

From the vantage point of a post-Enlightenment society that understands the separation of the political and the religious as an ideal to be protected, the Roman imperial situation requires careful attention to the myriad ways in which “Roman religion” might, it could be defensibly argued, not quite exist. That is, insofar as practices that could conventionally be called “religious”
intersected so thoroughly with political institutions, social structures, familial commitments, and recognition of the self-in-society, there is very little in ancient Roman society that would not as a consequence qualify as “religious.”

In the process of entering into a new paradigm, Ioudaismos itself (and later Hellenismos too) was re-signified from the name of a political/cultural/religious entity to the name of a religion. Frances Young has made the point quite plain: “Hellēnismos, Ioudaismos and Romanitas were originally terms referring to culture; only in response to Christianity did paganism or Judaism, or for that matter at a later date Hinduism, become a belief-system as distinct from a whole culture.” The Christian heresiologist was among the major agents of that re-signification, and Ignatius, that precursor of heresiology, anticipated this function as well. The bishop and future martyred saint inveighed mightily against those who blurred the boundaries between Jew and Christian. His very inveighings, however, are indicative of the ideological work that he is performing—work that in the fullness of time led to the making of both Christianity and Judaism. In Ignatius’s time (and, I will hypothesize, for many generations after), Ioudaismos and Christianismos constituted a very fuzzy set of categories. The “fuzzy category” is referred to by Ignatius as the “monster”: “It is monstrous to talk of Jesus Christ and to practice Judaism” (Magnesians 10:3; Ignatius, 126), he proclaims, thus making both points at once: the drive of the nascent orthodoxy—understood as a particular social location and as a particular form of self-fashioning and identity-making—toward separation and the lack of clear separations “on the ground.” In a related context, Schoedel remarks that “Ignatius tends to shape the world about him in his own image.”

The question of names and naming is central to the Ignatian enterprise. Near the very beginning of his letter to the Ephesians, in a passage whose significance has been only partly realized in my view, Ignatius writes, “Having received in God your much loved name, which you possess by a just nature according to faith and love in Christ Jesus, our Savior—being imitators of God, enkindled by the blood of God, you accomplished perfectly the task suited to you” (Eph. 1:1; Ignatius, 40). Although this interpretation has been spurned by most commentators and scholars of Ignatius, I would make a cornerstone of my construction a reading of this comment as a reference to the name Christians. It was, after all, in Ignatius’s Antioch that Christian believers were first called by that name (Acts 11:26). Ignatius is complimenting the church in Ephesus as being worthy, indeed, to be called by the name
of Christ owing to their merits.\textsuperscript{51} Indeed, as Schoedel does not fail to point out, in Magnesians 10:1, Ignatius writes, “Therefore let us become his disciples and learn to live according to Christianity [\textit{Christianismos}]. For one who is called by any name other than this, is not of God” (\textit{Ignatius}, 126). Even more to the point, however, is Magnesians 4:1: “It is right, then, not only to be called Christians but to be Christians” (see also Romans 3:2; \textit{Ignatius}, 170). Ignatius tells the Ephesians, then, that they are not just called Christians but are Christians by nature (\textit{φύσει}) as it were.\textsuperscript{52} Ignatius goes on in verse 2 to write, “For hearing that I was put in bonds from Syria for the common name and hope, hoping by your prayer to attain to fighting with beasts in Rome, that by attaining I may be able to be a disciple, you hastened to see me” (\textit{Ignatius}, 40). Once again, the interpretative tradition seems to have missed an attractively specific interpretation of \textit{name} here that links it to the \textit{name} in the previous verse. It is not so much the name of Christ that is referred to here as the name \textit{Christian}, which equals \textit{disciple} (cf. again Acts 11:26: “And the \textit{disciples} were called Christians first in Antioch”).\textsuperscript{53} The “common hope” is Jesus Christ (cf. Eph. 21:1 and Trallians 2:2; \textit{Ignatius}, 95, 140), but the common \textit{name} is \textit{Christian}.

I would suggest that Ignatius represents here the theme of the centrality of martyrdom in establishing the name \textit{Christian} as the legitimate and true name of the disciple; this, in accord with the practice whereby \textit{Christianus sum} (or its Greek equivalent) were the last words of the martyr, the name for which the martyr died.\textsuperscript{54} Similarly in the next passage, Ignatius explicitly connects martyrdom with “the name”: “I do not command you as being someone; for even though I have been bound in the name, I have not yet been perfected in Jesus Christ” (Eph. 3:1; \textit{Ignatius}, 48). The \textit{name} in which Ignatius has been bound (i.e., imprisoned and sent to Rome for martyrdom) is the name \textit{Christianos}.\textsuperscript{55} The nexus between having the right to that name and martyrdom or between martyrdom and identity, and the nexus between them and heresiology, separating Christianity from Judaism, is also clear.\textsuperscript{56} In opening his letters with this declaration, I think, Ignatius is stating one of his major themes for the entire corpus of his writings: the establishment of a new Christian identity, distinguished and distinguishable from Judaism. If this is seen as a highly marked moment in his texts, then one can follow this as a dominant theme throughout his letters, and the protoheresiology of Ignatius is profoundly related to this theme, as well.\textsuperscript{57}

This issue is most directly thematized, however, in Ignatius’s letter to the Magnesians. He exhorts, “Be not deceived by erroneous opinions nor by old fables, which are useless. For if we continue to live until now
according to Judaism, we confess that we have not received grace” (Mag. 8:1; Ignatius, 28).\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ioudaismos} consists, for Ignatius, of erroneous opinions and old fables, but what precisely does he mean? Let us go back to the beginning of the letter. Once more, Ignatius makes a reference to the name: “For having been deemed worthy of a most godly name, in the bonds which I bear I sing the churches” (Mag. 1:1; Ignatius, 104). Here, as Schoedel recognizes, it is almost certain that only the name \textit{Christian} will fit the context. This thought about the name is continued explicitly in Ignatius’s famous, “It is right, then, not only to be called Christians but to be Christians” (Mag. 4:1; Ignatius, 108). On my reading, it is the establishment of that name, giving it definition, “defining, . . . policing, the boundaries that separate the name of one entity [Christianity] from the name of another [Judaism]” that provides one of the two thematic foci for the letter (and the letters) as a whole, the other related one being, of course, the establishment of the bishop as sole authority in a given church.\textsuperscript{59}

Near the end of the letter to the Magnesians, Ignatius writes, “(I write) these things, my beloved, not because I know that some of you are so disposed, but as one less than you I wish to forewarn you” (Mag. 11; Ignatius, 128).\textsuperscript{60} Although Schoedel and others treat this compliment, “not because,” as mere rhetoric—i.e., that some of them \textit{were} so disposed and Ignatius is either being ingratiating or purposefully idealizing, I suggest rather that we take his statement literally, as an indication that Ignatius knows that they are \textit{not} so disposed, that what he is doing is constructing borders, delimiting what will be understood as legitimate Christianity, the proper name, and what will be excluded as Judaism.

As a sort of thought experiment, at any rate, I would like to take seriously the possibility that the “heterodox” ideas anathematized by Ignatius were, indeed, in some important sense \textit{Ioudaismos}, that is, that the believers who held them might well have thought of themselves as, in some important sense, \textit{Ioudaioi}, at the same time, of course, that they were “Christians” (perhaps, for them, \textit{avant la lettre}). The issue joined by Ignatius then is the making of the Christian name as something distinct and different, an opposed place to Judaism, “defining and policing the boundaries that separate the name of one entity from the name of another,” preventing the smuggling of contraband.

\textit{Ioudaismos} so far for Ignatius does not seem to mean what it does in other writers of and before his time, namely, that it signifies “false views and misguided practice” or refers especially to “the ritual requirements of that system.”\textsuperscript{61} Ignatius troubles to let us know that this is not the case, as
we learn from a famous and powerful rhetorical paradox in his letter to the Philadelphians:

But if anyone expounds Judaism to you, do not listen to him; for it is better to hear Christianity from a man who is circumcised than Judaism from a man uncircumcised; both of them, if they do not speak of Jesus Christ, are to me tombstones and graves of the dead on which nothing but the names of men is written. (Phil. 6:1; Ignatius, 200, my emphasis).

After considering various options that have been offered for the interpretation of this surprising passage, Schoedel arrives at what seems to me the most compelling interpretation: “perhaps it was the ‘expounding’ (exegetical expertise) that was the problem and not the ‘Judaism’ (observance).”62 I would go further than Schoedel by making one more seemingly logical exegetical step, to assume that for Ignatius 

Ioudaismos is a matter of expounding, just as Christianismos is. In Ignatius, I suggest, Ioudaismos no longer means observance per se (except insofar as expounding itself is an observance). In other words, for him Judaism and Christianity are two doxas, two theological positions, a wrong one (ετεροδοξία [Mag. 8:1; Ignatius, 118]) and a right one, a wrong interpretation of the legacy of the prophets and a right one.63 The right one is that which is taught by the prophets “inspired by his grace,” and which is called “Christianity” since it is “revealed through Jesus Christ his Son, who is his Word” (8:1). Ignatius’s point may in fact be even more radical, that Ioudaismos is comprised by the study of the prophets, or by any scripture at all. The words quoted certainly seem to mean that Christianismos consists of “speaking of Jesus Christ” — the Gospels still oral of course — while Ioudaismos is concerned with devoting oneself to the study of scripture.64 Although, to be sure, in chapter 9 of Magnesians Ignatius mentions one aspect of practice — the abandonment of the Sabbath for “the Lord’s Day,” assuming that the plausible translation “Lord’s Day” for κυριακή is correct65 — nevertheless Schoedel seems correct in asserting that it was too much attention to the meaning of biblical texts and not practicing of “the Law” that was at issue, that is, a scripturally based Christianity versus an exclusively apostolic faith based only on the disciples’ teaching.66 Ignatius explicitly links those who have not abandoned the Sabbath for the Lord’s Day as those who deny Christ’s death as well (Mag. 9:1; Ignatius, 123), a point that will take on greater significance below.
For Ignatius, seemingly, *Ioudaismos* and *Christianismos* are both versions of what we would call Christianity, since his opponents are those who say, “If I do not find it in the archives, I do not believe (it to be) in the gospel” (Phil. 8:2; *Ignatius*, 207). Ignatius’s antagonists, real or imagined, are not actually what we today would call Jews, since *Gospel* seems to be a relevant concept for them, but were Christians, even uncircumcised ones, who preached some heterodox attachment to Christ, or even merely an insistence that everything in Christianity be anchored in scriptural exegesis, the Old Testament being the scripture they had. They do not put Christ first, and therefore they are preaching *Ioudaismos*, and they are “tombstones.”

What is this *Ioudaismos*, and how does it define *Christianismos*? A closer reading of the passage will help answer this question:

I exhort you to do nothing from partisanship but in accordance with Christ’s teaching. For I heard some say, “If I do not find (it) in the archives, I do not believe (it to be) in the gospel.” And when I said, “It is written,” they answered me, “That is just the question.” But for me the archives are Jesus Christ, the inviolable archives are his cross and death and his resurrection and faith through him—in which, through your prayers, I want to be justified. (Phil. 8:2; *Ignatius*, 207)

The Greek of this passage allows for two translations at a crux. “ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ οὐ πιστεύω” can either be taken, following Schoedel, as “I do not believe (it to be) in the gospel,” or, as Bauer would have it, “[When I do not find it (also) in the Archives], I do not believe it, [when I find] it in the gospel.” Schoedel gives his reasons for adopting his translation:

Ignatius could not have accomplished anything by twisting his opponents’ words that badly (I take it for granted that they regarded themselves as believers in the gospel). . . . Conceivably a group of Christians could have declared rhetorically their unwillingness to believe the gospel unless it was backed up by Scripture simply to make clear the importance of Scripture to them. But then why would Ignatius have replied by saying, “It is written”? And why would they have challenged him on that as if to suggest that the truth of the gospel itself was in doubt? The answer may be that the group was actually made up of Jews closely associated with Christianity but doubtful of its central tenets. But surely
Ignatius has in mind Christians in danger of being attracted to Judaism (cf. Phd. 6.1) — people close enough to other members of the congregation that they almost “deceived” Ignatius (Phd. 11.1). When Ignatius indicates that “repentance” and a turning to the unity of the church is in order for this group (Phd. 8.1), it is likely that they were recognizably Christian.69

The possibility that Schoedel refuses to consider is that Jews who insist that the true Gospel must contain only ideas, histories that can be backed up from scripture, might have been precisely “people close to other members of the congregation,” and even, quel horreur, “recognizably Christian.” The group in Philadelphia to which the future martyr is objecting so strongly would be, on this reading, Christian Jews who insisted that the Gospel contained only scriptural truth, a position that was acceptable to the Philadelphian congregation with whom they were in communion.

Schoedel’s incredulity is generated by his assumption that Jew and Christian are separate identities by the time of Ignatius, an assumption that I would seriously put into question. If we do not make this assumption and recognize that the very content of the probably oral Gospel is under question at this time, then where do those “central tenets of Christianity” come from that these Jews close to Christianity might be said to doubt? That is exactly the question that they put to Ignatius: “they answered me, ‘That is just the question,’” to wit: Who are you, Ignatius, to determine what is or is not Gospel? Ignatius, however, for whom some nonscriptual kerygma is central, sees, as he insists over and over, such reliance on scripture as itself Ioudaismos, the following of Jewish scriptures, and not as Christianismos, the following of Christ’s teaching alone. This opposition between Ignatius and these other Christian Jews has been symbolized by him already as an opposition between those who keep the Sabbath and those who observe only the Lord’s Day. Here Ignatius draws it out further through an epistemological contrast between that which is known from scripture (i.e., Ioudaismos) and that which is known from the very facts of the Lord’s death and resurrection (i.e., χριστομαθία). As we have seen above, for Ignatius, those who observe the Sabbath are implicated as those who also deny the Lord’s death (Mag. 9:1). Schoedel believes that “the link between Judaizing and docetism was invented by Ignatius” and, moreover, “that the form of the polemic compelled Ignatius to look for a serious theological disagreement where none existed.”70

I have argued elsewhere, however, that Jews who held a version of Logos theology, and perhaps might even have seen in Christ the manifestation of
the Logos, might yet have balked at an incarnational Christology, that is, rather than the “low” Christology of which so-called Jewish Christians were usually accused, their Christology might have been, indeed, too “high” for Ignatius’s taste.\textsuperscript{71} What is not found in the “archives,” then, is precisely the notion that the Logos could die! That is exactly what Ignatius himself claims distinguishes the Gospel over against the Old Testament: “the coming of the Savior, our Lord Jesus Christ, his passion and resurrection” (Phil. 9:2; \textit{Ignatius}, 207). This suggests strongly that, if not precisely the same people, it is the same complex of Christian-Jewish ideas — accepting Jesus, accepting the Logos, denying actual physical death and resurrection — which Ignatius names as \textit{ioudaismos}, the product of overvaluing scripture against the claims of the Gospel, which alone must be first and foremost for those would have the name Christian, that name for which Ignatius would die.\textsuperscript{72} This suggestion is also borne out strongly in Magnesians where we find a strong association between those who keep the (Jewish) Sabbath and those who deny Christ’s actual death (Mag. 9:1; \textit{Ignatius}, 123).

In any case, Schoedel has surely advanced our understanding by showing that “it was Ignatius and not they [the heretics] who polarized the situation.”\textsuperscript{73} Ignatius produced his \textit{ioudaismos} (and perhaps his docetic heresy as well) in order to define more fully and articulate the new identity for the disciples as true bearers of the new name, \textit{Christianoi}. Ignatius is, in some important sense, the inventor of Judaism as a religion as part and parcel of his invention of Christianity. Justin, whose cause will be taken up in the next section, adopts and refines Ignatius’s strategy of defining Christian identity over against Jews and heretics, already somewhat more clearly defined in the Christian mind by Justin’s time.

\textbf{Justin makes a difference}

Le Boulluec found that it was Justin Martyr who was a crucial figure (if not the crucial figure) in the Christian shift from understanding \textit{hairesis} as a “party or sect marked by common ideas and aims” to “a party or sect that stands outside established or recognized tradition, a heretical group that propounds false doctrine in the form of a heresy.”\textsuperscript{74} As Le Boulluec put it so pithily, the result of his research is that, “Il revient à Justin d’avoir inventé l’héresie.”\textsuperscript{75} As we see at several points in Justin’s \textit{Dialogue}, Justin is very concerned to portray Trypho as not believing in the second divine person, this in spite of what I think to be the case, namely, that most (or at any rate numerous) non-Christian Jews did see the Logos (or his sister, Sophia) as a
central part of their doctrines about God. I would suggest that an important motivation for this expenditure of discursive energy is precisely to deny the second person to the Jews, to take it away from them, in order that it be the major theological center of Christianity, in order to establish a religious identity for the believers in Christ that would, precisely, mark them off as religiously different from Jews. Since this claim has recently been misunderstood, let me explain it a bit more. I believe that it can be shown (and indeed that I have shown) that well into the Christian era there were many non-Christian Jews (if not most) who found the notion of a deuterous theos, of one name or another, quite theologically compatible with their monotheism and indeed would have interpreted many of Justin’s prooftexts for this concept quite similarly to the way that he did. Through his portrayal, therefore, of Trypho as an implacable opponent of any such notion, Justin is, without of course saying so explicitly, doing two kinds of work. He is, on the one hand, constructing/producing a point of uniqueness of “Christianity” over against “Judaism,” but at the same time delegitimizing certain Christian opponents, rejectors of the notion of second gods, as Judaizers or Jews.

The question that I ask, assuming that Le Boulluec is right, is what precipitated this cataclysmic shift in the notion of identity specifically in Justin’s time and place. Justin’s identity crisis is articulated by him through the medium of Trypho’s challenging: “You do not distinguish yourselves in any way from the Gentiles” (Dialogue 10.3), providing, as it were, the justification, the articulation of the need for the Dialogue as an attempt for the Gentile Christian to so distinguish himself. There is more, however. Justin tells us that he is being accused of dithesism from within the “Christian” world, owing precisely to his Logos theology. The Dialogue, by establishing a binary opposition between the Christian and the Jew over the question of the Logos accomplishes, then, two purposes at once. It articulates Christian identity as theological. Christians are those people who believe in the Logos; Jews cannot, then, believe in the Logos. Secondly, Christians are those people who believe in the Logos; those who do not, are not Christians but heretics. This is the double motion of Christian heresiology that I am seeking to articulate in this study. The double construction of Jews and heretics, or rather, of Judaism and heresy effected through Justin’s Dialogue thus serves to produce a secure religious identity, a self-definition for Christians. It will be seen why for Justin the discourse about Judaism and the discourse about heresy would have been so inextricably intertwined. If Christian identity is theological, then orthodoxy must be at the very center of its articulation. According to Rowan Williams, “orthodoxy” is a way that a “religion,” sepa-
rated from the locativity of ethnic or geocultural self-definition as Christianity was, asks itself: “[H]ow, if at all, is one to identify the ‘centre’ of [our] religious tradition? At what point and why do we start speaking about ‘a’ religion?” For Justin, belief in the Logos is the very touchstone of that center, the very center of his religion. I should not be understood, then, as claiming either that Justin invented “heresy” in order to make a difference between Christianity and Judaism, or that he pursued Jewish difference (via the Dialogue) in order to condemn heretics, but rather that these two projects (in both senses of the word) were imbricated, like tiles of a Mediterranean roof, in such a way as to finally be, if not indistinguishable, impossible without each other.

Justin, of course, was not just reflecting an actually existing situation; he was actively participating on one side of a discursive process, the setting of limits, that brought such situations into existence. There is an interesting moment of inconsistency in Justin’s discourse, a moment of paradox, or at any rate of incongruity within Justin’s text, that may afford us insight into the gap between the reality being constructed by the Dialogue and the social reality that Justin knows:

For even if you yourselves have ever met with some so-called Christians, who yet do not acknowledge . . . [the] resurrection of the dead . . . do not suppose that they are Christians, any more than if one examined the matter rightly he would acknowledge as Jews those who are Sadducees, or similar sects of Genistae, and Meristae, and Galileans, and Hellelians, and Pharisees and Baptists (pray, do not be vexed with me as I say all I think), but (would say) that though called Jews and children of Abraham, and acknowledging God with their lips, as God Himself has cried aloud, yet their heart is far from Him. (*Dialogue* 80.3–4)

The implication of his last sentence, especially without the editorial insertion “would say,” which is not in the Greek, is that Jews who do not deny the resurrection or participate in other “heresies” do, indeed, have their hearts “close to God.” Just as in the Pseudo-Clementine texts, in which there are clearly Jews, identified there as Pharisees, who are deemed close to “orthodox” Christianity, closer indeed than some Christians in their insistence on the resurrection, in this moment in Justin’s text, the lines are not clearly drawn between “Judaism” and “Christianity.” Instead, in at least one isogloss, belief in resurrection, which marked the difference between orthodox
and heretic for the Rabbis and Justin and the Pseudo-Clementines alike, the line is drawn between Jew and Jew and between Christian and Christian, thus marking a site of overlap and ambiguity between the two “religions” that the text is at pains to construct as different.82

The gap which this textual moment uncovers allows us to begin to excavate further, beyond textual relations as such, and begin to assemble fragments of the social realities of which they were a part. It gives us access to the ambiguities of a situation in which the ideal, abstract, and legal borders being constructed by the heresiologists were constantly being transgressed by those who simply did not recognize them or abide by them, those who did not regard them as in any way normative, definitive, and in that sense “real.”

There is at least one more site within the Dialogue in which the new notion of heresy and the issue of Judaism are intimately intertwined. It is certainly suggestive that it is in Justin Martyr that we find for the first time hairesis in the sense of “heresy” attributed to Jewish usage as well:

I will again relate words spoken by Moses, from which we can recognize without any question that He conversed with one different in number from Himself and possessed of reason. Now these are the words: And God said: Behold, Adam has become as one of Us, to know good and evil. Therefore by saying as one of Us He has indicated also number in those that were present together, two at least. For I cannot consider that assertion true which is affirmed by what you call an heretical party among you, and cannot be proved by the teachers of that heresy [Οὗ γὰρ ὅπερ ἡ παρ(WINSTR(base)/base)[μ]ὶλεγομένη ἁίρεσις δογματίζει φάιην ἃν ἐγὼ ἂληθὲς εἶναι, ἢ ἐκείνης διδάσκαλοι ἀποδείξει δύνανται], that He was speaking to angels, or that the human body was the work of angels. (Dialogue 62.2, my emphasis)

Justin quotes Genesis 3:22 to prevent the Jewish teachers’ “distortion” of Genesis 1:26, “let us make,” since in the latter verse it is impossible to interpret that God is speaking to the elements or to himself. In order, however, to demonstrate that his interpretation that God is speaking to the Second Person (the Logos) is the only possible one, Justin has to discard another possible reading that some Jewish teachers, those whom Trypho himself would refer to as a hairesis, have offered but cannot prove, namely, that God was speaking to angels.83 On this text Marcel Simon comments:
However, when this passage, written in the middle of the second century, is compared with the passage in Acts, it seems that the term *hairesis* has undergone in Judaism an evolution identical to, and parallel with, the one it underwent in Christianity. This is no doubt due to the triumph of Pharisaism which, after the catastrophe of 70 C.E., established precise norms of orthodoxy unknown in Israel before that time. Pharisaism had been one heresy among many; now it is identified with authentic Judaism and the term *hairesis*, now given a pejorative sense, designates anything that deviates from the Pharisaic way.84

The text is extremely difficult, and the Williams translation does not seem exact, but it nevertheless periphrastically captures the sense of the passage in my opinion. A more precise translation (although still difficult) would be: “For I cannot consider that assertion true which is affirmed by what you call an *hairesis* among you, or that the teachers of it are able to demonstrate.”85 “It” in the second clause can only refer to *hairesis*, so Williams’s translation is essentially correct although somewhat smoothed out. Justin cannot consider the assertion true, nor can he consider that the teachers of the *hairesis* can prove it. There are two reasons for reading *hairesis* here as “heresy.” First, this is consistent with the usage otherwise well attested in Justin with respect to Christian dissident groups and, therefore, seems to be what Justin means by the term in general; and second, the phrase “what you call” implies strongly a pejorative usage. It seems to me, therefore, that Simon’s interpretation is well founded.

The literary dialogue between Justin and Trypho, a fictional, non-rabbinic Jew, provides us with a way to examine what Justin knew of Judaism and how he knew it, allowing us to interrogate the social formations underlying nascent Gentile Christianity and nascent rabbinic Judaism in a way that gets beyond the efforts to produce differences between them. As Demetrios Trakatellis has concluded, “Justin knew and presented rather accurately some basic aspects of the Judaism of his day” and “[i]t is plausible then to suggest that, when Justin described Trypho within the framework of his Dialogue the way he did, he was reporting a reality related to the theological contacts between Jews and Christians in his time.”86 The Judaism described by Justin as that which “your teachers” promulgate bears many significant parallels to actually attested rabbinic opinions.87 In a recent monograph, David Rokeah argues, however, that there was little, if any, contact between Justin and “actual Jewish”—by which he means Pharisaic or
rabbinic teachers. Rokeah adopts Oskar Skarsaune’s suggestion that much (if not all) of Justin’s knowledge of Jewish practice and lore is dependent on an early Jewish-Christian text, very likely the same one that is embedded in the Pseudo-Clementines.

The evidence for Rokeah’s position seems strong to me, but leads me to a different revision of our understanding of the history of Jewish/Christian interactions in the early centuries. There is no contradiction between Justin knowing a fair amount about early rabbinic Judaism and his major source being the Jewish-Christians in the background of the Pseudo-Clementines. Indeed, this lack of contradiction is precisely the point. Since, as has recently been well argued, the Jewish-Christians who are the source of the Pseudo-Clementine text were indeed very proximate to the early Rabbis and probably in close (and irenic) contact with them, groups such as theirs can be adduced as the medium of contact and the means by which knowledge was transferred between Gentile Christians and rabbinic Jews. For that reason, they were a source of restlessness on the newly invented borders, indeed, perhaps, one important catalyst for the invention of heresy on both sides of that border under construction. They numbered among them the “others” that both sides sought to exclude by naming heretics as heretics. As Albert Baumgarten has argued:

The Pseudo-Clementine texts exhibit detailed and specific knowledge of rabbinic Judaism. Their awareness is not of common-places or of vague generalities which might be based on a shared biblical heritage, but of information uniquely characteristic of the rabbinic world. There can be no doubt that we are dealing with two groups in close proximity that maintained intellectual contact with each other. The authors of the Pseudo-Clementines quite obviously admired rabbinic Jews and their leaders.

The “authors” of the Pseudo-Clementines, then, considered themselves at least fellow travelers of the Rabbis. Justin’s representation of Trypho as a Jew who “took the trouble to read them [the Gospels]” (Dialogue 10.2) and of the Jewish “teachers” as opposing such association (38.1) is very important as providing evidence that there were such Jews and that they may very well have been seen as troubling by other Jews and Jewish leaders. A Pharisaic-law-abiding group that was very knowledgeable in the ways of the Rabbis, but believed in Jesus as Messiah, or was strongly attracted to the Jesus movement, one like the group that produced the Pseudo-Clementines, certainly would
have transgressed the very limits that the heresiologists on both sides were so intent on instituting. Justin’s acceptance of such “Jewish Christians” into communion with “orthodox” Christians (Dialogue 47.1–2) would, if anything, have made them more “dangerous” to the Rabbis, for then the border between that which is “Jewish” and that which is “Christian” becomes impossible to locate. The existence of law-abiding Jewish-Christian groups (so-called “Nazoreans”), such as the circle behind the Pseudo-Clementine literature as possible mediators between rabbinic Jews who were non-Christians and even Gentile Christians such as Justin, provides suggestive evidence that Judaism and Christianity should be conceived as connected dialects of one language and not as separate languages, as it were, to borrow the great linguist Jespersen’s definition of a “language as a dialect with an army,” perhaps, indeed, up until the time of Theodosius. They were the “smugglers” who crossed the lines between Czechoslovakia and Poland that the heresiologist border-guards sought to draw carrying with them the contraband of religious knowledge and ideas.

Making history of theory

“Judaeo-Christianity,” not Jewish Christianity, but the entire multiform cultural system, should be seen as the original cauldron of contentious, dissonant, sometimes friendly, more frequently hostile, fecund religious productivity out of which ultimately precipitated two institutions at the end of late antiquity, orthodox Christianity and rabbinic Judaism. Ignatius’s letters and Justin’s Dialogue can be read as representations and symptoms of broader discursive forces within Judaeo-Christianity, as a synecdoche of the processes of the formation of nascent orthodoxy and nascent heresiology, as well as of the vectors that would finally separate the Christian church from rabbinic Judaism. Seen in this way, the factors that induced the production of the notion of heresy in the second century are strikingly like those that produced “apartheid comparative religion” in the nineteenth. The historical situation of the second century, I would submit, is arguably best revealed when we reread the ancient texts with an eye for notions of hybridity bred in the hothouse of postcolonial theory.
Notes

1 Jacques Derrida, *Glas*, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr., and Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 189b. And it is perhaps worth mentioning that that very border has taken on entirely different meanings since Derrida’s writing, not least because Czechoslovakia no longer exists.


3 See, e.g., Daniel Boyarin, “Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism,” *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 6.4 (1998): 577–627; and Boyarin, *Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), 93–130, where I argue that people attending both synagogue and church in third-century Caesarea were the “smugglers” who transported discourses of martyrology in both directions across the “abstract, legal, and ideal” frontier between Judaism and Christianity. I would add here “Jewish Christian” communities, such as those behind the Pseudo-Clementine texts.


8 This tale was suggested to me for this context by Ishay Rosen-Zvi.

9 A very diligent and instructive recent effort in the former direction is Israel Jacob Yuval, *Two Nations in Your Womb: Perceptions of Jews and Christians*, in Hebrew (Tel-Aviv: Alma/Am Oved, 2000). See, however, Galit Hasan-Rokem, “Narratives in Dialogue: A Folk Literary Perspective on Interreligious Contacts in the Holy Land in Rabbinic Literature of Late Antiquity,” in *Sharing the Sacred: Religious Contacts and Conflicts in the Holy Land First–Fifteenth Centuries* c.e., ed. Guy Stroumsa and Arieh Kopfsy (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben Zvi, 1998), 109–29, for a very different approach, one that focuses less on processes of differentiation as “polemic” and more on shared


14 This point is important for understanding the virulence of the Quartodeciman controversy at this time as well, which, I think, also was largely about establishing a Christianity that is completely separate from Judaism.

15 In the Middle Ages, there was as rich and technical a theological controversy on the nature of godhead among Jews as there had been in late antiquity among Christians, yet it did not issue in a structure of orthodoxy and heresy.

16 An elegant exemplification of the hybridity of hybridity itself can be found in the fact that Rebecca Lyman reads Justin himself under the sign of postcolonial hybridity. J. Rebecca Lyman, “The Politics of Passing: Justin Martyr’s Conversion as a Problem of ‘Hellenization’,” in Conversion in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages: Seeing and Believing, ed. Anthony Grafton and Kenneth Mills (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2003), 36–60. Note especially her remark: ‘Ironically, due to Justin’s and later Irenaeus’ successful polemics about ‘deviant’ teachers, we hesitate to give him as a ‘teacher’ a central place in the construction of orthodox Christian identity.”


19 Palestinian Talmud, Avodah Zarah 1.5.39d.


22 Ibid., 22–23.

23 For the persistence of the “monster” as a modern trope for human hybrids, see Rudyard Kipling and Thomas Carlyle as quoted in Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race (London: Routledge, 1995), 3, 5 respectively.

25 Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 33.

26 Young, *Colonial Desire*, 161.

27 This language has been adopted from the otherwise nearly scurrilous essay, Marjorie Perloff, “Cultural Liminality/Aesthetic Closure? The 'Interstitial Perspective' of Homi Bhabha,” at http://wings.buffalo.edu/epc/authors/perloff/bhabha/html.


29 Young, *Colonial Desire*, 19.

30 For another critique that problematizes the notion of “pure precolonial” selves as projected by certain versions of postcolonial analyses, see Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (London: Routledge, 1998), 181–82. Richard King argues that “Bhabha’s notion of ‘hybridity’ implies that the colonial space involves the interaction of two originally ‘pure’ cultures (the British/European and the native) that are only rendered ambivalent once they are brought into direct contact with each other” (*Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India, and the Mystic East* [London: Routledge, 1999], 204). While I am somewhat doubtful as to whether this critique is properly applied to Bhabha, it does seem relevant to me in considering the postcolonial model for reading Judaism and Christianity in antiquity, which, we might say, are always/already hybridized with respect to each other.


32 This is a point that will be further developed below. I do not enter here into the question as to whether *Christiani* was a derogatory epithet taken by the Christians themselves as an instance of reverse discourse (the view of Harold Mattingly, “The Origin of the Name Christiani,” *Journal of Theological Studies* n.s. 9 [1958]: 26–37, to which view I am inclined) or a name that they named themselves originally (the view of Elias Bickerman, “The Name of the Christians,” *Harvard Theological Review* 42 [1949]: 109–24). Most recently, supporting Mattingly’s position, see Judith Lieu, “‘I Am a Christian’: Martyrdom and the Beginning of ‘Christian’ Identity,” in *Neither Jew Nor Greek? Constructing Christian Identity* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2003). See also Lieu, *Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of the Christians in the Second Century* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), 23–24.


35 See, however, Lee I. Levine, *The Rabbinic Class of Roman Palestine in Late Antiquity* (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1989), not, to be sure, a Marxian work.
37 Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 37.
38 For a more detailed study of “religion” per se as a dispositif, see Boyarin, “The Christian Invention.”
39 The scare quotes are an indication that it was, in fact, a large part of Ignatius’s very project to invent the bishop, and he, himself as one, but that is beyond my scope here.
42 Paul’s two uses of the term Ioudaismos (unique in the New Testament) in Galatians 1:13–14 mean the mores/way of life (αναστροφή) traditional among Jews. It is surely clear that Paul had no sense of a not-yet-coined Christianismos as the name for a new religion, opposed to Judaism as the religion of Israel. For Paul, the relevant opposition is Greek and Jew, of course. As Conzelmann has put it, “The classifying of mankind from the standpoint of salvation history as Jews and Greeks is a Jewish equivalent for the Greek classification ‘Greeks and barbarians.’” Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, ed. George W. MacRae, trans. James W. Leitch, with James W. Dunkly (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 46. We surely do not have here, then, a differentiation of religions.
47 See Boyarin, “Semantic Differences.”
48 See Lieu, Image and Reality, 28, for an exploration of the anxieties brought on by this fuzzy border. This position is partially pace Keith Hopkins, “Christian Number and Its Implications,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 6.2 (1998): 187, who regards such fuzziness (or “porosity” in his language) as particularly characteristic of Christianity. Hopkins’s article is very important and will have to be reckoned with seriously in any future accounts of Judaeo-Christian origins and genealogies. See also Lyman, “Politics of Passing.”
Schoedel, *Ignatius*, 49. Schoedel also explicitly connects Ignatius’s heresiological work with his assertion of the authority of the monarchial bishop as instances of Ignatius’s constructive world-making (12).


Other interpretations seeing Ignatius’s comment as a reference to the name *Ephesus* seem to me quite far-fetched.

For this sense of being “by nature” Christians, see Trallians 1:1 and Schoedel’s discussion, *Ignatius*, 138.


Similarly, it seems to me that in Eph. 7:1 where Ignatius writes, “For some are accustomed with evil deceit to carry about the name, at the same time doing things unworthy of God” (*Ignatius*, 59), it is *not* the name *Christ* that these folks are carrying about (*pace* Schoedel: “that is, they move from place to place looking for converts to their version of Christianity”), but the name *Christian*. See Justin’s remark that, “For I made it clear to you that those who are Christians in name, but in reality are godless and impious heretics, teach in all respects what is blasphemous and godless and foolish.” *Dialogue* 80.3–4, ed. and trans. A. Lukyn Williams, *Justin Martyr: The Dialogue with Trypho* (London: SPCK, 1930); Justin, *Dialogus Cum Tryphone*, ed. Miroslav Marcovich (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997). Further citations of the *Dialogue* are given in the text by chapter and line numbers.

As Lieu remarks, “I Am a Christian,” in *Neither Jew Nor Greek?* 215, “The claiming of this identity involves the denial of other alternatives,” hence the importance of the name, martyrdom, and *Ioudaismos* in Ignatius. If one can be a Jew and a Christian, then Ignatius’s martyrdom would, indeed, be in vain.

Schoedel, *Ignatius*, 12, sees *heresy* and *heterodox* as quasitechnical terms in Ignatius. But cf. *Ignatius*, 147: “But we should note first that in referring to the ‘strange plant’ as ‘heresy’ Ignatius is mainly concerned about the false teachers themselves rather than their teaching. ‘Heresy,’ then, is still basically a matter of people who disrupt unity and create ‘faction.’ ”

See also Barrett, “Jews and Judaizers,” 220–44.


*Ignatius*, 128.

See Schoedel, *Ignatius*, 118, who considers Ignatius’s usage of *Ioudaismos* to be the same as in II Maccabees, Paul, and the pastoral epistles.

Ibid., 202–3.


Schoedel, *Ignatius*, 201.

Ibid., 123 n. 3.
66 Ibid., 123–24: “But Ignatius makes a characteristic move when he links the resurrection with the mystery of Christ’s death and emphasizes the latter as that through which faith comes. For it is Christ’s death that stands out as a ‘mystery’ in Ignatius’s mind (Eph. 19:1). One purpose of Ignatius here is to present the passion and resurrection (not Scripture as misinterpreted by the Jews and Judaizers) as that which determines the shape of Christian existence (and makes sense of Scripture).”

67 For further discussion of this difficult passage, see Schoedel, Ignatius, 207–9; and especially William R. Schoedel, “Ignatius and the Archives,” Harvard Theological Review 71 (1978): 97–106. Oddly enough, these Jewish Christians sound like Sadducees: “the Sadducean group reject [the oral traditions], saying that one should consider as rules [only] those which have been written down, and that it is not necessary to keep the regulations handed down from the ancestors” (Josephus, Antiquities 13.297). See also Birger Pearson, “The Emergence of the Christian Religion,” in The Emergence of the Christian Religion: Essays on Early Christianity (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1997), 11–14; Einar Molland, “The Heretics Combatted by Ignatius of Antioch,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 5 (1954): 1–6; Paulsen and Bauer, Die Briefe, 85–86; and the important argument of C. K. Barrett in “Jews and Judaizers,” in Jews, Greeks, and Christians, ed. Hamerton-Kelly and Scroggs, 233, who argues that Ignatius has heard this preaching, must mean that the persons in question were Christian, even if (in Ignatius’ eyes) unsatisfactory Christians. Ignatius is unlikely to have made his way into the synagogue.”

68 Paulsen and Bauer, Die Briefe, 85.

69 Schoedel, Ignatius, 207.

70 Ibid., 118–19. I disagree with Schoedel’s remark that “Ignatius speaks of Judaism where Paul would more naturally have spoken of the law,” that this contrast is “between grace and Judaism and not, as in Paul, between grace and law.” I think that Ignatius simply does not operate with an opposition between grace and law at all, as we can see from Mag. 2: “because he is subject to the bishop as to the grace of God and to the presbytery as to the law of Jesus Christ.”


72 This interpretation was generated in conversation with my colleague Rebecca Lyman for whose koinonia I am especially grateful. While it must be conceded that Ignatius does not mention Ioudaismos in the letters (Trallians and Smyrneans) where he is most explicit in his attacks on “docetics,” I still find it quite plausible to see the same tendencies at work in these instances, with perhaps a somewhat varying emphasis. In all instances, it does seem to be denial of Christ’s passion that is at work. Similarly in Ephesians, where it is generally conceded that Ignatius combats “docetic” teachers (Schoedel, Ignatius, 59, 231), Ignatius does not name the “heresy” either but merely refers to those “who are accustomed with evil deceit to carry about the name” (7:1), but there, too, he emphasizes positively the reality of the Incarnation, death, and resurrection, “first passible and then impassible [of] Jesus Christ our Lord,” who is, moreover, “God in death.” According to this interpretation we must understand those mentioned in Smyrneans 5:1, “whom the prophecies did not persuade nor the law of Moses, nor indeed until now the gospel” (Ignatius, 230), as meaning that they were
not persuaded to interpret those documents and traditions (for the Gospel is almost surely oral for Ignatius) as proof of the Gospel of incarnational Christology. As Schoedel, himself an adherent of the view that two groups of “heretics” are comprehended in Ignatius, writes:

As we have seen, Ignatius thinks of the appeal to the Scriptures as making sense only if it is recognized that they point forward to Christ and find their fulfillment there. The prophets and Moses gain their significance from the events of the Lord’s ministry (cf. Phd. 5.2; 8.2; 9.2) and the commitment of the martyr (cf. Phd. 5.1; 8.2). Thus arguments that Ignatius had used against Judaizers to subordinate the Scriptures to Christ are used here (in a modified form) against docetists to confirm the reality of the humanity of Christ. (Ignatius, 234)

Given, however, that it seems most plausible (in my view) to see the issue between Ignatius and those who “expound Ιουδαϊσμός” in Magnesians and Philadelphians as also about the death of the Logos, it seems most elegant to assume as well that the same arguments are used with the same goals in mind in both groups of texts, thus supporting the view of Theodor Zahn, Ignatius von Antiochien (Gotha, 1873), 356–99, esp. 370; and J. B. Lightfoot and J. R. Harmer, trans., The Apostolic Fathers, 2nd. ed., rev. Michael W. Holmes (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1989), 359–75. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Ignatius uses precisely the same terms, heterodoxy and grace as the terms of opposition in Mag. 8:1 and Smyr. 6:2. Cf. the awkwardness to which Schoedel is forced: “In any event, his arguments rely most heavily . . . on the nature of the gospel, and he finds it possible to adapt his views on the subject either to those who overemphasize the Scriptures (as in Philadelphia) or to those who teach docetism (as in Smyrna)” (Ignatius, 242). A further possible objection to this interpretation is the fact that Ignatius accuses his opponents at Smyrna of having no concern for “the widow, none for the orphan, none for one distressed, none for one imprisoned etc.” (6:2; Ignatius, 238), a set of objections that would seem hardly to have been directed at Judaizing. However, against this objection we can put Schoedel’s own obviously correct assertion that “[i]t would be naive, however, to think that the bishop was describing the behavior of his opponents accurately. What is true, perhaps, is that they valued their theology highly enough to be unwilling to sacrifice it simply to avoid the threat of disruption to the community” (Ignatius, 240). This would be just as true of alleged Judaizers who deny the physical death and resurrection as of so-called Gnostics. In my view, the interpretation that Ignatius deals with two groups of “heretics,” Jewish Christians who keep the Law and have too low a Christology and “Gnostics” who have too high a Christology, owing to their over-allegiance to pagan philosophies, is a product of the (later) heresiological schema itself, argued for compellingly by Karen King, in Making Heresy, wherein all heresy is either a matter of being too Jewish or not Jewish enough, as it were. The very assertion of the existence of a real entity called “Gnosticism” is, following Michael Allen Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), and the even more far-reaching King, is to buy into the (Justinian, Irenaeus) heresiological ideology itself.
by seeing all of Ignatius’s opponents as essentially one and the same, particularly so if they are being polarized by Ignatius himself, or as seeing it as applicable to both of the cases if the “two heresy” view holds.

74 This lucid summary of Le Boulluec’s thesis is given by David T. Runia, “Philo of Alexandria and the Greek Hairesis-Model,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 53.2 (1999): 118.


77 In recent discussions, my friend and colleague Marc Hirshman disagreed sharply with this assessment, arguing, in effect, that it is too dependent on Le Boulluec’s acceptance of Nautin’s argument that much of Irenaeus’s work includes a copy of a lost work of Justin’s against heresies. Even without the grandiosity of the larger argument, however, I believe that the texts cited and discussed from the *Dialogue* below are sufficient to establish Justin’s great concern for heresy as a negative — and not neutral — category. If he is, as he seems to be, the first author to use *hairesis* in this pejorative sense, then Le Boulluec’s argument stands whether or not we accept Nautin’s reconstruction. I would like to thank Hirshman for providing the critical stimulus to come back to this question.


79 This inconsistency in Justin’s text was pointed out to me by Shamma Boyarin.

80 For the crucial (Platonic) distinction between being called a Jew and being one, see Shaye J. D. Cohen, *The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 60–61. See on this passage Le Boulluec, *La notion d’hérésie*, 71, who considers that “La représentation hérésiologique a cependant besoin de déformer la conception juive des divers courants religieux pour attendre son efficacité entière.” In my view, this is less of a deformation than Le Boulluec would have it.


83 Edwards, “Justin’s Logos,” has made a compelling argument that in the *Dialogue* as much as in the *Apologies*, Justin’s Logos theology is being elaborated, indeed that his Logos theology is a product of the biblical interpretation promulgated in the *Dialogue*. However, since this claim is perhaps controversial (and indeed proved controversial to a recent audience of my work), I will stick here with the more general formula of the Second Person, whether deemed the Logos or not. There can be no doubting then that Justin argues several times with Trypho over the latter’s alleged denial of a Second Person. Since, as I am arguing, Second Person theology was nearly ubiquitous in pre-Christian Judaism and was not uncontested in early Christianity,
my reading strategy is to purport that Justin had a stake in making this be a (if not the) difference that marks off himself (Christian) from his opponent (Jew) and thus the marker of that self-definition, such that any Second-Person–deniers immediately confess, as it were, that they are really Jews and not Christians.


85 I am grateful for Erich Gruen’s and Chava Boyarin’s help with construing this passage in the Dialogue, although neither are responsible for my interpretation of it. Cf. the old translation in The Apostolic Fathers, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1989), 228: “For I would not say that the dogma of that heresy which is said to be among you is true, or that the teachers of it can prove that [God] spoke to angels, or that the human frame was the workmanship of angels.” David T. Runia for his part translates in “‘Where, Tell Me, is the Jew . . . ?: Basil, Philo, and Isidore of Pelusium,” Vigiliae Christianae 46.2 (1992): 178: “For personally I do not think the explanation is true which the so-called sect among you declares, nor are the teachers of that sect able to prove that he spoke to angels or that the human body is the creation of angels.”

86 Demetrios Trakatellis, “Justin Martyr’s Trypho,” Harvard Theological Review 79.1–3 (1986): 287, 297. A recent scholar from the side of rabbinics, Marc Hirshman, however, argues that Justin’s knowledge of rabbinic exegesis is “on the whole unimpressive.” Marc Hirshman, A Rivalry of Genius: Jewish and Christian Biblical Interpretation in Late Antiquity, trans. Batya Stein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 65. My preliminary assessment is that Hirshman’s somewhat skeptical remarks derive in part from an attempt to find in Justin the echoes of what are really later, detailed developments in rabbinic exegesis per se, while Trakatellis is essentially right that the general kind of Judaism that “Trypho” represents (and the voice of Justin himself telling Trypho what “your teachers say” even more so) is not far from what we can imagine as the religious ethos of nascent forms of Judaism close to the Rabbis in the second century.

87 For excellent examples, see Darrell D. Hannah, Michael and Christ: Michael Traditions and Angel Christology in Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 111–12. Note that for our purposes it doesn’t make any difference whether Trypho is a “real” person or one made up; the only significant point is whether the Judaism that he expresses and that, therefore, Justin knows can be shown to be a realistic possibility. See also A. H. Goldfahn, “Justinus Martyr und die Agada,” Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 22 (1873): 49–60, 104–15, 145–53, 193–202, 257–69; and see Hirshman, Rivalry of Genius, 31–42, 55–66. In spite of the recent work on this subject, this is a matter that will repay further research.

88 David Rokeah, Justin Martyr and the Jews (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

89 Oskar Skarsaune, The Proof from Prophecy—A Study in Justin Martyr’s Proof-Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 316–20; Rokeah, Justin Martyr and the Jews, 30. What remains, however, is to consider the question of the dating of that source, its possible connections with rabbinic or associated traditions, and the dating of those traditions. Both Skarsaune who accepts
such connections and Rokeah who rejects them rely on the assumption that material attributed to second-century Rabbis in fifth-century (and even eighth-century!) texts can be dated to the second century (Proof from Prophecy, 319; Justin Martyr and the Jews).

91 Ibid., 46–47.
92 As Williams, ed. and trans., Dialogue with Trypho, 74–75, points out, the Gospel is only represented in rabbinic literature with cacophemisms: e.g., ‘Aven Gilayon (The Scroll of Falsehood) or ‘Awon Gilayon (The Scroll of Sin). The contrast with Trypho’s “admirable and great” is striking, although vitiated somewhat by the fact that Williams is much too credulous in accepting the ascription and therefore the dating of this talmudic notice, which may be much later. One’s confidence in this ascription to early Palestinian sources is certainly not raised by the fact that it seems only to occur in this Babylonian talmudic citation and in a context which shows much Babylonian diction. See also Frédéric Manns, Essais sur le Judéo-Christianisme (Jerusalem: Franciscan Press, 1977), 131. The prohibition on conversation with Christians is not attested in rabbinic texts redacted before the mid-third century (albeit in the name of the early-second-century Rabbi Tarfon, who has even been—temptingly but implausibly—identified with Trypho), and even then, clearly was honored as much in the breach (within Palestinian and even rabbinic circles) as in the observance, pace Leslie W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 40, 45, who at least understands that the Dialogue is indicative of “closer intercourse between Christians and Jews in the first half of the second century than has usually been supposed,” but still imagines that the “rabbis of Jamnia” had sought to “enforce a pattern of Pharisaic orthodoxy which forbade contacts with the Minim, i.e. Christians.” See also Barnard’s crucial point that “[Trypho] warns us against identifying the linguistic frontier between the Greek and Semitic worlds with the cultural frontier between Hellenism and Judaism” (Justin Martyr, 42). All Judaism is, by definition, Hellenistic, precisely under the definition of Hellenism itself as the creative adaptation of Greek to Asiatic (and therefore also, ipso facto, Semitic) cultural forms and societies; see Lee I. Levine, Judaism and Hellenism in Antiquity: Conflict or Confluence (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998). By the time we can speak of anything recognizable as “Judaism” at all, it is, by definition Hellenistic. As Seth Schwartz has remarked, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 25, “When Alexander the Great conquered the east coast of the Mediterranean in 332 B.C.E., he found there a world which was not completely foreign to him, in which certain aspects, at least, of Greek culture already enjoyed widespread acceptance.” For a compelling general argument that binary oppositions between Judaism and Hellenism are a (problematic) scholarly construct, see also Erich S. Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism: The Reinvention of Jewish Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 292. Also Schwartz’s remark, “Hellenization was so pervasive and fundamental that it has little utility as an analytic category” (Imperialism and Jewish Society, 12). I am working here with the same assumption that motivates Schwartz’s work, namely, “that the Israelite religion, as practiced before the destruction of the Kingdom of Judah by the Babylo-
nians in 586 B.C.E., was distinct from the religion practiced by the Israelites’ putative
descendants, the Jews, in the Second Temple period” (19). “Judaism” is, then, entirely
a product of the Second Temple period and, therefore, almost from the beginning an
integral part of the Hellenistic world.

Land in the Talmudic Age (70–640 C.E.), ed. and trans. Gershon Levi (Jerusalem:
Late Antiquity, ed. Levine; F. Stanley Jones, An Ancient Jewish Christian Source on the
History of Christianity: Pseudo-Clementine “Recognitions” I.27–71 (Atlanta: Scholars
Press, 1995). See also James D. G. Dunn, The Partings of the Ways between Chris-
tinity and Judaism and Their Significance for the Character of Christianity (London: SCM

94 I am in full agreement with Joan E. Taylor that the term Jewish Christian is very prob-
lematic and would insist that we conceive of those people who were both Jewish and
Christian, even as late as the fourth century, not as “combining two religions,” but
as representing one form on a continuum of Judaeo-Christian religious identity and
Scholarly Invention,” Vigiliae Christianae 44 (1990): 314–15. All Christian heresiolo-
gists other than Justin himself seem to have immediately realized this “danger.” Just-
tin himself realizes that he is unusual in this respect.

95 Dunn, Partings of the Ways, 5, has also spoken of “first-century reality . . . as a more
or less unbroken spectrum across a wide front from conservative Judaizers at one end
to radical Gentile Christians at the other.” I would emend this statement by substitut-
ing for “conservative Judaizers” non-Christian Jews, thus also answering to Dunn’s
own call for a recognition of “the importance of the continuing Jewish character of
Christianity,” within the very same model; and also I would consider this situation
as obtaining quite a bit after the first century. For the literalness of my Jespersenian
conceit, see Codex Theod. 16.1.2, ed. Theodor Mommsen, Paul Martin Meyer, and
Jacques Sirmond, Theodosiani Libri XVI Cum Constitutionibus Sirmondianis et Leges
2, 833. Cf. Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Anti-
quity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 177.